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Abstract 
Judges are often reluctant to interact with medical ethics when deciding cases with an 
inherently ethical content. They sometimes even transfer decision-making responsibilities to 
medical ethics groups. At times this unwillingness is based on the presumption that medical 
ethics will be able to perform an effective regulatory function. The problem is there is a wide 
range of ethical discourse, both official and unofficial; so much it can cancel itself out. 
Therefore, as a regulatory tool for the medical profession, medical ethics is insufficient for 
the job. Judges, on the other hand, could arbitrate between competing ethical conclusions. 
Indeed, there is a strong argument they should. 
This thesis addresses this timely and complex issue. Judges need to be willing and able to 
rely on the soundness of their own moral convictions to recognise and deal appropriately with 
the inherent ethical content in certain cases. In order to do this, they need a decision-making 
framework that recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making, so as to provide 
judges with confidence in applying moral principles and medical ethics. This thesis will 
provide such an integrated framework. 
ii 
 
 
 
To Pop. Thank you for your sound pieces of advice regarding the thesis itself (“Why take so 
long to say everything?!”), and your encouraging words to me on this long journey (“When 
are you going to get a proper job?!”). I would not be the person I am today if it was not for 
you. And to my family. Thank you for always being there for me. 
  
iii 
 
Acknowledgments 
First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr Stephen Smith, my supervisor. Not only have I 
benefitted from his expert guidance, his clarity of thought and expression, and his infinite 
amounts of patience, but I have also gained a good friend. Thank you for making this 
experience so enjoyable until the last. 
I would also like to thank the examiners of my conversion document, Professor Martin 
Borowski, Universität Heidlberg, and Dr Mary Neal, University of Strathclyde, not just for 
their helpful comments on the conversion document itself, but for their valuable remarks 
about how my thesis might be developed and shaped. Likewise, I would like to thank 
Professor Margaret Somerville and Professor James Childress for allowing me to study under 
their tutelage at McGill University and the University of Virginia. Thank you for expanding 
my horizons, both culturally and ethically, far more than reading any number of books could 
do. 
Finally, I want to thank all my colleagues at Birmingham Law School for making it such a 
wonderful place to study, learn and work. In particular, I wish to thank Dr Gavin Byrne for 
always being willing to discuss ideas that are in development, and that I may not have 
grasped the full import of. Time is always limited, so thank you for sparing much of it for me. 
I would also like to thank Martin George for all his help in developing me as a teacher, and 
for showing me that eventually, land law is a subject that can provide some light relief.
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Table of cases ........................................................................................................................... ix 
Table of legislation .................................................................................................................. xi 
Chapter 1 .................................................................................................................................. 1 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
2. Miola’s analysis in Symbiotic ................................................................................................. 1 
3. Specific case analysis ............................................................................................................. 6 
3.1. Sidaway ...................................................................................................................... 9 
3.1.1. (Protection from) paternalism .......................................................................... 10 
3.1.2. Relation of doctor and patient .......................................................................... 12 
3.1.3. Recognition (and prioritisation) of respect for autonomy ............................... 14 
3.1.4. Misidentification of the nature of arguments: ethical and technical ................ 16 
3.1.5. Overall case conclusion ................................................................................... 20 
3.2. Chester ..................................................................................................................... 21 
3.2.1. Recognition (and prioritisation) of respect for autonomy ............................... 22 
3.2.2. Misidentification of the nature of arguments: principle and policy ................. 30 
3.3. General Conclusion .................................................................................................. 33 
4. Developments since Symbiotic ............................................................................................. 34 
4.1. Case Law .................................................................................................................. 35 
5. How this thesis complements Miola’s work ........................................................................ 43 
6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 46 
v 
 
Chapter 2 ................................................................................................................................ 48 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 48 
2. Charting the history of modest Incorporationism  .............................................................. 55 
2.1. One initial criticism .................................................................................................. 58 
3. Modest Incorporationism’s characterisation of laws, legal norms and moral principles .... 62 
3.1. Peremptoriness ......................................................................................................... 63 
3.2. Provenance conditions .............................................................................................. 66 
3.3. Applicability-conditions ........................................................................................... 70 
3.4. Overall conclusion .................................................................................................... 74 
4. Modest Incorporationism: further problems with Kramer’s own admissions .................... 76 
5. One right distinction? .......................................................................................................... 83 
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 91 
Chapter 3 ................................................................................................................................ 94 
1. Introduction: is law best seen through integrity or justice? ................................................ 94 
2. Understanding integrity through coherence ........................................................................ 98 
2.1. What does coherence require? .................................................................................. 98 
2.1.1. The essentials of coherentism and a conception of coherence itself ............... 98 
2.1.1.1. Element 1: An asymmetrical and linear order of epistemic priority of 
justification versus a holistic, symmetrical and nonlinear relation of 
justification ............................................................................................... 99 
2.1.1.2. Element 2: The conception of the concept of coherence ..................... 99 
vi 
 
2.1.2. Coherence, truth, justification and Dworkin .................................................. 103 
2.2. Integrity understood through coherence: does it fit? .............................................. 105 
2.2.1. Constructive interpretation............................................................................. 107 
2.2.2. Checkerboard solutions .................................................................................. 111 
2.2.3. Associative obligations .................................................................................. 116 
2.2.4. Overall conclusion ......................................................................................... 120 
3. Justice does not work as well as integrity ......................................................................... 120 
3.1. “Equality of respect” .............................................................................................. 122 
3.2. Constructive interpretation ..................................................................................... 124 
3.3. Integrity, justice, and the snail darter ..................................................................... 130 
3.3.1. The snail darter .............................................................................................. 132 
3.3.2. Can law as justice explain the snail darter? ................................................... 134 
3.3.3. Law as integrity and the snail darter .............................................................. 138 
3.3.4. Overall conclusion ......................................................................................... 142 
4. Chapter conclusion ............................................................................................................ 144 
Chapter 4 .............................................................................................................................. 145 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 145 
2. B&C’s common morality position outlined ...................................................................... 150 
3. B&C, foundationalism and coherentism ........................................................................... 155 
3.1. B&C’s tension: coherentism .................................................................................. 156 
3.2. B&C’s tension: traditional and weak foundationalism .......................................... 158 
vii 
 
4. Arguments against foundationalism .................................................................................. 162 
5. Coherentism and the isolation problem ............................................................................. 168 
5.1. Moral beliefs and the isolation problem ................................................................. 170 
5.2. Brian Leiter’s challenge: The “Chocolate Convention”......................................... 172 
5.3. Moral Properties—causally inefficacious? ............................................................ 181 
5.4. Is causal inefficacy therefore a problem? ............................................................... 188 
5.5. The isolation problem and B&C’s writings ........................................................... 191 
6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 193 
Chapter 5 .............................................................................................................................. 195 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 195 
1.1. Conceptualisation ................................................................................................... 195 
1.2. Aims of the current chapter .................................................................................... 196 
2. Supplementary features of Dworkin’s epistemology and why they are beneficial ........... 197 
2.1. Further characteristics of Dworkin’s moral epistemology and why Dworkin 
endorses these characteristics ................................................................................. 198 
3. B&C’s theory is interpretive in nature .............................................................................. 208 
3.1. B&C’s general interpretive commitments .............................................................. 210 
3.2. Respect for autonomy ............................................................................................. 214 
3.3. Criticisms of B&C’s theory .................................................................................... 221 
4. B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way ................................................................... 225 
4.1. The similarities between law and morality on this interpretive account ................ 226 
viii 
 
4.2. Why it is important B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way ........................ 229 
4.3. B&C’s theory of the common morality is based on a constructive interpretation; 
B&C’s four interpretive values secure the norms of the common morality .......... 231 
5. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 244 
Chapter 6 .............................................................................................................................. 246 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 246 
2. From construction to application: Chester ........................................................................ 247 
2.1. The facts ................................................................................................................. 247 
2.2. Application ............................................................................................................. 248 
2.2.1. Ethical application ......................................................................................... 249 
2.2.2. Legal application ............................................................................................ 262 
2.2.2.1. Standards of disclosure ...................................................................... 266 
2.2.2.2. The relationship between the legal standard and medical ethics ....... 284 
2.2.2.3. Causation............................................................................................ 289 
3. Comparative evaluation .................................................................................................... 299 
4. Chapter conclusion ............................................................................................................ 302 
Chapter 7: Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 303 
 
ix 
 
Table of Cases 
United Kingdom 
Al Hamwi v Johnston and Another [2005] EWHC 206 
Atwell v McPartlin [2004] EWHC 829 
Birch v University College Hospitals NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 2237 
Blyth v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1993] 4 Medical Law Reports 151 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 
Bolitho v City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232; [1997] 3 WLR 1151 
Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432 
Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 
Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] 1 AC 32; [2002] UKHL 22 
Gold v Haringey Health Authority [1988] 1 QB 481 
Jones v North West Strategic Health Authority [2010] EWHC 178 
Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1974] 3 ALL ER 757 
M’s Guardian v Lanarkshire Health Board [2010] CSOH 104 
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634 
McAllister v Lewisham and North Southwark Health Authority [1994] 5 Medical Law 
Reports 343 
x 
 
McGhee v National Coal Board [1972] 3 ALL ER 1008; [1973] 1 WLR 1 
Nicholas v Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust [2012] EWHC 591 
Parker v British Airways Board [1982] QB 1004 
Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] PIQR 53 
Pretty v DPP and Home Secretary [2001] UKHL 61 
Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital 
[1985] AC 871 
Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority [1994] 5 Medical  Law Reports 334 
Thorner v Majors [2009] UKHL 18 
Waverley Borough Council v Fletcher [1996] QB 334 
Wyatt v Curtis [2003] EWCA Civ 1779 
 
Other Cases 
Cantebury v Spence (1972) 464 F. 2d 772 
Chappel v Hart [1999] 2 LRC 341 
Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 
Rogers v Whitaker 16 BMLR 148 
Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill (1978) 437 US 153 
White v Turner (1981) 12 DLR (3d) 269 
xi 
 
Table of Legislation 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub L No 93-205 sec 7, 87 Stat 884, 892 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §1536 [1982]). 
The Medical Act 1983 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-190, 83 Stat 852 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq).
1 
 
Chapter 1 
1. Introduction  
The following thesis is concerned with using ideas from the practices of jurisprudence and 
bioethics to solve problems best characterised as falling under the topic of medical law. 
Though many of the discussions this thesis will evaluate have been analysed previously, it 
highlights new questions and areas of investigation, and reinterprets traditional legal and 
ethical frameworks in order to deal with its central research question. 
This chapter will analyse the fundamental issues motivating this thesis. It shall first analyse 
the research undertaken by José Miola. The chapter then provides an analysis of judicial 
approaches in two prominent medical law cases. The chapter then explores the developments 
in case law since Miola’s research, and examines how this thesis builds upon Miola’s work. 
Finally, it contends that judges can take a more proactive role in regards to the resolution of 
the issues in this chapter. This analysis and evaluation will establish a base on which the 
more detailed investigations of this thesis can take place.  
2. Miola’s analysis in Symbiotic 
The thesis takes the work of José Miola as its starting point, in particular his book Medical 
Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship.
1
 Essentially, Miola highlights a three-
element analysis regarding the relationship between medical ethics and medical law. 
The first element is the increase in the capacity of medical ethics guidelines, analysis and 
discussion has had the negative effect of cancelling out these various sources of medical 
ethics. This then leaves ‘a regulatory vacuum’, with the practitioner’s conscience filling the 
void.
2
 This vacuum also stems from the absence of any hierarchy of the various sources of 
                                                          
1
 José Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Hart 2007) (hereafter Symbiotic). 
2
 ibid 1. 
2 
 
medical ethics. Miola highlights three categories of ethical discourse; the formal sector, the 
semi-formal sector and the unofficial sector. The formal sector encompasses the General 
Medical Council (GMC) ‘as it is the sole body with statutory mandate to provide ethical 
advice to the medical profession’;3 the semi-formal sector includes the British Medical 
Association (BMA) and the Royal Colleges; the unofficial sector comprises others involved 
in medical ethical analysis from a range of disciplines such as law, philosophy, religious 
bodies, and pressure groups. Miola thinks this latter sector has had the greatest influence on 
the fragmentation of medical ethics, as it encourages a more analytical-orientated, less 
decisive-orientated approach to guidelines from the formal and semi-formal sectors. Overall, 
this fragmentation means in many scenarios, if a doctor wishes to show that his or her course 
action is ethical it is likely they are going to be able to find many sources that will both 
accept and reject a particular proposition.
4
 This is made worse by the fact that as far as 
judicial decision-making is concerned, ‘there is no method for prioritising or choosing 
between the different categories of discourse’.5  
The second element is on the other side of this relationship, the law and judges exacerbate the 
problem by misunderstanding the nature of medical ethics. This leads to the courts 
encouraging fragmentation, instead of restoring regulatory order.
6
 Judges, even in cases with 
                                                          
3
 ibid 6. See the Medical Act 1983, s35. For more detailed descriptions of the remit of the GMC and BMA, see 
Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 30-31. 
4
 ibid 6-7. 
5
 ibid 6. One the other side of this increasing proliferation and specification, Miola also notes that one problem 
which may have contributed to the ‘medical ethics renaissance’ (ibid 1) is ‘the historical generality of medical 
ethics, ethical principles and codes … medical ethics, has traditionally, as a result, placed much emphasis on the 
“conscience” of the individual medical practitioner to interpret a principle’ (ibid 46-47) (footnote omitted) 
(emphasis added). Therefore, at both ends of the range regarding medical ethics, there is the same outcome (a lot 
of discretion on the part of the individual practitioner) in practice. Indeed, Miola recognises this himself when 
he states that ‘a logical consequence of normative analysis, particularly when designed to address the question 
of generality within ethical commentary, is that of subject specificity… this does not solve the perceived 
problem so much as creating one at the opposite end of the spectrum’ (ibid 47). More importantly, this also 
shows that in both circumstances, be it a medical practitioner or a judge, in relying on their own convictions, a 
question of arriving at their decisions in a responsible, ethically defensible manner is always pertinent.  
6
 ibid 1. 
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an ‘inherently ethical content’7, display a deferential attitude to the medical profession.8 
Indeed, as judges’ ‘awareness of the ethical context to cases appears to 
grow…[p]aradoxically, this can sometimes lead to a lessening of the role given to medical 
ethics’.9 The issue is courts could reverse this fragmentation and maintain control. They 
could send a message to doctors regarding which source of discourse to prioritise, instead of 
inappropriately medicalising such matters. Instead, courts are complicit in this 
fragmentation.
10
 To be sure, it is not always the case judges abrogate responsibility to 
medical ethics because they are scared to engage with medical ethics. Indeed, at times this 
abrogation is based on the presumption “medical ethics” as a concept is able to perform an 
effective regulatory function. This premise is false in the current context.
11
  
Therefore, a problem exists that needs to be recognised and rectified. That problem is not just 
that medical ethics is in an ‘amorphous, fragmented state’12, but more importantly, the courts 
have not recognised this fact and continue to act as if medical ethics is in a suitable regulatory 
state. The courts need to realise and recognise their delegation to medical ethics is not 
effective.
13
 In the absence of a formal body which explicitly contemplates and delivers law 
                                                          
7
 ibid 8. Miola notes that ‘[t]he designation of ethical content is based on three criteria. First … there are what 
may be termed traditional ethical principles involved. Secondly, each issue [that Miola looks at] is the subject of 
traditional ethical guidance from the medical profession, which thus claims an authority over them. Lastly, in 
each case the decisions are not strictly medical in nature in the sense that doctors are not uniquely qualified to 
make them’ (ibid 9). This designation shall be followed here.  
8
 ibid 9. 
9
 ibid 9. This passage is interesting, because if Miola means that the courts are displaying a less deferential 
approach to the medical profession (which seems to be implied given the foregoing analysis) then this does not 
seem like a paradoxical situation at all, but simply the courts taking a more proactive stance in light of more 
sensitive ethical analysis surrounding the case. In addition to this, though Miola highlights this issue at various 
points (see, for example in the context of informed consent, 65, 72, 84-85), he never comments explicitly on 
whether this issue is a bad thing or not. However, it seems to be implied that there may be some negative 
consequences for medical ethics when he notes that ‘if medical ethics are less stringent than the law, the new 
found willingness of the judiciary to recognise and protect ethical principles will make it increasingly redundant 
as a regulatory tool, and the paradox identified should become ever more common’ (Miola, Symbiotic (n) 85). 
10
 ibid 212-213. The issue of whether the law and the courts can do this is discussed at the end of this chapter. 
11
 ibid 214. 
12
 ibid 216 
13
 ibid 216-217. Miola goes on to further note that ‘[a]fter this, there must be a further recognition that the 
discretion given to individual medical practitioners rather than medical ethics is a consequence of the 
fragmentation of discourse’ (ibid 217). 
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reform in conjunction with ethical standards,
14
 one solution is to ensure the courts recognise 
their confidence in medical ethics is misplaced where the ethical guidance does not perform 
an effective regulatory function. It could then provide judges with an appropriate decision-
making framework that recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making and allow 
them to take a less deferential stance based on robust ethical theory. 
The final element of Miola’s analysis is the process by which the fragmentation and failure of 
medical ethics’ regulatory function occurred is problematic. That process is where there are 
‘cultural flaws combining with excessive professional autonomy leading to a fragmentation 
of and a failure in regulation’;15 ‘while medical ethics has progressed through history, the 
doctor-based nature of ethical codes has not changed to any significant degree, and therefore 
the development of medical ethics has tended to reflect changes in the attitudes of medical 
practitioners rather than patients or society as a whole’.16 Furthermore, when this traditional 
model is contrasted with society’s diminishing trust in doctors, a tension is created that 
subsequently needs to be relieved.
17
  
What can be implicitly seen from this outline are calls from consistency in the courts’ 
treatment of medical ethics, in both action and principle. Furthermore, there needs to be a 
greater understanding of the role of “medical ethics” in the broad sense of the term, and the 
                                                          
14
 José Miola, ‘Why I Wrote…Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship’ (2011) 6 (1) 
Clinical Ethics 52, 53-54 (hereafter Why I Wrote). Indeed, this is Miola’s solution; see Symbiotic (n1) 216-219. 
15
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 1. 
16
 ibid 18. See Miola, Symbiotic (n1) chapter 2, “Historical Perspectives of Medical Ethics” for his full 
discussion. 
17
 ibid 37. Contemporary examples Miola attributes to society’s increased distrust in doctors include the events 
in the Bristol Royal Infirmary, and the effect of the trial of Harold Shipman (Margaret Brazier & José Miola, 
‘Bye Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Medical Law Review 85, 100) (hereafter B&M: 
Bye Bye). For Miola’s discussion of the Bristol Inquiry Report, see Symbiotic (n1) 2-5. On the other side, Miola 
also highlights that the recent ‘proliferation of medical ethics has appropriated the subject from the medical 
profession and to a significant extent has alienated doctors’ (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 33). For further discussion 
see Miola, Symbiotic (n1) chapter 3. Miola puts this down as a cultural flaw within the medical profession, since 
doctors themselves start to perceive medical ethics, with its increased academisation, as largely irrelevant to the 
practice of medicine. However, this proliferation in medical ethics was and continues to be justified by past 
events such as the medical experimentations carried out by Nazi doctors, which show the presumption of 
benevolent paternalism on the part of the doctor cannot always be taken for granted (ibid 210; 34).  
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ethical nature of judicial decision-making. This is for many reasons; in order for judges to be 
sensitive to the state of official and unofficial ethical discourse; in order to see whether the 
(particularly formal) ethical guidance is in a position to be able to perform an effective 
regulatory function; in order to clear up the hierarchical issue of ethical discourse so as to 
prevent fragmentation; and to be able to deal appropriately with the legal and ethical issues in 
each case.  
The symbiosis referred to in the title of Miola’s book is borne out when he states:  
The relationship between medical law and medical ethics is clearly a symbiotic one. 
Both organisms must coexist and must rely on the other. We have seen…that medical 
ethics and ethical principles have had to be dealt with by the courts and committees, 
while legal rules have had to be considered by medical ethics. Moreover, the law has 
frequently seen medicalisation and the abrogation of responsibility as a panacea, and 
the latter has therefore had to shoulder this burden, albeit willingly. But can this 
relationship be said to be mutually beneficial? I would have to say no.
18
 
 Notice however Miola, when describing the symbiosis, does not go on to suggest a break in 
the relationship. Therefore, it seems a reasonable inference given his recommendations at the 
end of the book this relationship is salvageable and has the potential for good.  
However, in order to substantiate these claims, a more detailed analysis of certain cases must 
be provided. This analysis will also highlight areas where Miola’s work can be improved. 
Last, this analysis will go towards refining the central research question of this thesis.
19 
                                                          
18
 ibid 209.  
19
 This chapter, due to the constraints of space, shall leave out an analysis of the influence of Bolam v Friern 
Hospital Management Committee ([1957] 1 WLR 582) on the matters discussed in this chapter. For a discussion 
of the influence of Bolam, see Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 10-15. Suffice to say here, though a strong case can be 
made that the test in Bolam was intended to be normative (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 12), the case was not 
subsequently interpreted in this manner. Therefore, what has arisen since Bolam is a perception that if a 
practitioner does bring experts to testify on their behalf, they are honest and prepared to stand by this testimony, 
6 
 
3. Specific case analysis 
In order to substantiate these claims, Miola examines case law surrounding five issues in 
Symbiotic, ‘to give a representative idea of how the courts treat medical ethics’20. This thesis 
shall look at case law involving risk disclosure and informed consent, both in this initial 
chapter and when looking to reinterpret the case law in the sixth chapter. Unfortunately, 
space precludes a consideration of other issues, as well as a detailed consideration of the law 
as it relates to risk disclosure. This chapter shall look in detail at two cases; Sidaway v 
Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
21
 and Chester v Afshar.
22
 Whilst initially this may seem 
like a very limiting analysis, both these important House of Lords’ decisions are at opposite 
ends of the spectrum, not just time wise but in terms of (certain) judges’ deference to the 
medical profession. Therefore, these two cases allow the contrast in judicial attitudes to be 
highlighted in a succinct, yet sharp way. This is not to say the intervening cases Miola 
examines will be neglected. Where necessary, certain intervening cases shall be used to 
further highlight the courts engagement (or lack of) with the ethical issues that arise.
23 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
then the judge will not ask for the defendant nor the expert to justify their practice. The judge will engage in no 
evaluation at all (B&M, Bye Bye (n17) 88). Given the situation regarding ethical matters and the medical 
profession above, this state of affairs is at best less than desirable. Though Bolitho v City & Hackney Health 
Authority has stated that the normative test is to be used ([1998] AC 232; [1997] 3 WLR 1151), it is also the 
case that Bolitho is limited in its impact. See, for example, B&M, Bye Bye (n17) 100-101; 105-107; Miola, 
Symbiotic (n1) 14-15. 
20
 ibid 15. Those are risk disclosure and informed consent, minors’ rights to refuse and to consent to medical 
treatment, sterilisation of people with learning disabilities, issues at the end of life, as well as analysing three 
government-commissioned reports on topics with an ethical element (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 16-17). See, 
respectively, chapters 4-8 of Symbiotic. 
21
[1985] AC 871. 
22
[2004] UKHL 41. 
23
For example, Brazier & Miola highlight the importance of Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust 
([1999] PIQR P53), a case decided in the Court of Appeal subsequently accepted by Chester. They note that 
‘[e]ven the cynic must concede that, whatever the outcome on the facts, the “reasonable doctor” test [regarding 
risk disclosure] received a body blow in Pearce. It survives only if the reasonable doctor understands that he 
must offer the patient what the “reasonable patient” would be likely to need to exercise his right to make 
informed decisions about his care’. (B&M, Bye Bye (n17) 110) (footnote omitted). However, see Maclean’s 
arguments concerning Lord Woolf’s test, in particular that ‘there is no discussion of how far the test clarifies the 
duty [to disclose]’ (Alasdair Maclean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and Beyond: Is the Legal Regulation of Consent 
Any Better Following a Quarter of a Century of Judicial Scrutiny?’ (2012) 20 Medical Law Review 108, 119) 
(hereafter Sidaway to Pearce) at 118-119, and that ‘it seems that the question [as to what constitutes a 
significant risk that must be disclosed] was ultimately decided [in Pearce] by clinical judgment rather than by 
informational needs of the reasonable patient. Lord Woolf’s words provide clearer guidance than those of Lord 
7 
 
At its most basic, ‘[t]he ethical, as opposed to technical medical issue [is] how much 
information a doctor must provide to a patient before her consent can be said to be 
“informed” and therefore valid’.24 Concerning risk disclosure, Miola contends the interaction 
between medical law and medical ethics works well. ‘There, the law recognise[s] the ethical 
component to the case, but set[s] a threshold for doctors that [is] below that demanded by the 
ethical guidance— so a doctor can be acting unethically, but legally’.25 Moreover, ‘this has 
been achieved within the context of formal and semi-formal medical ethics that have, [ ] 
exceptionally… sought to maximise the autonomy of the patient’.26 
Therefore, it might seem counterintuitive to look at this area of law. However, the interaction 
between medical law and ethics was not always complementary. Indeed, by examining more 
conservative judgments, these highlight the need for an ethical component to judicial 
decision-making. Further, as Miola notes, ‘the problem lies not just in how medical law and 
ethics have combined, but in what the perceived model of this ethico-legal relationship has 
the potential to do’.27 This process of cultural flaws, excessive autonomy and fragmentation 
has not been identified and therefore cannot be rectified. Therefore, the effective relationship 
that presents itself in the risk disclosure scenario is fortuitous and the exception to the rule.
28
 
Further, it is not just identifying the process that is relevant, but remedying that process which 
will lead to judges dealing with the inherent ethical issues in cases in a consistent, responsible 
manner.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bridge [in Sidaway] but the implementation of his test simply muddied the waters’ (ibid 121) (footnote omitted) 
at 120-121. Nonetheless, he does note that ‘Pearce followed a number of cases that ultimately redefined the 
judiciary’s approach to the relationship between the standard of and professional practice’ (ibid 117).  See Lord 
Steyn at [16] in Chester for his acceptance of Lord Woolf’s test. However, it must be noted that Chester 
‘concerned causation rather than the standard of care. Since a breach of duty was accepted, any comments were 
obiter and give only limited guidance on how the test will be applied in practice’ (Maclean, Sidaway to Pearce 
(n23) 122). 
24
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 16.  As Maclean notes, ‘[a]ll aspects of consent have been judicially considered, 
including capacity, voluntariness, the duty to disclose, and causation’ (Maclean, Sidaway to Pearce (n23) 109) 
(footnotes omitted). Here, the topics of capacity and voluntariness shall not be considered. 
25
 Miola, Why I wrote (n14) 53. 
26
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 211. 
27
 ibid 209-210 (emphasis in original). 
28
 ibid 210. 
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Related to above is whilst it is to be praised that judges may be ‘promoting patient autonomy 
as fundamental’,29 their view of autonomy may not be ethically sophisticated. If it is not, this 
may indicate that whilst the courts are aware of such ethical issues, those ethical issues may 
not receive much (or as much) sustained analysis as they should do. This point is bound up 
with developments since Miola’s analysis in Symbiotic. It might be thought as ‘this is an area 
in which medical law and medical ethics interact well with each other’,30 this positive trend 
would continue. However, the case of Al Hamwi v Johnston and Another
31
 shows this is not 
so, and the dangers of the court’s view of autonomy are realised.32 Indeed, it is noted that ‘the 
primacy accorded to the principle of autonomy [ ] in Chester…does not accord with the dicta 
of Simon J in the present case’.33 Further, the case of Birch v University College London 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust
34
 highlights ‘[l]ittle attention has ever been given to the 
attendant requirement to disclose alternatives, a facet of the duty which is arguably every bit 
as important in the quest to protect patient autonomy’35 until now. Given these developments, 
it could be contended the positive relationship between medical law and ethics in this area 
has taken a turn for the worse. The courts are inconsistent in their use of different conceptions 
of the concept of respect for autonomy, of which some conceptions are ethically 
unsophisticated. 
Overall, these foregoing points highlight an analysis regarding whether judges recognise the 
ethical nature of judicial decision-making and rely on their convictions to provide an ethically 
robust judgement in the area of informed consent is warranted. Miola’s analysis of Sidaway 
and Chester shall be followed and developed. However, this thesis shall treat themes as 
                                                          
29
 Sara Fovargue & José Miola, ‘One Step forward, Two Steps Back? The GMC, the Common Law and 
“Informed” Consent’ (2010) 36 J Med Ethics 494, 495 (hereafter F&M, One Step Forward). 
30
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 85. 
31
 [2005] EWHC 206. 
32
 F&M, One Step Forward (n29) 496. 
33
 José Miola, ‘Autonomy Rued OK?’ (2006) 14 Medical Law Review 108, 112. 
34
 [2008] EWHC 2237. 
35
 Rob Heywood, ‘Medical Disclosure of Alternative Treatments’ (2009) 68 (1) CLJ 30, 30 (hereafter 
Alternative Treatments). 
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opposed to persons (as Miola does). The selection of themes and their interaction is discussed 
with each case in mind, though there are overlapping themes between both cases. Each theme 
is selected to give a representative illustration of the problems involved when courts take a 
deferential attitude towards the medical profession in cases with an inherently ethical content. 
3.1. Sidaway 
Sidaway is important because the case ‘was the first time that the House of Lords dealt with a 
non-negligence case, and the issue was, in substance if not in form, more concerned with 
ethics than technical medical practice’.36 Succinctly; ‘[t]he plaintiff had suffered paralysis 
due to a small inherent risk materialising following an elective operation to cure back pain. 
She had not been warned of this risk and sued, arguing that she should have been’.37 But ‘the 
House of Lords, however, was to have trouble in reaching a decision, and indeed, in the end 
Sidaway may be best described as messy. The courts could not seem to decide on which 
interpretation of Bolam to use, and some judges wanted to dispense with it altogether’.38 
Thus, the key issue in Sidaway was how to define a risk as material so that the doctor must 
disclose this risk in order for the patients consent to be deemed autonomous and informed.
39
 
The themes that shall be used to analyse the approaches in Sidaway are as follows: the 
misidentification of the nature of arguments; the nature of the relationship between doctor 
and patient; (protection from) paternalism; and recognition (and prioritisation) of the 
principle of respect for autonomy. It is also important to clarify the argument in two respects. 
First, many of the Law Lords’ arguments do not fit exclusively within one theme, but instead 
overlap with others. Second, though one of the section’s main aims is to analyse the 
                                                          
36
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 55. However, it must also be noted ‘their lordships confirmed that negligence, rather 
than trespass was the appropriate vehicle for regulating the duty to disclose information regarding risks’ 
(Maclean, Sidaway to Pearce (n23) 112). See specifically, Lord Diplock (n21) at 892-895, Lord Bridge at 900 
(with whom Lord Keith concurred). See also Chatterton v Gerson [1981] QB 432. 
37
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 16. See Lord Scarman’s judgement (n21) at 877-882 for the detailed facts of the case. 
38
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 16. 
39
 ibid 57. However, eventually all five Law Lords dismissed Mrs Sidaway’s claim. 
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sophistication with which judges treat the ethical issues and medical ethics, there shall not be 
a theme of “ethical sophistication”. The analysis undertaken under the themes identified will 
go towards showing the ethical sophistication of the particular judgements. 
3.1.1. (Protection from) paternalism 
Sidaway was concerned in substance with an ethical matter. Therefore, it would be beneficial 
if the courts were to identify the real, ethical nature of the issues and their arguments. 
However, once it was decided (incorrectly) to resolve the ethical issue in Sidaway by 
deference to clinical judgment, the judgments have a much more paternalistic tone. This is 
the nature of the test in practice.
40
 The problem here is not paternalism as a concept itself. In 
some circumstances, some forms of paternalism may be justified.
41
 The issue is advocating 
paternalism without reference to any ethical principles, the judgements in Sidaway leave open 
the possibility patients may not be protected from the excesses of unjustified medical 
paternalism.
42
 Therefore, these passages highlight the need for a decision-making framework 
that not only identifies the ethical nature of judicial decision making, but also allows judges 
to come to an ethically sophisticated conclusion.  
For example, in Lord Diplock’s judgement ‘there are several instances…where he came close 
to openly sanctioning such paternalism’.43 He notes:  
Inevitably all treatment, medical or surgical, involves some degree of risk that the 
patient’s condition will be worse rather than better for undergoing it…All these are 
matters which the doctor will have taken into consideration in determining, in the 
exercise of his professional skill and judgement, that it is in the patient’s interest that 
                                                          
40
 See Beauchamp and Childress’s (hereafter B&C’s) discussion of the professional practice standard in Tom L 
Beauchamp & James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7
th
 edn, OUP 2013) 126 (hereafter PBE), and 
in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
41
 See, for example, B&C’s discussion of paternalism in PBE (n40) at 214-226. 
42
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 58. 
43
 ibid. 
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he should take the risk involved and undergo the treatment recommended by the 
doctor.
44
 
The deference to the medical profession (and its ethics
45
) and the clearly paternalistic tone is 
highlighted in the italicised portion above. Further, as there is no engagement with medical 
ethics or ethical principles in Lord Diplock’s judgment, it looks more like he is simply 
asserting this paternalistic stance is the ethically correct one to take, as opposed to basing this 
on any ethical framework or sound convictions. 
Additionally, Lord Templeman believed the principle of respect for autonomy was 
adequately protected by the right of the patient to ask questions which must be fully and 
truthfully answered. Though seemingly a welcome approach, Miola notes ‘this approach 
somewhat eroded any notion that the principle of self-determination was being prioritised’.46 
This is because Templeman further notes: 
I do not subscribe to the theory that the patient is entitled to know everything…An 
obligation to give a patient all the information available to the doctor would often be 
inconsistent with the doctor’s contractual obligation to have regard to the patient’s 
best interests. Some information might confuse, other information might alarm a 
particular patient.
47
   
Again, this position is based on ethically unsophisticated arguments. How is the patient able 
to exercise a right to judge whether to undergo treatment, if the doctor is to gauge how much 
information to tell the patient on the basis of her medical experience and training? Although 
                                                          
44
 (n21) at 890-891 (emphasis added). 
45
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 59. 
46
 ibid 61. 
47
 (n21) at 904. As Miola points out this is ‘the only passing reference to medical ethics as a concept or construct 
as opposed to the ethical principle of self-determination in any of the judgments’ (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 65). 
This is worthwhile noting because it substantiates Miola’s claim that judges are not in fact scared to abrogate 
decision-making responsibility to medical ethics, even though in this case, a degree of oversight was maintained 
(ibid). 
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the patient has the ultimate decision, this is curtailed in substance. The ultimate objective is to 
ensure the patient undergoes the procedure, as the doctor has deemed this in the patient’s best 
interest.
48 
To compound these issues, subsequent developments in case law have ensured the principle 
of respect for autonomy has not been prioritised. As seen in Blyth v Bloomsbury Health 
Authority
49
 and Gold v Haringey Health Authority
50
 patient choices were again subject to 
what the doctor thought was best for them.
51
 Indeed, it is noted by Miola ‘[i]n both cases the 
court not only refused to recognise the ethical content, but also moved further away from the 
principle of autonomy than even Lord Diplock in Sidaway.’52  
3.1.2. Relation of doctor and patient 
Bound up with above, it is apparent Lords Diplock, Templeman, Bridge (and implicitly Lord 
Keith’s) focus in the doctor-patient relationship was on the conduct and actions of the doctor. 
The upshot is there is a consequent lack of focus upon the patient, the principle of respect for 
autonomy and the patient’s right to information in the informed decision-making scenario.53 
Therefore, this view of the doctor-patient relationship is ‘overly simplistic’54, and there is no 
                                                          
48
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 61. Indeed, this analysis is pertinent to both Lord Diplock’s comment that if the patient 
was to question the doctor ‘[n]o doubt … the doctor would tell him whatever it was the patient wanted to know’ 
((n21) at 895), as well as Lord Bridge’s comment ‘that, when questioned specifically by a patient of apparently 
sound mind about risks involved … the doctor’s duty must, in my opinion be to answer both truthfully and fully 
as the questioner requires’ (ibid at 898). 
49
 [1993] Med LR 151. Blyth was decided in 1987 but subsequently not reported until 1993. 
50
 [1987] 2 All ER 888. 
51
 B&M, Bye Bye (n17) 91. 
52
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 65. See, for example, Neill LJ’s discussion of Sidaway in Blyth at 160, and Kerr LJ’s 
discussion of Sidaway at 157, which is complementary to that of Neill LJ’s position. See also Lloyd LJ’s 
discussion of Sidaway in Gold at 489-90, which also defines (incorrectly) the provision of information as a 
different sort of technical medical skill (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 68). 
53
 F& M, One Step Forward (n29) 495. 
54
 Maclean, From Sidaway to Pearce (n23) 111. 
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ethical sophistication to their Lordship’s positions. They may have been ‘too readily 
convinced by arguments that enhancing patient autonomy may damage patients’ health’.55 
Examples of this can be seen in the following. Lord Bridge states the intention in the risk 
disclosure scenario is ‘how best to communicate to the patient the significant factors 
necessary to enable the patient to make an informed decision whether to undergo the 
treatment’.56 However, in some circumstances, in order to achieve this aim, the doctor ‘may 
take the view, certainly with some patients, that the very fact of his volunteering, without 
being asked information of some remote risk in the treatment proposed…may lead to that risk 
assuming an undue significance in the patients calculations’.57 This position is ethically 
unsophisticated. It focuses not on ‘co-operative decision making’58, but on a unilateral 
practice, with the doctor determining what is best. Furthermore, the idea certain risks will be 
unduly significant, albeit remote, cannot be as easily analysed from the doctor’s perspective 
as Lord Bridge’s passage suggests. Indeed, B&C note ‘[a]n individual’s perception of risks 
may differ from an expert’s assessment. Variations may reflect not only different goals and 
“risk budgets” but also different qualitative assessment of particular risks, including whether 
the risks in question are voluntary, controllable, highly salient, novel, or dreaded’.59 
Therefore, there needs to be a more nuanced consideration than suggested by Lord Bridge.
60
 
Further, like Lords Diplock
61
 and Bridge, it is clear Templeman takes the view of the doctor-
                                                          
55
 Margaret Brazier ‘Patient Autonomy and Consent to Treatment: The Role of the Law?’ (1987) 7 Legal 
Studies 169, 170 (hereafter Autonomy and Consent). 
56
 (n21) at 899. 
57
 (n21) at 899 (emphasis added). 
58
 Maclean, Sidaway to Pearce (n23) 116. 
59
 B&C, PBE (n40) 235 (footnote omitted). See generally B&C, PBE (n40) 232-237. 
60
 However, Lord Bridge does highlight that ‘[i]n so far as it is possible and appropriate to measure such risks in 
percentage terms[,] some of the expert medical witnesses called expressed a marked and understandable 
reluctance to do so’ ((n21) at 900-901). 
61
 It is clear that Lord Diplock views the relationship of patient and doctor as unilateral. Though Lord Diplock 
does note that the present issue was one of ‘how to conduct a bilateral discussion with the patient’ he goes on to 
immediately after to say that this “bilateral discussion” is one to be done ‘in terms best calculated not to scare 
[the patient] off from undergoing an operation which, in the exercise of the paramount duty of care … [the 
doctor] is satisfied that it is in [their] interests to undergo despite such risks as may be entailed ((n21) at 891). It 
is clear, therefore, that the reference to a “bilateral discussion” is more in form than any actual substantive 
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patient relationship as unilateral in nature, given he explicitly highlights the dangers of 
providing too much information to the patient.
62
 This analysis therefore reinforces Brazier’s 
point that those Lordships in the majority assumed patients do not want comprehensive 
information concerning treatment proposals.
63
  
3.1.3. Recognition (and prioritisation) of respect for autonomy 
This theme is important because whilst all of the judges in Sidaway identified the ethical 
principle of respect for autonomy,
64
 this is not necessarily enough to lead to an ethically 
sophisticated argument. This recognition needs to be implemented.
65
 As seen in Lord 
Scarman’s judgment, this leads to a more ethically sophisticated discussion, with explicit 
ethical arguments against the professional practice standard, resulting in a better overall 
judgment. ‘For Lord Scarman…the key principle was the right to self-determination of 
patients, with everything else flowing from that…For his Lordship, the principle of autonomy 
should be given primacy over medical opinion regarding what was best for the patient’.66 
Lord Scarman states: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
endorsement. See also how Lord Diplock notes ‘[t]he only effect that mention of risks can have on the patient’s 
mind, if it has any at all, can be in the direction of deterring the patient from undergoing the treatment which in 
the expert opinion of the doctor it is in the patients best interest to undergo ((n21) at 895) (emphasis added). 
62
 F&M, One Step Forward (n29) 495. This can be seen (in addition to the quote accompanying footnote 47) 
when he notes that ‘[a] patient may also make an unbalanced judgement if he is provided with too much 
information and is made aware of possibilities which he is not capable of assessing because of his lack of 
medical training, his prejudices or his personality. Thus the provision of too much information may prejudice 
the attainment of the objective of restoring the patient’s health’ ((n21) at 904). 
63
 Brazier, Autonomy and Consent (n55) 186. Professor Brazier identifies this as one of the courts ‘three basic 
assumptions. That is, ‘[t]he proposition that patients in general do not want comprehensive information on 
treatment proposals, and may react capriciously to such information’. Brazier goes on to note that this 
assumption ‘is not founded on any hard evidence. Indeed … what evidence there is from the USA [at the time of 
the article] to the contrary’ (Brazier, Autonomy and Consent (n55) 186). For this evidence to the contrary, see 
ibid 174-175. What is also interesting in Lord Templeman’s judgement is that he states ‘[i]f the doctor making a 
balanced judgement advises the patient to submit to the operation, the patient is entitled to reject that advice for 
reasons which are rational, irrational, or for no reason’ ((n21) at 904). This links into Beauchamp and 
Childress’s analysis of risk perception, as highlighted when analysing Lord Bridge’s judgement earlier. 
64
 Even including Lord Diplock; see (n21) at 895. For Lord Bridge, see ibid at 897. For Lord Templeman see 
ibid at 903. 
65
 Though it will be shown when analysing Chester that even the prioritisation of the principle of respect for 
autonomy may be done in an ethically unsophisticated manner. 
66
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 62 (emphasis in original). 
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If…the failure to warn a patient of the risks inherent in the operation which is 
recommended does constitute a failure to respect the patients right to make his own 
decision, I can see no reason in principle why, if the risk materialises and injury or 
damage is caused, the law should not recognise and enforce a right in the patient to 
compensation.
67 
Here Lord Scarman promotes the ethical principle of respect for autonomy, whilst warning 
against a too deferential approach to the medical profession. It is his recognition of the ethical 
principle that allows him to separate out diagnosis and treatment as primarily clinical matters 
from the ethical matter of risk disclosure.
68
 Because of this recognition, Lord Scarman goes 
on to state that: 
Ideally, the court should ask itself whether in the particular circumstances the risk was 
such that this particular patient would think it significant if he was told it existed. I 
would think that, as a matter of ethics, this is the test of the doctor’s duty. The law, 
however, operates not in Utopia but in the world as it is: and such an inquiry would 
prove in practice to be frustrated by the subjectivity of its aim and purpose.
69
  
Nonetheless, because of this distinction, Lord Scarman further states ‘[t]he law, however, can 
do the next best thing, and require the court to answer the question, what would a reasonably 
prudent patient think significant of in the situation of this patient’.70 Thus, Lord Scarman’s 
approach advocates the doctrine of informed consent. Importantly, Lord Scarman’s 
discussion of the ethical principles underlying the doctrine of informed consent,
71
 coupled 
with his warnings against medical deference in light of Bolam, make the arguments ethically 
                                                          
67
 (n21) at 884-885. Lord Scarman further notes ‘[i]f it be recognised that a doctor’s duty of care extends not 
only to the health and well-being of his patient but also to a proper respect of his patient’s rights, the duty to 
warn can be seen to be part of the doctor’s duty of care’ (ibid at 885). 
68
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 63. 
69
 (n21) at 888. 
70
 ibid. 
71
 ibid at 882. 
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sophisticated. There is a considered discussion of whether the patient’s autonomy should be 
prioritised over the principle of benevolent paternalism.
72
 There is also a discussion of the 
moral status of the informed consent test, and a discussion of the values the law should 
promote and be seen through.
73
 Therefore, the judgement is the polar opposite of Lord 
Diplock’s, and is ethically more considered, responsible and defensible. For this it is to be 
welcomed.
74
 
3.1.4. Misidentification of the nature of arguments: ethical and technical 
The negative implications of some of the Law Lord’s approaches in Sidaway have been 
highlighted. These include some of the judgements taking on an ethically unsophisticated 
paternalistic tone, and in focusing on the conduct and actions of the doctor in the doctor-
patient relationship, providing an ethically crude analysis of this relationship in practice. 
Further, whilst the principle of respect for autonomy is identified by all the Law Lords, the 
majority do not go on to implement this principle. Therefore, a more significant issue 
emerges. All of the foregoing issues stem from the lack of understanding and 
misidentification that the pertinent issues in Sidaway are ethical, and not technically medical 
in nature. Many of these negative implications stem from the willingness of the Law Lords to 
defer decision-making responsibility to the medical profession, on the basis of an incorrect 
characterisation of the issues in practice. Further, the issue is not simply there is an ethically 
unsophisticated analysis by the Law Lords, with then a failure at the end of their decision to 
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 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 63. 
73
 As Miola notes ‘[t]he law’s role would thus be to prioritise the autonomy of patients. In effect, his Lordship 
began with the premiss that the principle of self-determination was paramount and then asked how the law could 
best protect it’ (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 63). 
74
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 63. But this makes it all the more perplexing that in Maynard v West Midlands 
Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634, Lord Scarman was willing to be so deferential to medical 
authority, whereas he was to deliver such an ethically sensitive judgement a mere year later. However, these two 
cases might be distinguished on the bases that Sidaway concerned the provision of information, whereas 
Maynard concerned treatment and diagnosis. Again, whilst this is only a single instance and is subject to the 
foregoing counter-point of the distinction between the facts of the two cases, it does suggest that there is not a 
consistent application of a judicial decision-making framework that provides confidence to judges in relying on 
their convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics. This, in itself, is problematic. 
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fully consider the implications of their reasoning. It is this lack of understanding is pervasive 
throughout the entire judgement of many of the Law Lords’ decisions in Sidaway.  
Indeed, in Sidaway, as pointed out immediately above, there were two key points at which the 
Law Lords were to misidentify the nature of their judgements. The first was in initially 
outlining the nature of the matter before them as one of clinical practice or not.
75
 The second 
was in misidentifying the nature of their further arguments throughout the remainder of their 
decision, for example in rejecting alternative tests or elaborating upon their initial position. 
Both these matters interlink with one another. Arguably the more important misidentification 
is at the initial stage of whether the matter is clinical or ethical in nature. Therefore, it shall 
suffice to concentrate on the former, as the consequences of both instances of 
misidentification are the same.
76
  
In not identifying the real nature of their arguments even though it is apparent their 
judgements rely on moral claims, this means it is difficult to analyse the judge’s ethical 
reasoning (if there is any) and the basis for the judge’s ethical (and possibly legal) claims 
becomes unclear. Second, whilst doctors may have expertise in matters of technical medical 
skill, it is not necessarily the case they have expertise in matters of morality and ethics. 
                                                          
75
 This issue is similar to what Brazier and Miola term ‘Bolamisation’; whereby ‘the case is taken outside its 
proper limits’ (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 13). Brazier and Miola in Bye Bye (n17) divide the actions of the courts 
into the categories of ‘overt Bolamisation, covert Bolamisation and the widening of Bolam’s sphere of 
influence’ (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 13) (emphasis in original). See Miola, Symbiotic (n1) chapters 6&7 for 
discussion of these two latter issues. See also, in general B&M, Bye Bye (n17) 90-95. 
76
 For examples of the misidentification of the nature of their further arguments, See Lord Bridge recognising 
‘the logical force of the Canterbury doctrine, proceeding from the premise that the patients right to make his 
own decision must at all costs be safeguarded against the kind of medical paternalism which assumed that 
“doctor knows best”’ (ibid at 899, relying on Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 F. 2d 772). It can be argued Lord 
Bridge is not recognising the logical force of the doctrine at all, but in fact the ethical force of the doctrine of 
informed consent. In recognising that a valid ethical principle underpins the status or attractiveness of this legal 
test, it seems what Lord Bridge is commenting on here is the moral status of this fact, with the test itself bound 
up with the arguments concerning its moral status (Stephen Guest, ‘How to Criticise Ronald Dworkin’s Theory 
of Law’ (2009) 69 (2) Analysis 1 
<http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctlsfd/papers/how_to_criticize_ronald_dworkins_theory_of_law.pdf> 4 
(online) accessed 27
th
 June 2014 (hereafter How to Criticise)). See also how Lord Bridge then goes on to reject 
this doctrine as ‘the doctrine as quite impractical in application for three principal reasons’ ((n21) at 899). Again 
here, Lord Bridge misinterprets the nature of his arguments, as the reasons he puts forward for rejecting the 
practicality of the test are ethical in substance. 
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Therefore, incorrectly characterising an ethical decision as clinical in nature, decision-making 
responsibility is deferred to professionals who may not be appropriately qualified to make 
these sorts of decisions.
77
 Third, this incorrect characterisation means that courts end up 
unintentionally delegating decision-making responsibility not to technical professional 
practice, but to medical ethics.
78
 As we have seen above, this means ‘delegated issues are 
often being abrogated to the personal morality of individual medical practitioners’.79 
Cumulatively, all of this, and the fact itself the courts are misidentifying the nature of their 
arguments points in favour of a change to a decision-making framework that not only 
recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making but facilitates an ethically 
responsible decision. It might also be thought these consequences would encourage judges to 
be explicit in identifying the nature of their arguments. However, this is not so. 
The following passages show the initial misidentification of the nature of the arguments. In 
stating the question before him was ‘a naked question of legal principle’80, Lord Diplock 
refuses to recognise any ethical content in the case and therefore subsequently deal with it.
81
 
‘[O]nce risk disclosure was perceived as just another area of medical practice, the law 
effectively lost any of the powers of oversight that it may have had’.82 Lord Bridge and Lord 
Templeman were also to hold that Bolam did apply. However, this was with the proviso that 
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 Ian Kennedy, The Unmasking of Medicine: A Searching Look at Healthcare Today (rev edn, Paladain Books, 
Granada 1983) 83; Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 13.  
78
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 13. 
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 ibid 216. 
80
 (n21) at 892. 
81
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 57. 
82
 ibid 58. Indeed, Lord Diplock notes that ‘[w]hat we do know, and this is in my view determinative of this 
appeal, is that all the expert witnesses specialising in neurology … agreed that there was a responsible body of 
medical opinion which would have undertaken the operation at the time the neuro-surgeon did and would have 
warned the patient of the risk involved in the operation in substantially the same terms’ ((n21) at 892) (emphasis 
added). Further, he notes that ‘[m]y Lords, no convincing reason has been in my view advanced before your 
Lordships that would justify treating the Bolam test as doing anything less than laying down a principle of 
English law that is comprehensive and applicable to every aspect of the duty of care owed by a doctor to his 
patient’ ((n21) at 893). But it might be pertinent to ask here, given that Lord Scarman was willing to find that 
the key ethical principle underpinning the case was that of respect for autonomy, could Diplock himself not 
have identified this principle? Again, in light of this, the judgement begins to look even less ethically 
sophisticated. 
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in some circumstances the courts would be able to decide on the standard of care and 
therefore declare the professional practice unreasonable, and thus negligent.
83
 Lord Bridge 
goes on to ask whether ‘the patient’s right to decide…is sufficiently safeguarded by the 
application of the Bolam test without qualification’.84 In stating ‘that a decision what degree 
of disclosure of risks is best calculated to assist a particular patient… must primarily be a 
matter of clinical judgement’,85 Lord Bridge decides to disregard the separation of ethical and 
technical issues, despite identifying the ethical principle of respect for autonomy throughout 
his judgement, and despite the separation being needed most at this point. However, Lord 
Bridge did state he was ‘of opinion that the judge might in certain circumstances come to the 
conclusion that the disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed 
choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make 
it’.86 Therefore, although the issue was primarily a clinical one for Lord Bridge, his approach 
(reluctantly) ensured that the courts could still be the ultimate arbiters.
87
 As Miola notes, 
‘Lord Templeman adopted a similar approach with respect to the use of Bolam…However, he 
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 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 59. Given that Lord Keith concurred with Lord Bridge’s judgement, these three judges 
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framed his argument differently: the responsibility to ask questions and become better 
informed would rest with patients’.88 Thus, although they interpreted Bolam in the manner 
that Bolitho did, holding that the test was normative in character, they still saw the issue of 
risk disclosure as primarily a clinical matter.
89
 
In contrast, Lord Scarman goes on to explicitly recognise the ethical nature of the arguments 
as concerning the principle of respect for autonomy. Having recognised and placed this 
ethical principle at the centre of his decision making, this enabled him to then interpret 
existing case law so as to provide a more proactive stance for the courts. Indeed, he goes on 
to critique Bolam on the basis it is incompatible with the right of patients to have their 
decisions be respected.
90 
3.1.5. Overall case conclusion 
Initially it might seem a good thing that all the judges identified the ethical principle of 
respect for autonomy, and to a greater or lesser extent this principle influenced each of the 
judgements in the case.
91
 However, it is less pleasing to note that if Lord Diplock is included, 
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four Law Lords accepted a test based on professional practice,
92
 despite this being an ethical 
issue. Furthermore, this also means their Lordships’ view of the doctor-patient relationship is 
unilateral in nature. This is the best way to see the judgement they are giving, despite that it 
might be an inadvertent consequence of their decision (though in some circumstances, it 
seems deliberate). It also means it is less likely patients will be protected from the excesses of 
unjustified medical paternalism. Lord Scarman’s decision is the most ethically robust, whilst 
both Lord Bridge and Lord Templeman do not recognise the extent to which their discussions 
rely on ethical claims. Finally, ‘the identification of an ethical context to a case by judges 
does not necessarily mean medical ethics are engaged with’.93 Thus these conclusions 
highlight the need for a decision-making framework that not just recognises, but facilitates 
ethical analysis by judges and provides confidence to rely on their convictions in applying 
moral principles and medical ethics. 
This chapter shall now explore Chester. Again, this case is important to examine as it came 
some twenty years after Sidaway. Therefore, it is an appropriate case to analyse the changes 
in judicial awareness of the ethical nature of the case before them, and judicial deference 
towards the medical profession. Although there is a greater discussion of the ethical 
principles underpinning the case, various points throughout the judgement demonstrate the 
need for a judicial decision-making framework that not only recognises the ethical nature of 
judicial decision making, but enables judges to deal with the ethical principles in the case in a 
responsible, confident manner. 
3.2. Chester 
Two positions have emerged in the previous case law; one approach which is sensitive to the 
ethical principles underlying these cases, and another that abrogates responsibility over 
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technically ethical issues to the medical profession. What is important about Chester is the 
ethically sensitive approach advocated by Pearce was chosen by the House. Indeed, Chester 
goes even further.
94
 In the case Ms Chester suffered nerve damage as a result of undergoing 
surgery to remove three spinal discs which had degenerated. Although she consented to 
surgery, she was not warned of this risk, which the parties agreed should have been given. 
What makes the case interesting is Ms Chester admitted had she been informed of the risk, it 
could not be said with certainty she would not have consented to the operation at all. Thus, 
the issue was one of causation; as it currently stood, Ms Chester would fail the test for 
causation as she could not demonstrate the breach of duty caused the harm. The question put 
before the House of Lords was whether it would be possible to relax the rules of causation. It 
was decided, by a bare majority, it was possible to relax these rules.
95
 Again, the decisions 
shall be analysed through the use of themes. The themes of the misidentification of the nature 
of arguments and recognition (and prioritisation) of the principle of respect for autonomy 
shall be used again. However, each theme here deals with arguments slightly different in 
nature to the issues in Sidaway. 
3.2.1. Recognition (and prioritisation) of respect for autonomy 
Like Sidaway, each Law Lord identified the principle of respect for autonomy. But, this did 
not necessarily lead to an ethically sophisticated argument. Also, when prioritising the 
principle of respect for autonomy and relying on different sources of medical ethics 
discourse, this could have been done in a more ethically sophisticated manner. 
The prioritisation point can be seen in Lord Walker’s judgement. Though Miola is correct in 
noting ‘the basis of his conclusions were formed…by a desire to see the law fit in with the 
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guiding principle he identified’,96 what is concerning about Lord Walker’s brief judgment is 
the simple assertion of autonomy as important without any real discussion as to the nature of 
the principle of respect for autonomy (or any other pertinent principles for that matter), nor its 
(potentially wider) implications for the doctor-patient relationship. For example, he notes 
‘[i]n Sidaway…Lord Scarman described the patient’s right to make his own decision as a 
basic human right…during the twenty years which have elapsed since Sidaway, the 
importance of personal autonomy has been more and more widely recognised’.97 Walker also 
notes ‘[t]he surgeon’s duty to advise and warn his patient is closely connected with the need 
for the patient’s consent to submit, under anaesthesia, to invasive surgery…The advice is the 
foundation of the consent. This is why it is so important’.98 It is in this sense that Lord 
Walker’s judgement is underdeveloped, albeit ethically aware. 
In contrast, Lord Hoffman delivers the most conservative judgement of the House. Miola is 
correct in stating ‘if anything, he was less tolerant of the ethical issues underpinning the 
case’.99 Lord Hoffman’s tone is generally dismissive throughout. For Lord Hoffman, ‘the 
damage was defined in terms of the strictly legal physical aspect and not the loss of dignity 
caused by the absence of an autonomous choice being made’.100 When then noting ‘[t]he 
remaining question is whether a special rule should be created by which doctors who fail to 
warn patients of risks should be made insurers against those risks’,101 he goes on to dismiss 
this argument by noting ‘the risks that may eventuate will vary greatly in severity and…[i]n 
any case, the cost of litigation over such cases would make the law of torts an unsuitable 
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vehicle’.102 This shows Lord Hoffman was not willing to discuss the ethical issues in the case 
in any detail. This is despite Ms Chester ‘seeking compensation for the lack of adherence to 
ethical principle of autonomy rather than any physical damage caused’.103 Furthermore, this 
argument above employs arguments of policy (arguments concerned with social goals, and 
economic or political situations
104
) to argue against the ethical principle of respect for 
autonomy. Whilst judges deploying arguments of policy in general is problematic,
105
 that he 
uses arguments concerned with social goals to dismiss an ethical principle concerned with 
rights and obligations is even more questionable.
106
 More firmly, it trivialises the principle of 
respect for autonomy; one implication of this judgement is ‘[t]he price for loss of dignity or 
autonomy…appeared to be a slightly insignificant inconvenience which was not to be taken 
too seriously’.107 This is clearly not the case for Ms Chester; the better moral argument is one 
in which the law protects patients autonomy, and in light of these principles, the legal facts 
should be changed accordingly.
108
 Thus, Lord Hoffman’s judgement is ethically 
unsophisticated. 
Similarly, whilst recognising the ethical issue in the case
109
, Lord Bingham notes:  
The patient’s right to be appropriately warned is an important right, which few 
doctors in the current legal and social climate would consciously or deliberately 
violate. I do not for my part think that the law should seek to reinforce that right by 
providing for the payment of potentially large damages by a defendant whose 
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violation of that right is not shown to have worsened the physical condition of the 
claimant.
110
 
Lord Bingham refers to the patient’s right to be appropriately warned, but refers to this as a 
legal and social, but not an ethical, right. In this judgement ‘the ethical component was 
therefore identified but not engaged with. This approach is inimical to the original 
proposition of the right of the patient to be fully informed, in order to make her own decision, 
was paramount’.111 In not promoting the principle of respect for autonomy, or at least dealing 
responsibly with the ethical principles after they were identified, Lord Bingham’s treatment 
of the ethical issues in the case is inconsistent. Whilst the ethical nature of judicial decision-
making is recognised, further ethical discussion is absent from Lord Bingham’s judgment.  
In contrast to these approaches, ‘the consideration and primacy given to autonomy by Lords 
Steyn, Hope and Walker eclipses…perhaps even that of Lord Scarman in Sidaway’.112 Lord 
Steyn’s judgement highlights the principle of respect for autonomy as the key driver to the 
case.
113
 Because of this, Lord Steyn takes a more proactive stance on behalf of the courts. He 
notes ‘surgery performed without the consent of the patient is unlawful. The court is the final 
arbiter of what constitutes informed consent’.114 Both issues are neatly bound up when he 
states ‘[i]n modern law, medical paternalism no longer rules and a patient has a right to be 
informed by a surgeon of a small, but well established, risk of serious injury as a result of 
surgery’.115 
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However, Lord Steyn then highlights ‘there is no direct English authority permitting a 
modification of the approach to the proof of causation in a case such as the present’.116 Miola 
analyses this scenario by noting ‘English law would not allow the ethical principles identified 
and examined by Lord Steyn to be given primacy. Rather, Lord Steyn would have to choose 
between the ethics and the settled law’.117 This does not capture the situation in enough 
detail. As Lord Steyn highlights himself, at the time of the case there was no direct authority 
on the issue. However, it was not the case that English Law would not allow the ethical 
principles to be given primacy. Lord Steyn went on to state -‘[o]n the other hand, there is the 
analogy with Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd…which reveals a principled 
approach to such a problem’118 and ‘[a]t the very least, Fairchild shows that where justice 
and policy demand it, a modification of causation principles is not beyond the wit of a 
modern court’.119 Lord Steyn then states ‘I have come to the conclusion that…[h]er right to 
autonomy and dignity can and ought to be vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from 
traditional causation principles’.120 In this judgement ‘Lord Steyn was openly, and 
unequivocally, prioritising the philosophy behind the law above its substantive rules’.121   
Likewise, Lord Hope’s judgment is, at least, very ethically aware. His Lordship notes that 
‘[c]ommon…to all the speeches in Sidaway was a recognition of the fundamental importance 
that must be attached to the right of the patient to decide whether he will accept or reject the 
treatment which is being proposed by the doctor’.122 Further, he also notes: 
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The duty was owed to [Ms Chester] so that she could make her own decision as to 
whether or not she should undergo the particular course of surgery which he was 
proposing to carry out. That was the scope of the duty, the existence of which gave 
effect to her right to be informed before she consented to it. It was unaffected in its 
scope by the response which Miss Chester would have given had she been told of 
these risks.
123
  
Lord Hope thus recognises the principle of respect for autonomy, and the interplay between 
this principle and the duty of the doctor. Moreover, Miola comments Lord Hope is in fact 
more forceful in his acceptance of the principle of respect for autonomy than the other judges. 
As the italicised part of the quote shows, ‘Lord Hope held that if the autonomy of patients 
was to be considered paramount, the issue of causation could only be seen as irrelevant’124. 
Lord Hope goes on to state:  
The function of the law is to protect the patient’s right to choose. If it is to fulfil that 
function it must ensure that the duty to inform is respected by the doctor. It will fail to 
do this if an appropriate remedy cannot be given if the duty is breached and the very 
risk that the patient should have been told about occurs and she suffers injury.
125 
Therefore, in seeing the concept of law primarily through the function of the principle of 
respecting autonomy, and thus concluding the legal fact of causation is irrelevant in light of 
the fundamental importance of these principles, Lord Hope’s judgement is ethically 
sophisticated when viewed this way.
126 
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Also important is there are points at which Lord Steyn and Lord Hope deal with different 
sources of medical ethics discourse. First, Lord Steyn states ‘it is necessary to identify 
precisely the protected legal interests at stake. A rule requiring a doctor to abstain from 
performing an operation without the informed consent of a patient serves two purposes’.127 
The most important purpose here is ‘[i]t also ensures that due respect is given to the 
autonomy and dignity of each patient.’128 In defining these concepts, Lord Steyn quotes 
Ronald Dworkin in Life’s Dominion,129 regarding the meanings of autonomy and dignity. 
Lord Steyn here ‘utilised unofficial medical ethics’130 to define and accept the conceptions of 
these concepts. Nonetheless, given there is no further discussion or analysis of Dworkin’s 
arguments, there is ‘insufficient structure’ to Lord Steyn’s interaction with this analysis, as he 
is simply using ethical discourse to further his own ends in an unreflective way.
131 
Further, Lord Steyn goes on to note his judgement ‘ought to come as no surprise to the 
medical profession which has to its credit subscribed to the fundamental importance of a 
surgeon’s duty to warn a patient in general terms of significant risks: Royal College of 
Surgeons: “Good Surgical practice” (2002) chap 4, guidelines on consent’.132 This 
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engagement with the ‘semi-formal sector of discourse’133 again is valuable, as it provides a 
‘reference point for the medical profession rather than the court’.134 However, Lord Steyn 
devotes a mere four lines to address the issue at the end of his judgement. Further, he appeals 
to the Royal College’s guidelines as opposed to the GMC’s or BMA’s. These points make it 
clear this engagement with medical ethics as a concept could have been more considered, and 
the intended engagement was still with ethical principles;
135
 ‘while there is a belated 
interaction with semi-formal and unofficial medical ethics, there is insufficient structure to 
the meeting’.136   
In contrast, Lord Hope engages with unofficial discourse to identify two key ways the law 
can impact upon the medical professional. Lord Hope notes that Professor Michael A Jones 
in his article ‘Informed Consent and other Fairy Stories’  
observed that the law cannot play a direct role in setting out detailed rules by way of 
guidance to doctors, but that it can have a powerful symbolic and galvanising role and 
that this is it major strength. The message was that he was seeking to convey was that, 
while the case law provided little guidance to doctors and even less comfort to 
patients, litigation on informed consent could provide a stimulus to the broader debate 
about the nature of the doctor-patient relationship.
137
  
Here Lord Hope engages with unofficial medical ethics to further strengthen his decision. 
This also led the way for Lord Hope to deal with the issue of whether it should be left to the 
law or medical ethics to enforce the duty on the part of the doctor. Lord Hope notes Professor 
Jones’s preferred solution ‘would be found if the iterative process between case law and 
professional guidance were to lead to the creation of a more substantive “right” to truly 
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informed consent for patients’.138 Lord Hope is here advocating a more proactive approach on 
the part of the courts. In creating this right, medical ethics would have to follow suit, creating 
the stimulus highlighted in the above quote. This line of reasoning shows a degree of 
appreciation for the respective roles of law and ethics,
139
 making his judgement a considered 
and responsible one. 
3.2.2. Misidentification of the nature of arguments: principle and policy 
Unlike the discussion of Sidaway above, what is meant here is at times certain Law Lords 
define the nature of their arguments differently to the definitions that shall be used in this 
thesis. These definitions at their most basic are as follows. ‘Arguments of principle justify a 
political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some individual or group 
right’;140 alternatively, an argument that uses principles uses standards that are to be applied 
because they are demanded by justice, fairness, or another aspect of morality.
141
 In contrast, 
‘[a]rguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or 
protects some collective goal of the community as a whole’.142 In some circumstances, 
certain Law Lords define their arguments of principle as arguments of policy. 
More importantly it shall be shown in the next chapter, through a discussion of the character 
of moral principles, these definitions are the right ones to use. If the foregoing point is 
accepted, then a number of consequences follow. First, there are sound principles of political 
morality arguing against judicial decisions based on policy.
143
 Second, it again makes it 
difficult to analyse the judges’ reasoning in the case, and particular judgements begin to look 
less ethically sophisticated. Whilst there is an identification and promotion of ethical 
                                                          
138
 ibid. 
139
Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 78-79. 
140
 Dworkin, TRS (n104) 82. 
141
 ibid 22. 
142
 ibid 82. See further ibid 90-91. 
143
 ibid 84. See further ibid 81-84; 91-92. 
31 
 
principles, there is still a lingering sense this project is not followed through completely. 
Thus, something analogous to Miola’s idea that ‘an effective relationship between law and 
ethics, such as that regarding risk disclosure, can only been seen as fortuitous in the way that 
it has developed’144 is pertinent here; whilst judges recognise the ethical nature of judicial 
decision-making, there is an absence of an appropriate decision-making framework so that 
judges are able to rely on their convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics to 
come to a legally and ethically robust decision. It will suffice here to show how the nature of 
the Law Lords’ arguments have potentially been misunderstood.  
Looking at Lord Steyn’s judgement, it appears at times as though he (according to the 
definitions above) misidentifies the nature of his arguments. Though he states ‘where justice 
and policy demand it, a modification of causation principles is not beyond the wit of a 
modern court’,145 in stating the claimant’s right of autonomy needs to be prioritised and that a 
principled solution was available, Lord Steyn is appealing to fundamental ethical principles 
(individual aims as opposed to collective goals) to justify a modification to the principles of 
causation. Put another way, Lord Steyn believed arguments of ethical substance should 
prevail over arguments of fit with previous cases, and the weight of fundamental principles 
was such to ‘allow an overall judgement that trades off an interpretation’s success on one 
type of standard against its failure on another’.146 Thus, Miola is correct in stating ‘Lord 
Steyn was openly, and unequivocally, prioritising the philosophy behind the law above its 
substantive rules’.147 Indeed, Lord Steyn at least recognises the ethical nature of judicial 
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decision-making, and despite misidentifying the nature of his arguments at various points, 
does rely on the soundness of his convictions in applying moral principles.  
Again, at times Lord Hope makes explicitly principled arguments, yet misidentifies these 
arguments’ nature. He first notes ‘I would prefer to approach the issue which has arisen here 
as raising an issue of legal policy which a judge must decide’.148 Yet, directly after this, he 
states ‘I start with the proposition that the law which imposed the duty to warn on the doctor 
has at its heart the right of the patient to make an informed choice as to whether, and if so 
when and by whom, to be operated on.’149 But from this passage it is clear he is not relying 
on policy arguments (in the sense defined above) at all, but ethical and evaluative principles 
(in the sense defined above) to justify his position. In addition, we can see further his 
promotion of the principle of respect for autonomy in the following passage: 
To leave the patient who would find the decision difficult without a remedy, as the 
normal approach to causation would indicate, would render the duty useless in cases 
where it may be needed most…I would find that result unacceptable. The function of 
the law is to enable rights to be vindicated and to provide remedies when duties have 
been breached. Unless this is done, the duty is a hollow one, stripped of all its 
practical force and devoid of all content. It will have lost its ability to protect the 
patient and thus to fulfil the only purpose which brought it into existence.
150 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
corrective justice. This is also seen when discussing and using Professor Tony Honoré’s arguments in his 
commentary on Chappel. For example, Honoré notes that ‘[a]ll the High Court has therefore done [in Chappel v 
Hart] is give legal sanction to underlying moral responsibility for causing injury of the very sort against the risk 
of which the defendant should have warned her’ (Tony Honoré, ‘Medical Non-Disclosure: Causation and Risk: 
Chappel v Hart’ (1999) 7 Torts LJ 1, 8 (emphasis added)). Here, Honoré looks to rely explicitly on moral 
principles and moral argument. But then again, we see a misidentification of the nature of Honoré’s arguments 
when Lord Steyn notes that ‘he was also right to say that policy and corrective justice pull powerfully in favour 
of vindicating the patient’s right to know’ ((n22) at [22]). Given that Honoré himself notes that his arguments 
are moral ones, it is pertinent to ask exactly where the policy arguments in the foregoing discussion are. 
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This quote is worth noting in full, as Lord Hope states immediately after ‘[o]n policy grounds 
therefore I would hold that the test of causation is satisfied in this case’.151 Again, Lord Hope 
has misidentified the nature of his arguments. The italicised portions of the quote show a 
repeated emphasis of a rights-based argument that has nothing to do with policy 
considerations. There are simply no policy based arguments in the foregoing quote, nor in the 
other quotes that show how Lord Hope has based his argument on ethical principles. 
Therefore, for Lord Hope to say that his conclusion is based on policy arguments is wrong, 
according to the definitions given above. 
3.3. General conclusion 
Many positives can be pulled out of the decision in Chester. The principle of respect for 
autonomy was again highlighted by all the Law Lords. In addition the majority view, in 
particular Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, use fundamental principles to underpin their 
arguments, and engage in a degree of ethical analysis to justify their legal conclusions. There 
is also a canvassing of unofficial medical ethics and academic opinion involving moral 
argument to inform Lord Hope and Lord Steyn’s judgement, making it ethically somewhat 
considered. Further, ‘for the first time, we can see medical ethics interacting with the law and 
vice versa’.152 Last, it can reasonably be said Chester ‘finally heralds the effective arrival into 
English law of Lord Scarman’s approach’.153 However, this case is not to be uncritically 
welcomed with open arms. 
Indeed, though Lord Hope notes ‘[c]ommon however to all the speeches in Sidaway was a 
recognition of the fundamental importance that must be attached to the right of the patient to 
decide whether he will accept or reject the treatment’,154 there still are lingering elements of 
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the Sidaway approach in Chester given only a bare majority decided for Ms Chester, with 
Lord Hoffman ‘even less tolerant of the ethical underpinnings of the case’.155 In addition, to 
temper the point above, medical ethics as a concept could be further critically discussed by 
the courts to come to an ethically robust decision. Although there is some interaction with 
unofficial and semi-official discourse, this is belated in manner. Thus, whilst ethical 
principles are recognised, the wider picture of the concept of medical ethics is not.
156
 This 
issue is compounded by the frequent misidentification by the judges of the nature of their 
arguments and decisions.  
Overall in analysing Sidaway and Chester, the points identified at the beginning of the 
section are still pertinent. The ethical issues judges identify do not receive as much sustained 
analysis as they should do. In addition, the development of the relationship between medical 
law and ethics in the informed consent scenario is fortuitous.
157
 Finally, and most 
importantly, there is a need for an appropriate judicial decision-making framework that 
recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making and provides confidence to judges in 
relying on their convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics so as to come to 
a legally and ethically sound decision. 
4. Developments since Symbiotic 
This chapter shall now show developments in case law surrounding informed consent since 
Symbiotic lend further weight to the argument that the positive development of the 
relationship between law and ethics surrounding this topic is fortuitous.
158
 The section shall 
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show the courts misunderstand the ethical nature of judicial decision-making, and have not 
fully grasped how to implement the principle of respect for autonomy. Though an analysis of 
Chester shows an ethically considered prioritisation of the principle, coupled with 
developments in case law, this analysis shows courts are inconsistent in their use of different 
conceptions of the same concept. These developments highlight although judges might be 
trying to promote patient autonomy, they are not doing so in an ethically sophisticated 
manner. This in turn therefore lends further weight to the need for a framework that can 
facilitate the desired outcomes noted above. 
4.1. Case law 
In his selection of cases, Miola is making a representative (as opposed to empirical) claim. 
He states ‘[t]he chapters do not profess to be a comprehensive analysis of the case law as 
only a few cases are considered and only enough to give a representative idea of how the 
courts treat medical ethics’.159 From this, it is reasonable to infer Miola is claiming the best 
way to see what is occurring in these cases is that courts frequently abrogate decision-making 
responsibility to medical ethics, but in the area of informed consent, the interaction between 
law and ethics works. However, as part of this representative analysis, where there is an 
interaction with certain conceptions of the concept of autonomy (for example, Lord Steyn in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
set for doctors are in fact very stringent; and second that it emphasises a considered, defensible view of 
autonomy as requiring not just more information, but facilitating understanding by doctors by requiring 
interaction and communication (Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 81; F&M, One Step Forward (n29) 495). However, the 
GMC’s new detailed guidance, Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together (ethical guidance, 
2008), in contrast ‘may serve to undermine the very points—commitment to dialogues, personalisation of care, 
and information provision—that had placed the GMC’s requirements so far above the law in its treatment of 
patients as individuals’ (F&M, One Step Forward (n29) 496). For further discussion, see Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 
79-83, and F&M, One Step Forward (n). In relation to this thesis, this is something judges need to be aware of. 
This in turn points to the need for an appropriate decision-making framework being provided that recognises not 
just the ethical nature of judicial decision making, but also provides a framework for judges to appraise both 
pertinent moral principles and medical ethics, and subsequently rely on the soundness of their convictions to 
apply these. 
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Chester) there is no sustained consideration as to why this conception is preferable. The 
problem is in not setting out explicitly why a particular conception is preferable, this lays 
down no future guidance as to how the principle of respect for autonomy is to be prioritised 
and implemented. This leaves open the possibility of future courts using an inconsistent 
conception of the same concept. Importantly, this conception has the possibility to be 
ethically unsophisticated. Also, as there is no sustained consideration of which conception of 
respect for autonomy is ethically preferable, the potential for ethically unsophisticated 
inconsistencies goes unnoticed. The foregoing all lends weight to the idea that courts do not 
understand the ethical nature of judicial decision-making. 
These problems are exemplified in Al Hamwi. This case highlights the problems of simply 
equating more information with more autonomy, as opposed to protecting patients’ rights by 
emphasising the value of communication and shared decision-making. Those problems are; 
first, if there is less emphasis on the communication aspect as a means of respecting patient 
autonomy, as opposed to the volume of information imparted, the focus immediately 
becomes unilateral in nature again. The doctor’s conduct is thrown into the spotlight, the 
result being the attempt on the part of the courts to emphasise this is the patient’s decision to 
make is insincere in nature. Second, there is a danger that in simply imparting volumes of 
information to patients, they could again be left to their own decisions.
160
 Finally, it is also 
telling there is only one passing reference to Chester, and no reference to the views expressed 
therein
161. Indeed, Miola notes this case ‘raises questions about just how far the law will take 
its commitment to autonomy with respect to risk disclosure’.162 
In Al Hamwi:  
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Mrs Al Hamwi, who did not speak much English and wanted to undergo 
amniocentesis, was left, after counselling, under the impression that there was a 75% 
chance of harming the foetus. She thus refused her consent and gave birth to a child 
with a genetic abnormality that would have been detected by the test.
163
 
Most important is Mrs Al Hamwi claimed the North West London Hospitals NHS Trust 
(through their Consultant Obstetrician, Miss Kerslake) failed to properly explain the risks of 
amniocentesis. This resulted in Mrs Al Hamwi declining to have the test, rather than 
accepting it, as she would have done.
164
 
The court rejected this claim.
165
 Simon J found ‘Miss Kerslake may have taken particular, but 
not inappropriate, care to give information about the choices available to the Claimant’.166 He 
also found ‘[i]t seems to me unlikely that both [the midwife] and Miss Kerslake failed to 
follow their usual practice of handing the Information Leaflet to their patients; and I find that 
they did so in this case’.167 It was agreed by expert witnesses this leaflet (“Amniocentesis 
Information”) was an appropriate means of informing a patient of the risks of 
amniocentesis.
168
  
However, ‘[w]hat is clear, though, is that at some point the information regarding the risk of 
miscarriage was not understood. Indeed, Mrs Al Hamwi had specifically sought diagnostic 
tests, but, after meeting with Miss Kerslake, she had changed her mind’.169 Given this, it 
might be thought the value of the information and its communicative aspect, as opposed to 
merely the volume, would have been subjected to scrutiny by the judge. However, this did 
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not occur. And it is at this point that the dangers of simply imparting volumes of information 
to patients are realised.
170
 
Simon J initially noted ‘I approach this case on the basis that a clinician must take reasonable 
care to give a warning which is adequate in scope, content and presentation’171. However, he 
went on to further state:  
The Checklist [Miss Kerslake kept] provides powerful evidence that the Claimant was 
given appropriate counselling on Amniocentesis…I have concluded that Miss 
Kerslake imparted accurate information during the consultation and that, in particular 
she conveyed the necessary information as to the risks inherent in the amniocentesis 
test.
172 
Additionally, he rejected the suggestion that 
the clinician’s duty is to ensure that the information given to the patient is understood. 
In my view that is to place too onerous an obligation on the clinician. It is difficult to 
see what steps could be devised to ensure that a patient has understood, short of a 
vigorous and inappropriate cross-examination…Clinicians should take reasonable and 
appropriate steps to satisfy themselves that the patient has understood the information 
which has been provided; but the obligation does not extend to ensuring that the 
patient has understood.
173 
From these quotes a common theme emerges: it is more important the information has been 
imparted than it has been communicated effectively. Indeed, that Simon J believed Miss 
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Kerslake had taken reasonable steps to ensure the patient understood the information, despite 
not elaborating on what these steps were, nor questioning the fact Miss Kerslake had not 
investigated why Mrs Al Hamwi changed her mind, shows these reasonable steps (whatever 
they may be) are quite easy to satisfy.
174
 Further, the use of a checklist regarding the dangers 
of amniocentesis might lead to a more rigid, formalistic approach to the provision of 
information. That Simon J found the checklist was a good indicator the evidence given was 
appropriate is worrying in this respect. The implication of these quotes is Mrs Al Hamwi was 
effectively left to her own decision.
175
 
These consequences lead to two important related points. First, the direct quote immediately 
above sets out a statement of principle, using the definitions given. It argues that on the 
conception of respect for autonomy used, this aspect of morality means it is not morally 
obligatory the concerned clinician ensures the patient understands the information that has 
been given. Put in terms of the rights a patient has, according to this conception of respect for 
autonomy, this dimension of morality does not secure an individual a right to ensure the 
information has been imparted to them in ways in which they can understand. However, 
given the highlighted consequences of this position, Simon J has not understood the 
consequences of his ethical argument, despite presenting one. This leads to the further 
inference this ethical principle was set out without any real thought as to its implications or 
consideration of what this position really means.  
Second, in comparison with the conception of respect for autonomy put forward by Lord 
Steyn in Chester, the two conceptions are inconsistent. Lord Steyn defined the principle of 
respect for autonomy in terms of protecting the capacity to express one’s own character-
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values through the views, choices and actions that they take.
176
 This is a more nuanced view 
of respect for autonomy, of which a consequence would be to ensure that the patient has 
understood the information provided. But in both cases, there is no sustained analysis of why 
each particular conception has been chosen, and why either conception is ethically preferable. 
In failing to provide this direction, Chester leaves open the possibility of an inconsistent 
application of different conceptions of the same concept, some of which are ethically 
unsophisticated. Moreover, these inconsistencies and consequences are not recognised or 
dealt with by the courts. The foregoing issues point towards the conclusion that when looked 
at together, Chester and Al Hamwi show the courts do not fully understand the ethical nature 
of judicial decision-making, or how to implement the principle of respect for autonomy in a 
consistent, structured manner. 
Overall therefore, Mrs Al Hamwi’s autonomy was not protected. That Mrs Al Hamwi 
seemingly did not understand the information given to her,
177
 and ultimately made a decision 
she would not have made had she understood the information reinforces this point. This goes 
on to show the disconnect between the courts thinking they are protecting patient autonomy, 
but in fact not doing so in an ethically sophisticated manner, and actually having adverse 
consequences in reality.
178 
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This problem is further compounded by other developments in case law. For example that it 
was noted in Atwell v McPartlin
179
 the doctor is allowed to ‘adopt an overbearing or bullying 
attitude in order to secure compliance’180 with a particular course of treatment shows there 
might still be a tension between giving prominence to autonomy and deferring to clinical 
judgement on the part of the courts. This puts patients in a potentially no win situation; in one 
scenario, patients can simply be left to make their own decision on the basis of information 
not understood. Alternatively, doctors are free to adopt an excessively paternalistic attitude to 
secure compliance with a treatment they think in the best interest of patients.
181
 In addition to 
this, it was noted in Birch that: 
Was it necessary for the [doctor] to go further and to inform Mrs Birch of 
comparative risk…? No authority was cited to this effect but in my judgment there 
will be circumstances where…the duty to inform a patient of the significant risks will 
not be discharged unless she is made aware that fewer, or no risks, are associated with 
another procedure.
182
  
This decision and reasoning is to be welcomed, given it is ‘the first English case where the 
duty to disclose alternative treatments was central to the finding of liability and is an example 
of a judge being clearly prepared to look beyond the traditional one dimensional focus of the 
duty of disclosure’.183 However, Cranston J does further note ‘[t]he difficulty is in 
delineating, in general terms, the circumstances in which the duty arises to inform of 
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comparative risks’,184 and  therefore left this issue unresolved, analogously to Lord Steyn in 
Chester. 
Therefore, in concluding this section, Miola is making a representative claim that the area of 
informed consent is one in which the relationship between ethics and law is positive. 
However, developments in case law since Symbiotic have shown this positive relationship is 
(as Miola acknowledges) fortuitous in nature, and presents certain problems, due to a lack of 
sufficient structure on the part of judges and their discussions. Although the law is more 
symbolically respectful of patient’s autonomy, in fact the law has adopted an ethically “thin” 
view of autonomy, which potentially allows doctors to either leave patients to their decisions 
or adopt an overbearing attitude to pressure them into accepting certain treatments. It would 
be legally and ethically better if there was a greater focus on the process leading up to the 
disclosure of risk, and viewed as a continuous process in the doctor-patient relationship rather 
than as an isolated event, of which the outcomes are paramount. This would promote the 
richer view of autonomy highlighted at various points above. Indeed, as it has been shown 
how risk perception is quite subjective in nature, a test which focuses upon outcomes in 
relation to risk disclosure will be inherently uncertain.
185
 Thus, this is an area where the 
relationship between law and ethics needs more structure to it. One way to achieve this is by 
providing judges with an appropriate decision-making framework that recognises the ethical 
nature of decision making, so as to provide confidence to judges in relying on their 
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convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics, to come to a responsible 
conclusion. 
This chapter shall now go on to look at the areas where Miola’s research can be developed. It 
shall contend judges can take a more proactive role regarding the resolution of the issues 
above. In doing so, it shall show how the discussions in this thesis are complementary to 
Miola’s work. This will then allow an overall conclusion to be reached as to whether the law 
needs to take the forefront in relation to arbitrating between competing ethical conclusions 
and principles, and thus instigate a new, better symbiosis than the one that currently exists.  
5. How this thesis Complements Miola’s work  
Given this thesis is using Miola’s work as a point of departure, it is important to interpret his 
investigation into ‘how the courts have conceptualised and utilised medical ethics in the cases 
before them’. Miola draws from this the conclusion that ‘[a]t times, medical ethics is seen as 
nothing more than “professional etiquette” not to be interfered with. At others, judges will 
instinctively abrogate decision-making responsibility to medical ethics as soon as they 
identify the ethical issue in a case’.186 
However, this is part of Miola’s larger conclusion: ‘medical law and ethics can be seen to 
have combined to have allowed more, rather than less, discretion for the conscience of 
individual medical practitioners’.187 Further, ‘[i]n the absence of  hierarchy or categorisation 
of ethical discourse, the law is essentially complicit in the fragmentation, and indeed its 
general abrogation of responsibility means that it has at times become little more than a 
fragment of discourse’.188 Last, ‘both the law and medical ethics presume that the other is 
regulating behaviour, and do not see the need to do so themselves, and thus…no regulation 
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occurs’.189 Miola states it is ‘imperative that future courts and committees actually recognise 
the problem that exists’.190 
Thus, Miola is sustained and explicit in identifying that judges do abrogate responsibility, and 
take a deferential stance towards the medical profession, even where the issue is ethical in 
nature. He is also sustained and explicit in setting out the negative consequences of such a 
stance. However, he is not sustained and explicit (though it is mentioned) in analysing and 
showing how judges do not have to abrogate responsibility and can take a more proactive 
stance in cases with an inherently ethical content.
191
 Indeed, Miola notes himself, Symbiotic 
‘was about the “problem” rather than the cure, and it never pretended to be otherwise’.192 
It therefore becomes clear that a complementary project to Miola’s work is feasible. As Miola 
notes, he has identified and highlighted the problem. Further, he highlights there is a 
possibility that courts could take a more proactive attitude in dealing with medical law cases 
with an inherently ethical content. This thesis will complement Miola’s work by explicitly 
showing theoretically the courts have the ability to realise this possibility of taking a more 
proactive stance, and can deal with the ethical issues that arise in a particular case in a 
confident, responsible manner, and how to realise this possibility. Whilst Miola’s solution is 
focussed upon the legislative, policy level, this thesis shall concentrate explicitly on the 
judiciary and provide a framework for arguments of principle to deal with the various aspects 
of complex cases.
193
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The significant issues in this thesis are therefore, theoretically, can courts deal with the 
inherent ethical issues in cases such as Sidaway and Chester in a confident, responsible 
manner. Further, if they can, how can courts deal with these issues, given the inconsistent use 
of the same concept highlighted above. There is an important related discussion which asks 
whether judges ought to be, or should be, deferential to the medical profession. Such a 
discussion is outside the scope of this thesis. This discussion already assumes what this thesis 
is trying to prove; that courts do have the ability to take a more proactive stance in relation to 
the resolution of the inherent ethical issues in certain cases.
194
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
such as the law. The consequences of the arguments of this thesis for medical professionals are therefore an 
indirect concern, as opposed to being a direct concern, like Miola.  
194
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then deal responsibly with the ethical issues in a case is by being less deferential to the medical profession. It 
might be thought that a responsible way to deal with the inherently ethical issues in a case is by, after ethical 
analysis and conclusion, deferring to the medical profession. However, this conclusion would still seem to be 
reached as a result of the decision-making framework provided. It seems as though Jonathan Montgomery is 
getting at something like this in his article Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine (Jonathan Montgomery, 
‘Law and the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 (2) Legal Studies 185). 
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Alternatively, it can be said whilst Miola is looking at the discourse itself, and potential 
bodies as remedies to the problem, this thesis is looking at correct approaches judges can take 
to the ethical issues in such cases. This thesis looks at ways to rectify this particular problem, 
other than Miola’s suggestion at the end of his book. It is in this sense that the two projects 
are complementary.  
6. Conclusion 
In concluding, the strands of this chapter need to be collected. The central research question 
of this thesis shall then be set out explicitly. The work to be undertaken in the next chapter 
shall then be outlined. 
This chapter first highlighted the three-element analysis presented by José Miola in 
Symbiotic. The chapter then examined more specifically two important cases surrounding the 
area of informed consent/risk disclosure; Sidaway and Chester. Elements of judicial 
deference to the medical profession and medical ethics were highlighted, as was whether 
judges in those particular cases had come to an ethically nuanced, responsible decision. It was 
shown although courts were becoming more proactive in dealing with ethically complex 
issues, the ethical issues judges identify do not receive as much sustained analysis as they 
should do. In addition, it was also shown the development of the relationship between 
medical law and ethics in the informed consent scenario occurred by chance as opposed to 
choice. The analysis of the developments in case law since Symbiotic confirmed this, and 
showed that courts are inconsistent in their use of different conceptions of the same concept. 
Given all this, it was then shown how this thesis would complement and build upon Miola’s 
research, by showing explicitly the theoretical basis on which the courts can (and if so how 
to) take a more proactive role in relation to the resolution of ethical issues in cases like 
Sidaway and Chester. 
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Overall then, throughout the discussion of Miola’s work, the analyses of Sidaway and 
Chester, and developments since, the chapter has been implicitly looking at what role moral 
principles play in relation to the stance judges do and can take in cases like Sidaway and 
Chester. Therefore, the key link between a discussion of the above issues and the starting 
point for a theoretical explanation of how judges can take a more proactive role in the 
resolution of inherent ethical (and legal) controversies, is by looking explicitly at what role 
moral principles play in the type of cases this chapter been looking at. Because of this, next 
chapter shall look explicitly at the question “What role do moral principles play in hard 
cases?”.   
However, this question is part of the larger central research question of this thesis. It is clear a 
legal theory that both fits and justifies what currently judges are doing, and can be used as a 
normative tool to critique their legal approaches needs to be developed. In addition, a 
bioethical theory is needed that corresponds to and is thoroughly integrated with the legal 
theory so both are mutually complementary. This bioethical theory also needs to provide a 
framework for how judges can go about dealing with the ethical issues that arrive in 
controversial cases in a responsible manner. The central research question of this thesis can 
therefore be formulated as follows: 
“Can an appropriate decision-making framework be provided to judges that 
recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making so as to provide confidence 
to judges in relying on their convictions in applying moral principles and medical 
ethics to come to a legally and ethically responsible decision?”
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Chapter 2 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will look to identify the role moral principles play in helping judges decide cases 
like Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
1
, and Chester v Afshar.
2
 These sorts of 
cases are known as hard cases. The previous chapter established a central research question 
that needs to be answered. However, in order to fully answer this, the more specific research 
question “What role do moral principles play in hard cases?” needs to be answered, despite 
already being well explored. Many of the negative effects of judicial deference to the medical 
profession in cases involving inherently ethical matters were highlighted in the previous 
chapter. Given this, it was established the key starting point for an explanation as to how 
judges can take a more proactive role in the resolution of the inherent ethical and legal 
controversies in such cases is by looking at what role moral principles play in the resolution 
of these issues. Further, in providing a detailed explanation of the role moral principles play 
and the characteristics they have, it shall be shown that it is identified by many prominent 
legal theorists that when judges decide hard cases, they rely on the soundness of their own 
convictions in applying moral principles.
3
  
This analysis also reveals an interesting paradox with the findings in the previous chapter; 
judges apparently rely on the soundness of their own convictions in applying moral 
principles, but are unwilling to employ these convictions to engage with medical ethics in 
cases with an inherently ethical content. In answering how moral principles are relied upon, 
this could provide further weight to the conclusion that for certain reasons, judges are 
                                                          
1
 [1985] AC 817. 
2
 [2004] UKHL 41. 
3
 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977) 124 (hereafter TRS). 
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deferring ethical issues to the medical profession in medical law cases, when in fact they can 
take a more proactive role.
4
  
As noted explicitly in the previous chapter, it is also clear in order to answer this central 
research question an integrated and mutually complimentary framework to analyse current 
legal and ethical approaches by judges is needed, to critically depict what currently occurs in 
medical law cases having an inherently ethical content. It is essential this framework is 
detailed enough to provide a normative tool to be able to critique current judicial approaches 
and suggest ones for the future. The framework needs to be able to show how the normative 
potential of law and bioethical theory may be used to attain the resolution of controversy.
5
 
This framework will then show how judges should be more proactive in recognising the 
ethical nature of judicial decision-making and coming to a legally and ethically responsible 
decision. This analysis and direction, in turn, should provide confidence to judges to rely on 
their convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics.  
Therefore, having outlined the importance of figuring out what role moral principles play in 
hard cases, this chapter shall analyse two competing explanations of the characteristics of 
                                                          
4
 José Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Hart 2007) 9 (hereafter Symbiotic)). 
Another way to frame the issues discussed in chapter 1 is these moral principles and medical ethics discourses 
are currently used as mere deferential ‘exclusionary reasons’ (Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 
(Hutchinson 1975) 40) within judicial decisions. ‘An exclusionary reason is a second order reason to refrain 
from acting for some reason’ (Raz, ibid 39) (emphasis in original). 
5
 Andrew Halpin, ‘The Methodology of Jurisprudence: Thirty Years Off the Point’ (2006) 19 Can J L & 
Jurisprudence 67, 92 (hereafter Thirty Years). Indeed, as adverted to in chapter 1 (at footnote 194) Jonathan 
Montgomery recognises the interlink between the importance of a sound theoretical base, an analysis of role that 
moral principles play in hard cases, and the approach that judges should take in medical law cases with an 
inherently ethical content. He notes ‘[t]he question of what approaches judges should take depends very much 
on their understanding of the relationship between law and healthcare practice … Whether and how this matter 
depends on an analysis of the desired connection between law and morality’ (Jonathan Montgomery, ‘Law and 
the Demoralisation of Medicine’ (2006) 26 (2) Legal Studies 185, 199). In this chapter, the focus will be on 
ascertaining which legal theory to use. In regards to the bioethical theory, this thesis takes as its starting point 
the four-principles theory of Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress (hereafter B&C) in their book Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics (7
th
 edn, OUP 2013 (hereafter PBE)), and subsequently seeks to reinterpret this theory. 
This is to remedy its weaknesses and to fully integrate it with the favoured legal theory, so that it is mutually 
supportive. For this reinterpretation, see chapters 4&5, and for the integration of the legal and bioethical 
theories, see chapter 6. All references in this chapter to PBE will be to the 7
th
 edition of that book, unless 
otherwise stated. 
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moral principles: Matthew Kramer’s theory of ‘modest Incorporationism’6 and Ronald 
Dworkin’s theory of law (more specifically the ‘adjudicative principle of integrity’7).  
Professor Kramer’s theory is a version of positivism he has defended on a number of 
different occasions.
8
 For Kramer, ‘the incorporation of moral principles into a legal system’s 
array of norms [as a response to the problems presented in hard cases] is contingent rather 
than inevitable’.9 This means on Kramer’s account, moral principles are initially “external” to 
“the law” in that they are not necessarily part of judicial decision-making. They are then 
incorporated into the law so as to become and function as legal norms. For example, if judges 
were to rely on medical ethics discourse in cases with an inherently ethical content, the moral 
principles enshrined within such discourse would, according to Kramer’s theory, be 
recognised as legal norms.
10
 
In contrast, Dworkin contends ‘we cannot understand legal argument and controversy except 
on the assumption that the truth conditions of propositions of law include moral 
considerations’.11 On Dworkin’s account moral principles are bound up with judicial 
decision-making, in that it (‘how judges should identify and enforce people’s legal rights’12) 
involves deciding whether a particular proposition of law is true or not, with evaluative 
                                                          
6
 Matthew H Kramer, ‘Throwing Light on the Role of Moral Principles in the Law: Further Reflections’ (2002) 
8 Legal Theory 115, 130 (hereafter, Throwing Light). It must also be noted that Kramer uses a number of 
synonyms to highlight the ambit of his theory of Incorporationism (ibid 124). Those include his theory being a 
‘moderate Incorporationist theory’ (ibid 124) and also being ‘mildly Incorporationist’ (ibid 132). For purposes 
of clarity we shall use the term of ‘modest Incorporationism’ (ibid 130). 
7
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1986) 225. 
8
 For example, See Matthew H Kramer ‘How Moral Principles Can Enter into the Law’ (2000) 6 Legal Theory 
83 (hereafter Moral Principles); Matthew H Kramer, ‘Of Final Things: Morality as One of the Ultimate 
Determinants of Legal Validity’ (2004) 24 Law and Philosophy 47 (hereafter Of Final Things); Matthew H. 
Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet (OUP 2004) chapters 1-4 (hereafter WLMM); Matthew H Kramer, ‘Why 
the Axioms and Theorems of Arithmetic are Not Legal Norms’ (2007) 27 OJLS 555 (hereafter Why The 
Axioms); Matthew H Kramer, ‘Contents versus Existence-Conditions: A Brief Reply to John Morss’ (2008) 53 
AM J Juris 101 (hereafter Contents); Matthew Kramer, ‘Moral Principles and Legal Validity’ (2009) 22 Ratio 
Juris 44.  
9
 Kramer, Throwing Light (n6) 116. 
10
 ibid 115-116. 
11
 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press 2006) 234, (hereafter JIR). 
12
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Ronald Dworkin Replies’ in Justine Burley (ed) Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by 
Dworkin (Blackwell 2004) 382 (hereafter Dworkin Replies).  
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considerations necessarily featuring amongst the truth conditions of propositions of law.
13
 
Dworkin believes the concept of law to be an interpretive concept; ‘[a] proposition of law is 
true…if it flows from principles of personal and political morality that provide the best 
interpretation of the other propositions of law treated as true in contemporary legal 
practice’.14 As Dworkin focuses upon the question of people’s rights, this provides an 
important contrast with Kramer. The question of whether a particular moral principle belongs 
to the existing body of “law” becomes unimportant for Dworkin, with him noting his theory 
does not (and need not) fit into this particular way of viewing law.
15
 For example, if judges 
were to rely on medical ethics discourse in cases with an inherently ethical content, according 
to Dworkin’s theory, the moral principles enshrined in such discourse would simply figure as 
pertinent moral principles in the truth conditions of that particular proposition of law, and 
would not be enshrined with the status of legal norms (like Kramer’s theory).  
Therefore, there are two competing explanations regarding the role of moral principles in 
hard cases. It thus is important to work out what effects the theoretical distinctions between 
both positions have on the characteristics of the moral principle itself. If one theory cannot 
adequately explain how judges can take a more proactive attitude by using moral principles, 
then this theory must be discounted, as it cannot fulfil the aims set out above. 
This chapter will show Kramer’s own arguments regarding the circumstances of hard cases 
can be used to highlight that modest Incorporationism is inadequate for these particular 
purposes. The ‘Incorporationist criterion’16 can only be preserved at the cost of making that 
criterion so abstract it cannot give much, if any, critical direction to judges in resolving 
                                                          
13
 Dworkin, JIR (n11) 5. 
14
 ibid 14. 
15
 Dworkin, TRS (n3) 293. See also Dworkin, JIR (n11) 238-239. 
16
 Kramer, Throwing Light (n6) 138. 
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arguments about what the law requires.
17
 There are also a number of other detrimental effects 
with such an abstract criterion; most notably it may undermine the notion of a convention 
itself.
18
 Kramer’s two stage process of moral principles existing “externally” to “the law” and 
then being incorporated is not an accurate depiction of legal practice, and does not have to 
occur. This goes some way to showing Dworkin’s adjudicative principle of integrity should 
be preferred out of the two.  
In showing Dworkin’s theory is preferable in relation to the resolution of ‘normative 
debates’19 in hard cases, this also strengthens the argument that the courts have the ability to 
realise the possibility of taking a more proactive stance in relation to the resolution of the 
inherent ethical issues in cases like Sidaway and Chester. As evaluative considerations 
necessarily feature as part of the truth conditions of propositions of law, whilst judges may 
sometimes need to refer explicitly to medical ethics discourse,
20
 judges can appeal to 
principles of personal and political morality as fundamental as is necessary to show that a 
particular proposition is true.
21
 Judges can appeal to such principles, for not only does 
Dworkin’s theory of law accurately capture the practices of judges in hard cases and the role 
moral principles play, but justifies these practices as well.
22
 This also leads on to the 
                                                          
17
 E Phillip Soper, ‘Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute’ in Marshall Cohen 
(ed) Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (Duckworth 1984) 19 (hereafter Obligation). 
18
 Dworkin, JIR (n11) 193. 
19
 Soper, Obligation (n17) 18. This is meant in the sense of providing direction about how moral principles are 
to be used to determine which propositions of law are true, not ‘disagreement about what [the law] should be’ 
(Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n7) 7). 
20
 For example, either to provide guidance to the medical professional regarding the relationship between their 
ethical and legal duties (for example, by referencing the formal sector’s (GMC’s) guidance on consent and how 
this relates to their legal duty) or to be informed by the unofficial sector of discourse so as to responsibly and 
confidently discuss conceptions of different concepts, settle on one conception and explain why (Miola, 
Symbiotic (n4) 6-7; 83-84). 
21
 Dworkin, JIR (n11) 52. See, for example, Dworkin’s discussion of ‘justificatory ascent’ (ibid 53) in JIR (n11) 
52-57. See also chapter 3 where it is argued the value of integrity is best understood along the lines of 
“coherence with equality”. The particular proposition in question must be consistent, mutually explanatory with, 
and non-anomalous to the fundamental principles of equality that underpin the legal system as a whole.  
22
 This latter issue will be discussed more extensively in chapter 3, where it will be shown that integrity is the 
value we should see the concept of law through, as integrity accords better with the fundamental demands of 
principle made by the centrally important principle of ‘equality of respect’ (Stephen Guest, ‘Integrity, Equality 
and Justice (2005) 3 (233) Revue Internationale De Philosophie 335, 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctlsfd/papers/integrity_equality_and_justice.pdf> 6 (online) accessed 27
th
 June 2014). 
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conclusion that Miola may have misconceived the pertinent issue. The issue is not which 
principles enshrined in medical ethics discourse can we use and bring into “the law” (in some 
external sense) to come to an ethically responsible decision, but which principles, by virtue of 
their necessary status in the truth conditions of propositions of law, can we apply to come to a 
legally and ethically responsible decision in hard cases, which may be reinforced by referral 
to medical ethics discourse.  
The chapter will then finally look at a second theoretical distinction between Dworkin and 
Kramer’s theories of law. Whilst ‘Dworkin has long affirmed that there is a uniquely correct 
answer to every legal question or virtually every legal question that might arise in any 
particular jurisdiction’23, by contrast Kramer contends that there can be ‘hard cases with no 
uniquely correct solutions’.24 These differences again force a choice between the two 
theories. More specifically, since Dworkin’s theory can take account of Kramer’s objections 
and, as Dworkin contends, there are right answers to hard cases, this alleviates problems 
highlighted in Miola’s three-element analysis of the relationship between medical law and 
ethics at the start of chapter one.  
However, despite these relevant ‘germane point[s] of dissimilarity’25 between modest 
Incorporationism and the adjudicative principle of integrity, what further motivates this 
discussion is Kramer’s claim that ‘a modest Incorporationist thesis is peculiarly suitable for 
the accomplishment of the purpose which Incorporationism was devised to fulfil: viz., the 
purpose of fending off some of Dworkin’s…attacks against legal positivism which were 
                                                          
23
 Matthew H Kramer, ‘When is There Not One Right Answer?’ (2008)  53 Am J Juris 49, 49 (hereafter One 
Right Answer?). 
24
 Kramer, WLMM (n8) 37. 
25
 Matthew H Kramer, ‘On Morality as a Necessary or Sufficient Condition for Legality’ (2003) 48 Am J Juris 
53, 71 (hereafter On Morality). The term relevant here means relevant for the scope of our investigation. Space 
precludes a thorough investigation into certain points of dissimilarity (ibid) but nonetheless, as will become 
clear throughout the chapter, both approaches are remarkably similar in practice.  
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focused on the role of moral principles as adjudicative touchstones in hard cases’.26 Whilst 
Dworkin has reasoned that the point of his original critique has been missed,
27
 the intriguing 
point here is instead of missing the point of Dworkin’s original critique, Kramer in fact 
explicitly critiques Dworkin by contending ‘the moral principles that judges often cite to 
justify their legal decisions…are also legal principles’.28 Kramer is able to make such a claim 
as he accepts the argument that ‘Dworkin fails to distinguish between disagreements over the 
contents of various criteria, and disagreements over their applications…Though some 
disputes are undoubtedly of the former type, many others are of the latter type’.29 The cost of 
this riposte shall be analysed. We shall see modest Incorporationism has to come an 
extremely long way towards Dworkin’s adjudicative principle of integrity in order to 
compensate for his attack. Yet, these theoretical similarities of supposedly “clashing” camps 
are important, for we can then be confident as to the role moral principles play in helping 
                                                          
26
 Kramer, Throwing Light (n6) 129. 
27
 Dworkin, JIR (n11) 234. That original critique was (as outlined earlier) that ‘we cannot understand legal 
argument and controversy except on the assumption that the truth conditions of propositions of law include 
moral considerations’ (Dworkin, JIR (n11) 234). 
28
 Dworkin, JIR (n11) 233. At this point, it can be noted this is more beneficial than misunderstanding the nature 
of the argument that is being made, as is the case, for example, with Brian Leiter. Leiter contends that ‘Dworkin 
[has] simply described the rule of recognition for those legal systems … in which there is a conventional 
practice among judges of deciding questions of legal validity by reference to moral criteria’ (Brian Leiter, 
‘Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence (2003) 48 Am J Juris 17, 27 
(hereafter Hart/Dworkin Debate). He notes that ‘the only possible challenge Dworkin’s theory could present to 
Hart’s is if the former’s particular jurisprudence of Anglo-American legal systems were deemed correct, but 
could not be accounted for within the framework of Hart’s general jurisprudence. In particular the question for 
Hart’s positivism is whether it can make sense of the phenomenon of judges treating some principles as legally 
binding, not in virtue of their pedigree, but simply in virtue of their content’ (ibid 24). Leiter further contends ‘if 
Hart is right, then Dworkin’s theory is … merely an exercise in particular jurisprudence: Dworkin simply 
described the rule of recognition for those legal systems … in which there is a conventional practice among 
judges of deciding questions of legal validity by reference to moral criteria’(ibid 27) (emphasis in original). To 
support this inference, Leiter notes that ‘[i]n arguing that legal positivism can make room for the possibility of 
legally valid “principles”… Hart made two claims … [the latter being most important] that there is nothing in 
the positivist notion of a Rule of Recognition that precludes content based tests of legal validity … which might 
account for those principles which are legally binding but lack a pedigree’ (ibid 24). But again, Leiter has made 
the mistake of thinking that Dworkin’s critique makes an ‘essentially taxonomic point: that the moral principles 
judges often cite to justify their legal decisions … are also legal principles and that taxonomic positivists are 
therefore wrong to separate legal from moral principles in the way they do’(Dworkin, JIR (n11) 233). This again 
misses the point of Dworkin’s original critique, which was to show that in legal practice, particularly in 
instances of theoretical disagreement, ‘we cannot understand legal argument and controversy except on the 
assumption that the truth conditions of propositions of law include moral considerations’ (ibid 234), or to put it 
another way, ‘every conclusion about what the law is, necessarily involves evaluative considerations’ (Andrei 
Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (2
nd
 edn, Hart, 2005) 27). 
29
 Matthew H Kramer, ‘Legal Positivism and Objectivity’ (2006) 5 (2) APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Law 
9, 12 (emphasis in original). 
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judges decide hard cases. It will also be highlighted where relevant that because of these 
theoretical similarities, it is very likely that both Dworkin’s and Kramer’s theories will come 
to the same outcome in practice.
30 
2. Charting the history of modest Incorporationism 
To begin, it is necessary to outline modest Incorporationism in detail. Kramer’s 
Incorporationism is as follows: 
Incorporationism consists in the following thesis: it can be the case, though it need not 
be the case, that a norm’s correctness as a moral principle is a sufficient condition for 
its status as a legal norm in this or that jurisdiction. Albeit the role of moral 
correctness as a sufficient condition for legal validity is not inherent in the concept of 
law, it can be operative under the basic criteria for law ascertainment in any particular 
legal regime. Incorporationism maintains that moral principles regularly regarded by 
judges and other officials as legally determinative in this manner are indeed legal 
norms, notwithstanding that they have perhaps never been laid down in explicit 
sources such as legislative enactments or judicial rulings. When legal officials do 
engage in a practice of treating the moral soundness of norms as a sufficient condition 
for the norm’s legal authoritativeness, they have thereby incorporated moral 
                                                          
30
 It may also be questioned as to why this chapter will not look at ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’ (Kramer, Moral 
Principles and Legal Validity (n8) 45). It may seem a more interesting comparison to Dworkin’s theory of law 
because ‘exclusive legal positivists contend that the very nature of law is inconsistent both with the role of 
moral principles as legal norms and with the role of such principles as criteria for validating legal norms’ (ibid 
46). However, ‘[t]hey do not deny … that judges can be obligated to apply moral principles, only that their 
being obligated to do so does not entail that such principles are law’ (Scott J Shapiro, ‘On Hart’s Way Out’ 
(1998) 4 Legal Theory 469, 483). These comments are remarkably similar to Dworkin’s commitments. That is, 
that when moral principles are relied upon, they are relied upon as moral  principles, not that everything that 
figures among certain truth conditions should be counted as belonging to a distinct set of rules or principles 
called legal (Dworkin, JIR (n11) 234). Indeed, Dworkin has commented that ‘I suppose that if I had to choose I 
would opt for exclusive [ ] positivism, though my heart isn’t in it’ (ibid 239).  This is bar obviously each 
theory’s underlying ideas as to ‘the point of legal practice’ (Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out (n30) 505, footnote 
67). Whilst this point is not examined in great detail here, suffice to say the more interesting question and 
comparison here, given the scope of the chapter and thesis, is what the effect is on the moral principles 
characteristics when they become incorporated to the law so as to become legal norms (Kramer, Moral 
Principles and Legal Validity (n8) 45). 
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principles into their system—even before some or all of the applicable principles have 
received explicit recognition.
31
 
Kramer seeks to refine this thesis by adhering to a doctrine of modest Incorporationism: 
‘[modest] Incorporationist theory submits that, even in legal systems where moral correctness 
does amount to a sufficient condition for legal validity, it cannot amount to such a condition 
in most cases. Only in hard cases do any Incorporationist criteria…become activated’.32  
These definitions also ‘echo a number of passages in [Kramer’s] previous expositions of 
Incorporationism’33. As these passages will help clarify the role of the Incorporationist 
doctrine in hard cases, it is necessary to also note these. These passages include the notion 
that: 
By regularly adverting to the fundamental requirements of morality as the foundation 
for their choices of dispositive norms in hard cases, the officials engage in an 
Incorporationist practice that absorbs all genuine precepts of morality into the law 
regardless of whether those precepts have been discretely identified and designated as 
such. That blanket absorption through the justificatory orientation of the officials is 
the cardinal way in which they treat moral principles as laws.
34 
However, there is a complex interlink with previous precedential cases:  
                                                          
31
 Kramer, Why The Axioms (n8) 556. 
32
 Kramer, Throwing Light (n6) 124. Kramer rejects a ‘robust Incorporationist stance’ (Kramer, Throwing Light 
(n6) 124), whereby, ‘a robust Incorporationist … is keen to stress that the processes of law-ascertainment in any 
given regime might render moral worthiness the lone sufficient condition for legal validity’ (Kramer, WLMM, 
(n8) 25), on the basis of ‘not purely … conceptual analysis but also on an empirical assumption’ (Kramer, 
Throwing Light (n6) 124), which leads to the ‘onset of crippling irregularity’ (Kramer, WLMM (n8) 31). For 
further arguments see Kramer, Throwing Light (n6) 124-30; Kramer On Morality (n25) 76-81; Kramer, WLMM 
(n8) 26-35. See also Jules Coleman’s extensive critique of Kramer’s distinction between a modest and robust 
Incorporationist thesis in Jules L Coleman, ‘Constraints on the Criteria of Legality’ (2000) 6 Legal Theory 171, 
178 footnote 17 (hereafter Constraints). 
33
 Kramer, Moral Principles and Legal Validity (n8) 49. 
34
 Kramer, Of Final Things (n8) 96. For further elaboration, see Kramer, ibid at 94-5; Kramer, WLMM (n14) 71-
75, 90-91. What is interesting and will become important later is the notion of a ‘justificatory orientation’ 
(Kramer, Of Final Things (n8) 96).  
57 
 
The moral principles absorbed into the law by the Incorporationist criteria…do 
directly determine the content of the law, even though their content determining 
effects are subordinate to the Court’s rulings. The subordination of any such effects 
consists in their susceptibility to being displaced by the Court’s judgements, but that 
susceptibility is activated only within the confines of the judgements themselves and 
their precedential impacts. There is no across-the-board displacement; there are only 
piecemeal displacements.
35
  
Further, ‘though each of the true principles of morality is subject to being superseded as a law 
for hard cases, by a precedent setting invocation of some alternative touchstone, each of those 
principles remains a part of the law until it is so supersede.
36 
Finally, to present a comprehensive picture as possible, it is also worthwhile noting Kramer’s  
discussions of Incorporationism have laid down a complex test for the status of any 
norm as a law within any particular jurisdiction. An existent norm N is among a legal 
system’s laws if and only if each of the following two conditions is satisfied: 
(i) N itself is regularly treated by the system’s officials as a justificatory basis for 
adjudicative decisions, or N derives from a provenance that is regularly treated 
by officials as a general source for binding of binding bases for adjudicative 
decisions. 
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 Kramer, Of Final Things (n8) 90. Kramer also discusses this notion in relation to ‘misapplications of the 
Incorporationist criteria’ (ibid 91). He notes ‘the official’s misapplications of the incorporationist criteria in hard 
cases do not alter the general fact that those criteria endow the correct principles of morality with the status of 
laws for such cases. Yet, insofar as the misapplications have precedential force, they effect specific alterations in 
the law. Any such misapplication displaces some moral precept that is optimal for addressing hard cases of 
some type, and substitutes it for an inferior precept which has thereby gained the status of a law for addressing 
hard cases of that type’ (ibid 91). 
36
 ibid 91. For further elaboration on the ‘multiplicity and rankings’ (ibid 88) of the ‘modestly Incorporationist 
… Rule of Recognition’ (ibid 90) in the context of Rebutting Kenneth Himma’s arguments, see Kramer, ibid 91-
93. 
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(ii) Either N is a product of one or more of the system’ s authoritative law 
generating organs, such as a legislature or a court or  a constitutional 
assembly; or it is free floating.
37
   
2.1. One initial criticism 
Kramer’s refinements to this complex doctrine provide a degree of clarity. However, even at 
this stage, one preliminary point may be raised. It concerns the substance of disagreements 
occurring in hard cases. As Kramer is a positivist, what John Gardner calls the ‘distinctive 
proposition of “legal positivism”’38 becomes important; ‘in any legal system, whether a given 
norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on 
its sources, not its merits (where its merits in the relevant sense include the merits of its 
sources)’.39 The reason for the contingency of the incorporation of moral principles is 
because Kramer adheres to the idea law ascertainment is a matter of convention. Such 
conventions are formed only by the attitudes and behaviour of legal officials and others 
involved in the legal process. Kramer believes this is so, and that judges are engaged in the 
application of conventional criteria even in certain hard cases. This is in response to 
Dworkin’s argument that as judges disagree over which criteria to use to ascertain what the 
law is in a particular scenario, and conventions involve convergence, these law-ascertaining 
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criteria cannot be conventional, and must necessarily include evaluative considerations. 
Kramer responds by highlighting a distinction regarding disagreement concerning criteria; the 
distinction between disagreeing over the application of criteria (whether the rule applies in a 
certain instance), and disagreement about the content of the criteria itself (disagreement about 
the very rules of the convention). Kramer contends that Dworkin fails to recognise this 
distinction, and believes that many more disagreements that arise are over the application of a 
certain criteria, though he does admit that some disputes are over the content of certain 
criteria.
40
   
However, this creates a problem, heightened by the very substance of the disagreements in 
hard cases. Kramer acknowledges ‘Dworkin’s prime purpose in adducing an array of hard 
cases…is to…[highlight] theoretical disagreements—disagreements of a sort that supposedly 
cannot be acknowledged by legal positivists’.41 For example, ‘suppose the judges on a 
particular court accept as a matter of convention that they must follow the past decisions of 
higher courts, but disagree about whether they must follow their own past decisions’.42 
Whilst this can be seen as an instance of theoretical disagreement, in that there is no 
convention upon such a matter, it could be restated as an instance of criterial disagreement 
over matters of application as opposed to content. However, because the substance of the 
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disagreement is of a fundamental nature, it still would need to be resolved by the application 
of non-conventional principles of political morality. Therefore, in order for Kramer to show 
in hard cases legal systems rest on an Incorporationist criterion, Kramer’s notion of such a 
criterion would need to be so abstract to take account of such deep disagreements to the point 
it would become trivial.
43
 Though Kramer may proclaim ‘[w]hat the officials are required to 
do under the Incorporationist criteria in their Rule of Recognition is determined not by the 
beliefs about the extensions of those criteria, but the objective extensions themselves’44, this 
criterion becomes ‘of little practical use in resolving critical arguments about what “the law” 
requires’.45 It can be reasonably inferred that, in order to restate the theoretical disagreement 
as one of criterial disagreement, the criterion above would have to roughly take the form that 
disputes as to whether to follow precedent are to be settled by looking at whether, overall, it 
is morally proper to do so.
46
 Thus, even if it was accepted such a criterion existed, it would 
not provide any real use as a normative tool to suggest how judges should take a more 
proactive role in relation to medical law cases having an inherently ethical content, and how 
they should apply moral principles and medical ethics to deal with the legal and ethical issues 
arising in a responsible manner.  
These arguments also lead onto the related unwanted conclusion that the content of the 
convention is of such abstraction that the practices for justifying outcomes of particular cases 
could be radically divergent, yet still be counted as conventional, due to the sheer 
abstractness of the convention itself. Indeed, almost any legal practice could be counted as 
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conventional.
47
 This in turn does not, nor would it, make the task easier for judges to rely 
upon this criterion. Finally, and more forcefully: 
the strategy eviscerates the idea of convention itself.  A convention exists only when 
each person acts in a certain way because others are acting in that way as well; a 
convention makes the appropriateness of behaviour dependent on the convergent 
behaviour of others…But it is implausible to think that any judge’s conviction that he 
ought to decide cases in a [morally appropriate] way depends on the convergent 
behaviour of others. A judge would think that he should decide in a proper way 
whatever other judges do or think. What is the alternative? Deciding [immorally]?
48
 
Whilst these latter two claims are contentious, they do give reason for doubting 
Incorporationism as a model that can guide judges.
49
 Kramer’s theoretical explanation 
regarding the role moral principles play in hard cases does not accurately capture what occurs 
in relation to disagreements in hard cases. Further, no direction is or can be given to judges 
regarding how they should apply moral principles to take a more proactive role in the 
resolution of controversial issues in case law involving (for example) informed consent. It 
therefore seems these social norms ‘satisfy positivistic requirements in a purely formalistic 
way’.50 These arguments shall be probed further in the latter stages of this chapter. 
Still, it must be noted Kramer does acknowledge there can be instances of theoretical 
disagreement. This, however, causes more problems for Kramer’s theory. For if he is willing 
to acknowledge in principle the distinction between disagreements over content and 
application, Kramer needs a theory or way to distinguish between when disagreements are of 
a theoretical nature, or when they are disagreements over application of a single convention. 
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Because Kramer is willing to entertain the possibility of both types of disagreement 
occurring, it may be very hard, even theoretically, to draw the distinction between criterial 
disagreements and theoretical disagreements. This is true even if Kramer was to say his 
theory is nonetheless operative in all circumstances and does not need another method to 
distinguish when disagreements are of a particular nature.
51
 Thus because of this difficulty, 
Kramer’s modest Incorporationism is ineffective as a tool to show how judges should be 
more proactive in coming to an ethically and legally responsible decision by applying moral 
principles in cases with an inherently ethical content. By Kramer’s own admissions, his 
theory still leaves matters unclear. This account of moral principles, whereby they are 
external to “the law” and then incorporated so as to become legal norms does not show 
appropriately how courts have the ability to realise the possibility to be more proactive in 
cases like Sidaway and Chester. 
To recap, Kramer’s theory of Modest Incorporationism has been set out. Potential problems 
with Kramer’s theory which need addressing and clarifying have also been highlighted. This 
chapter shall now go on to look at the theoretical similarities between Kramer and Dworkin 
in regards to the characteristics of moral principles in hard cases. 
3. Modest Incorporationism’s characterisation of laws, legal norms and moral 
principles 
Having outlined modest Incorporationism, a comparative analysis between it and Dworkin’s 
theory is necessary. The similarities provide a detailed explanation as to the role moral 
principles play in helping judges decide such issues with which both agree. Therefore, we can 
be confident that we are providing the best explanation of how to use moral principles to 
come to a legally and ethically proactive and responsible decision in hard cases. The 
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differences in theory are also important, as a closer look at each theory ascertains which 
theory is a better reflection of legal practice, and which theory is more useful as a normative 
framework for providing a basis for judges to take this more proactive stance in inherently 
ethical cases. Finally it will be highlighted via the similarities in theory how far modest 
Incorporationism has to come towards Dworkin’s adjudicative principle of integrity, but will 
also show the relevant ‘germane point[s] of dissimilarity’52 between Kramer’s arguments and 
Dworkin’s. These distinctions shall be explored thematically. 
3.1. Peremptoriness 
The first theme is peremptoriness. Peremptoriness here is defined as the ability for rules 
(including laws and legal norms) to act as exclusionary reasons, requiring us to act in a 
certain way; these rules interpose themselves between persons and the various reasons there 
are for acting one way or another.
53
 As Kramer believes ‘the role of law [is] an institution that 
establishes source-based standards for the purpose of steering conduct’,54 Kramer implicitly 
endorses the notion laws and ordinary legal norms ‘partake of peremptoriness’.55 Further 
evidence and a key contrast with moral principles is highlighted when Kramer seeks to 
counter the problem that ‘when officials adhere to an Incorporationist Rule of Recognition, 
the legal norms which they ascertain are not reasons for the decisions they reach. Instead they 
reside wholly in the Rule of Recognition itself’.56 Kramer notes ‘[w]e ought not to be 
surprised that the moral principles invoked to fill the gaps in the source based law are 
                                                          
52
 Kramer On Morality (n25) 71. 
53
 Kramer, Throwing Light (n6) 117; Dworkin, JIR (n11) 204; J E Penner, McCoubrey &White’s Textbook on 
Jurisprudence (4
th
 edn, OUP 2008) 120) (emphasis in original). See also Raz’s formulation in footnote 4 above. 
It must also be noted here that although Shapiro makes a distinction between Raz’s use of ‘exclusionary 
reasons’ (Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (n4) 40) and Hart’s use of ‘peremptory reasons’ (Scott J Shapiro, 
‘Law, Morality and the Guidance of Conduct’, (2000) 6 Legal Theory 127, 164) (see Shapiro’s discussion, ibid 
163-167), Kramer treats the distinction as dubious (Kramer, Throwing Light (n8) 118-120).  The concepts shall 
be treated as synonymous throughout the chapter.  
54
 Kramer, Throwing Light (n8) 134. 
55
 Kramer, WLMM (n8) 23 
56
 ibid 36. Kramer also notes ‘Shapiro contends that the distinction is of the upmost importance because of the 
basic role that is ascribed to law … the role of presenting people with norms that can guide and direct their 
conduct’(ibid 19) . 
64 
 
different from any ordinary legal norm, in that they are incapable of serving as reason-
creating-guides for people’s conduct’.57 
A number of additional functions of this nonguiding legal norm (meaning that moral 
principle which has been incorporated into the law, in contrast to an ordinary legal norm or 
law laid down by, say, statute)
58
 are then elaborated on. These are ‘described…as that of 
“terminating disputes” and “achieving closure” and “resol[ving]the points at issue”’.59 As 
well as this, it is also noted that ‘when moral precepts are applied to the facts of hard cases 
within a [modestly] Incorporationist regime, they perform both a heuristic function and a 
confirmatory function’.60 Despite Kramer’s Incorporationist commitments, these functions 
are similar to the functions of principles that Dworkin speaks of.
61
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We can therefore be confident that moral principles do not function in exactly the same way 
as laws/rules/ordinary legal norms in relation to their providing exclusionary reasons in hard 
cases (though as we shall see in the discussion of applicability-conditions, moral principles 
may be able to provide partially exclusionary reasons). So, if a judge was to rely on the 
guidance provided by the GMC in a case involving informed consent, this would mean the 
moral principles in that guidance would not function so as to require a particular decision one 
way or the other, but would add weight to the line of argument that these principles support 
(if they are valid and the overall more coherent case can be made using these principles).  
However, despite such similarities, the one relevant basic difference remains apparent; for 
Kramer ‘such principles have been incorporated into the law’62 on the basis of the 
Incorporationist criterion, whereas Dworkin explicitly denies any such notion is needed.
63
 
Therefore, the broader debate concerning “on what theoretical basis can judges take a more 
proactive role in recognising the ethical nature of judicial decision-making and coming to a 
legally and ethically responsible decision?” is answered differently depending upon the 
commitments of each theory. Bringing these arguments together, as modest Incorporationism 
is an ineffective tool for the purposes immediately above, given it does not provide an 
adequate reflection of legal practice in certain circumstances nor any normative guidance, 
and Dworkin’s theory of law is particularly appropriate for these purposes, we can be 
confident Dworkin’s theory of law provides the best legal theoretical explanation as to how 
judges might take a more proactive approach in cases like Sidaway and Chester.  
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3.2. Provenance conditions 
The second theme is provenance conditions,
64
 meaning where moral principles originate 
from, so as to be applicable in a hard case. One main theme throughout Kramer’s writings is 
his emphasis on moral principles being ‘free floating’;65 ‘Incorporationism maintains that 
moral principles regularly regarded by judges and other officials as legally determinative are 
indeed legal norms, notwithstanding that they have perhaps never been laid down in any 
explicit sources such as legislative enactments, or constitutional provisions or administrative 
regulations’.66 The reason for Kramer’s emphasis on provenance conditions is because of his 
Incorporationist commitments. Kramer needs to look explicitly at the free floatingness of 
moral principles to answer the larger question of their availability to become legal norms.
67
   
When Dworkin’s idea of where principles originate from is compared, Dworkin notes ‘a 
proposition of law is true if it flows from principles of personal and political morality 
generally treated as true in contemporary legal practice’.68 This leads to two interesting points 
concerning the characteristics of moral principles, and the role they play in hard cases on 
Dworkin’s account. First, Dworkin relies upon moral principles as part of an interpretive fact 
used to justify a proposition of law;
69
 ‘facts figure…in the “interpretive” account of law but 
only because they are embedded in moral judgements about the moral status of those facts’.70 
Because of this, the question of provenance does not need to be answered in the way it does 
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for Kramer, as facts do not constrain moral judgements (as they are part of them) and are not 
significant in themselves.
71
 
Second, the related question regarding the availability of moral principles is subsumed within 
a larger question of justification for Dworkin. This gives a clear structure to Dworkin’s 
argument. Because Dworkin treats the concept of law as an interpretive concept, this means 
he must come up with a theory of interpretation himself, as a plausible ‘interpretation of the 
higher order practice of using interpretive concepts’.72 His theory of interpretation is that of 
constructive interpretation.
73
  This idea is important in relation to the role of moral principles 
in hard cases in two senses. First, in trying to impose purpose on law in order to make it the 
best possible example of what it can be,
74
 principles will become available when they have 
relevance in the process of constructively trying to interpret the law to attain the correct 
resolution of a particular outcome. However, this final interpretation will again be a moral 
judgement.
75
 Thus, moral principles are relevant here in being offered as the ‘best 
interpretation of other propositions of law generally treated as true’.76 
Further, as legal practice is interpretive, it ‘does not simply exist but has value[.] It serves 
some interest or purpose or enforces some principle—in short [ ] it has some point’77.  The 
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value Dworkin conceptualises for law is integrity. This makes further demands on the use of 
principles so that the law is seen as morally coherent as possible.
78
  By arguing for a plausible 
value, and how that value makes sense of our practices, something important is therefore 
learned about the nature of law and the way that principles should be used if we wish to 
produce a moral outcome in the resolution of disputes.
79
  
Overall, moral principles become available because of the interpretive commitments of 
Dworkin’s theory of law. This is in contrast to Kramer. Since Kramer sees the incorporation 
of moral principles into the law as contingent, the question of the origin of moral principles 
and their availability to be incorporated is one that must be answered explicitly, by looking at 
the characteristics of the principle itself (as well as its ability to resolve the case concerned). 
Kramer seeks to do this by giving an essentially negative connotation, showing why the 
principles of morality are not like foreign laws or associations’ rules.80 This is the provenance 
condition of the moral principle. The specific characteristics of the moral principle and the 
broader overall debate concerning the theoretical basis of a more proactive judicial role are 
altered and answered differently depending upon the commitments of each theory. 
However, it is clear both theories are in agreement at a more general level that moral 
principles are used where they are able to resolve the case at issue, and that judges rely on the 
soundness of their convictions in applying moral principles. This common idea is captured 
and highlighted similarly, but explained in different ways by Kramer’s and Dworkin’s 
theories of law. Thus, we can be confident about the general role moral principles play in 
hard cases. However, it is important to highlight the potential negative implications of the 
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notion of being able to incorporate moral principles because they are free floating and the 
idea of only giving due respect to parallel systems of authority.
81
 These implications lead to a 
rejection of the Incorporationist theory based on its incapacity as a tool to provide a 
theoretical explanation and demonstration as to how judges can take a more proactive role in 
the resolution of the inherent ethical and legal controversies in hard cases. 
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discourse (Miola, Symbiotic (n4) 9), something that may necessarily need to be done in certain cases to come to 
a legally and ethically responsible decision. Admittedly, whilst Kramer may say that we may be able to engage 
with the principles underpinning the guidance itself (as has already been noted) (Miola, Symbiotic (n4) 9), the 
reference to these ethical principles is in context with trying to critically engage with the norms that the 
authoritative system that exists alongside the legal system has laid down (Kramer, WLMM (n8) 39).  This seems 
to be in a direct tension with Kramer’s notion of ‘due respect’ (Kramer, WLMM (n8) 39), given the sharp 
distinction Kramer draws between a legal system and other systems of authority as running parallel to each other 
(Kramer, WLMM  (n8) 39). The GMC is given a statutory mandate and statutory powers to establish a system of 
authority, under the Medical Act 1983, an act of our legal system. That is, ‘the GMC [has a] statutory role as the 
guardian of ethical guidance to the medical profession’ (Miola, Symbiotic (n4) 217). That the two are so closely 
interlinked shows why the law should be able to do more than simply give ‘due respect’ (Kramer, WLMM (n8) 
39) to the GMC’s principles.  At least, given the requirements of Dworkin’s theory, we are able to engage in 
such a practice, due to the demands of his interpretive methodology. 
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3.3. Applicability-conditions 
The final category that needs to be looked at is ‘applicability-conditions’.82 What is meant 
here is the characteristics of how, why and what circumstances a moral principle is applicable 
in hard cases. Much of the applicability-conditions of Kramer’s nonguiding legal norms have 
been highlighted already in the discussion relating to their peremptoriness. The discussions 
are interlinked because these nonguiding legal norms are involved in ‘“terminating 
disputes”…“achieving closure” and “resol[ving]the points at issue”’.83  
There is one important particular contrast between Kramer and Dworkin in relation to how 
and why a moral principle is applicable in hard cases. Although Kramer readily accepts the 
moral principles incorporated under an Incorporationist Rule of Recognition cannot act as 
exclusionary reasons at all,
84
 Dworkin contends that ‘principles have a dimension of weight 
and give agents nonconclusive reasons for action. Valid principles…may conflict and their 
resolution is based on the aggregate weight of the principles on either side of the argument’.85 
It can be inferred from this quote Dworkin sees principles as providing partially exclusionary 
reasons. Though it can be questioned how much prominence Dworkin would give to this 
view, as Dworkin does not endorse the idea that the law’s role is to steer conduct by 
establishing source-based standards for this purpose,
86
 this is not to say the matter is of no 
concern to Dworkin. 
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Concern with principles providing partially exclusionary reasons can be seen in Dworkin’s 
discussions of Raz’s conception of authority. In seeking to rebut Raz’s main contention that 
‘nothing can count as law if citizens must use moral judgement to identify its content’,87 
Dworkin shows a statute with moral content still nonetheless ‘has normative consequences 
for those disposed to accept its authority. They now have an additional reason to reflect 
carefully on the moral quality of everything they do…they would not be making a conceptual 
mistake if they said they were behaving differently out of deference to the authority of the 
new law’.88 This point is commonsensical, and indeed mirrors Kramer’s argument that 
‘restrictions on the scope of a peremptory reason are fully compatible with its nature as such 
a reason’.89 However, Dworkin’s discussion of whether moral principles provide 
exclusionary reasons is bound up within his broader argument that moral considerations can 
(and necessarily do) figure in the criteria for identifying true propositions of law.
90
 Therefore, 
one of the broadest debates in legal theory impacts upon the debate concerning the theoretical 
basis on how judges can take a more proactive role in recognising the ethical nature of 
judicial decision-making and coming to a legally and ethically responsible decision. It also 
leads to differing explanations as to the characteristics of moral principles in hard cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as opposed to it being the methodological feature of Dworkin’s position (Halpin, Thirty Years (n5) 76-77). This 
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regarding their applicability-conditions and peremptoriness, and the reasons behind their 
peremptoriness. 
To return to Kramer’s contention that the incorporated moral principles are not exclusionary 
reasons,
91
 it is also clear for Kramer that the ‘justificatory orientation is the crucial condition 
for the existence and contents of the modestly Incorporationist criteria in [the officials’] Rule 
of Recognition’.92 This justificatory orientation is a sustained regular practice of appealing to 
the general requirements of morality as the basis for choosing the norms with which judges 
resolve hard cases.
93
 Further, those moral principles that judges cite are a means of giving 
expression to the requirements of the modestly Incorporationist Rule of Recognition.
94
 It can 
be deduced from these statements there is an element of weight in relation to these 
principles.
95
 However, this notion of weight must be distinguished from the way it is used by 
Dworkin. This notion of weight for Kramer takes on a more trivial sense than the way in 
Dworkin uses it. This stems from those moral principles not being able to serve as reason-
creating guides, since they do not add any reasons-for-action to the reasons that already exist 
as a result of the criteria in the Rule of Recognition itself.
96
 This is opposed to the Dworkin’s 
contention that ‘[i]f a judge believes principles he is bound to recognise point in one direction 
and that principles pointing in the other direction, if any, are not of equal weight, then he 
must decide accordingly’.97 We can also see that ‘an Incorporationist legal system['s] Rule of 
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Recognition settles everything in advance’.98 Thus, the dimension of weight only becomes 
applicable when a judge appeals to those moral principles as an aid to applying the modestly 
Incorporationist Rule of Recognition in a particular case,
99
 as opposed to making ‘a 
proposition of law true in virtue of an interpretive fact’.100  
The distinction can be summed up by noting facts are significant in themselves for Kramer 
given his positivist commitments, as opposed to not being so for Dworkin.
101
 It is in this 
sense the dimension of weight becomes trivial. Putting this all together, if a judge was to rely 
on guidance provided by the GMC in a case involving informed consent, this would mean for 
Kramer, the moral principles in that guidance would not function so as to require a particular 
decision one way or the other. They are a means of giving expression to the requirements of 
the modestly Incorporationist Rule of Recognition. Nor would these moral principles add any 
further exclusionary reasons to the modestly Incorporationist Rule of Recognition. They are 
simply there to fill gaps in the source-based law. These moral principles would be 
incorporated into “the law” so as to aid the application of this Rule of Recognition. It is in 
this trivial sense these moral principles would add weight to the line of argument they 
support. In contrast, this would mean for Dworkin the moral principles in that guidance 
would not necessitate or completely require a particular decision one way or another. 
However, these moral principles can still have normative implications and act as partially 
exclusionary reasons. This is because they may figure in the truth conditions of a true 
proposition of law, that proposition providing the most coherent interpretation of other true 
propositions of law. It is in virtue of this interpretive fact that moral principles would add a 
non-trivial weight to the line of argument they support. 
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This comparison highlights the characteristics and function of the moral principle are 
different in relation to broader commitments of either theory. In concluding, under this theme 
the broader commitments of both modest Incorporationism and Dworkin’s theory of law have 
the biggest impact upon the characteristics of the role that moral principles play in hard cases. 
Because of this, as has been adverted throughout the discussion, it then becomes important to 
determine which theory is law is more favourable over the other. 
3.4. Overall conclusion 
In concluding overall, the foregoing comparative evaluation has shown the similarities 
between Dworkin’s and Kramer’s theory of law. For example, both Kramer and Dworkin 
believe moral principles are continuously present, or pervasive, in the resolution of hard 
cases, and are arguments which incline in one direction or another.
102
 In addition, though 
both theories differ in their specific explanation as to the provenance conditions of moral 
principles, the fact Kramer also regularly speaks of how the ‘justificatory orientation is the 
crucial condition for the existence and contents of the modestly Incorporationist criteria’,103 
shows both theorists believe judges rely on the soundness of their convictions in applying 
moral principles.
104
 However, depending on the theoretical viewpoint, the judge’s reliance on 
the soundness of her convictions in applying moral principles comes into play at different 
points and for different reasons. 
This evaluation is important for two further reasons. First, in trying to theoretically explain 
how judges can take a more proactive approach in cases like Sidaway and Chester, it shows 
                                                          
102
 Dworkin, TRS (n3) 26; Kramer, Throwing Light (n6) 132. See further how it was noted earlier in setting out 
the doctrine of modest Incorporationism that ‘[b]y regularly adverting to the fundamental requirements of 
morality as the foundation for their choices of dispositive norms in hard cases, the officials engage in an 
Incorporationist practice that absorbs all genuine precepts of morality into the law regardless of whether those 
precepts have been discretely identified and designated as such. That blanket absorption through the 
justificatory orientation of the officials is the cardinal way in which they treat moral principles as laws’ 
(Kramer, Of Final Things (n8) 96) (emphasis added).  
103
 Kramer, Of Final Things (n8) 90. 
104
See also, explicitly, Dworkin, TRS (n3) at 124, and Law’s Empire (n7) at 261-262. 
75 
 
we can be confident regarding the roles moral principles play when judges decide hard cases. 
Second, it has also highlighted the relevant basic difference between Dworkin and Kramer’s 
theories. Whilst the similarities of the roles moral principles play in hard cases has been 
highlighted, the explanation for those roles, and the larger debate of the theoretical basis of 
how judges can take a more proactive role to come to a legally and ethically responsible 
decision in hard cases is answered differently by Kramer and Dworkin because of the 
‘germane point[s] of dissimilarity’105 that have been shown in the foregoing discussion. Thus 
when coupled with the arguments previously noted against Kramer, this shows the more 
plausible framework for the operation of moral principles in hard cases, and the normative 
potential of the law and bioethical theory to obtain the resolution of controversy
106
 is 
Dworkin’s theory. 
Further, the paradox between the findings in the last chapter and the current one can now be 
made explicit. It has been identified in this chapter that two theories with fundamental 
opposing divisions agree that judges rely on the soundness of their moral convictions in 
applying moral principles. Chapter three shall establish this further. But in contrast, it was 
highlighted in Miola’s three-element analysis, and in the discussion of Sidaway and Chester 
in the last chapter that for judges ‘[a]t times, medical ethics is seen as nothing more than 
“professional etiquette” not to be interfered with. At others, judges will instinctively abrogate 
decision-making responsibility to medical ethics as soon as they identify the ethical issues in 
a case’.107 The central research question attempts to dissolve this paradox by showing this 
abrogation is unnecessary. A theoretical explanation of the basis of legal practice, integrated 
with sophisticated ethical theory demonstrates how judges can come to a legally and ethically 
responsible decision in hard cases.  
                                                          
105
 Kramer, On Morality (n25) 71. 
106
Halpin, Thirty Years (n5) 92. 
107
 Miola, Symbiotic (n4) 9. In relation to Sidaway, see chapter 1 point 3.1.1., “Misidentification of the nature of 
arguments” and Chester point 3.2.2., “Misidentification of the nature of arguments”. 
76 
 
Finally, this leads us to another important point of the last section. That is the highlighting of 
certain ideas and commitments by Kramer that can be used to further critique his theory to 
show it is inadequate for the purposes set out. This task will now be undertaken, before 
turning to another point of difference between Kramer and Dworkin. 
4. Modest Incorporationism: further problems with Kramer’s own admissions 
It was highlighted above that for Kramer the role of law in his modest Incorporationism is as 
an institution that establishes standards which are source-based for the purpose of guiding 
conduct.
108
 It is reasonable to conclude from this that Kramer sees ‘the law’s primary 
function…[as being] to motivationally guide the conduct of judicial officials via its secondary 
rules [here, by the modestly Incorporationist Rule of Recognition]’.109 However, ‘guidance 
by a rule presupposes at least a high degree of conformity’.110 This notion has led to a number 
of criticisms of Incorporationism. First, due to the level and scale of disagreement of officials 
(as opposed to the substance of those disagreements) and the divergence of officials’ 
decisions in hard cases, there does not in fact exist a modestly Incorporationist Rule of 
Recognition, as there is no relevant convergence of behaviour.
111
 Further, Incorporationism 
merely shows us that judges can be committed to the same rule, and are not actually guided 
by the same rule.
112
  
Kramer seeks to counter these objections by contending that if the justifications by the 
officials themselves and the patterns of official justifications are examined, then this shows 
how officials whose decisions may be in disagreement may still be adhering to the 
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Incorporationist Rule of Recognition;
113
 ‘the existence of the Incorporationist criterion in a 
modestly Incorporationist Rule of Recognition does not depend on the emergence of a 
formulation to which all officials subscribe. Instead, it depends on a practice of justification 
in which the Incorporationist criterion is immanent as a shared presupposition’.114 But, this 
leads Kramer’s theory into more problems, in that if the practice is construed as interpreting a 
particular criterion, that criterion is extremely abstract.  
This is reinforced by a number of points made in Kramer’s writings. Bound up with this 
practice of justification is the notion that criticism ‘will descend upon the [c]ourt in the 
aftermath of hard cases, irrespective of the outcomes that were reached’.115 This statement 
supports the idea that we may be able to count any legal practice as conventional
116
 and thus 
‘these social norms satisfy positivistic requirements in a purely formalistic way’.117 If judges 
are going to be critiqued regardless of the outcome of their case, this implies the range of 
reasons that potentially can be invoked to dispose of the case is great. Therefore, if we wish 
to formulate a convention that captures the whole range of these reasons, it is likely that the 
convention will have to become increasingly broader to capture the relevant “convergent” 
behaviour, until ultimately it gives no specific direction as to how to apply moral principles to 
resolve hard cases. This is despite Kramer noting that ‘in hard cases with no uniquely correct 
solutions, [modestly] Incorporationist officials will be acting in accordance with their Rule of 
Recognition so long as the moral principles which they invoke and the outcomes which they 
favour are within the range of acceptable principles and outcomes’.118   
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What further supports this critique is Kramer’s idea that an Incorporationist Rule of 
Recognition exists if there is a practice of justification in which the Incorporationist criterion 
is shared and presupposed by judges.
119
 Kramer rejects the idea that there is a conventional 
criterion which treats a principle’s moral correctness as sufficient for legal validity which is 
applicable in all cases, as opposed to hard ones.
120
 This rejection is on the explicit basis that 
‘the scheme of governance which [such a Rule of Recognition] underpins is devoid of the 
operational regularity that characterises any genuine system of law’.121 This is due to the 
widespread divergences in people’s moral outlooks and answers to moral questions in large, 
complex societies.
122
 However, Kramer notes this will still occur within a modestly 
Incorporationist regime.
123
 It is these very points which render the idea of ‘a practice of 
justification in which the Incorporationist criterion is immanent as a shared 
presupposition’124 liable to the charge that in hard cases, for such a criterion to be shared at 
all, it has to be of such abstraction as to be able to class any potentially justifiable course of 
conduct as conventional; controversy is controversy regardless of the range of cases over 
which it occurs, and even then, the range of controversy does not tell us about how often such 
controversy may occur.
125
 Whilst Kramer tries to counter this by contending his rejection of 
robust Incorporationism is at the level of application,
126
 Kramer is only able to reject the 
doctrine at such a level by again adhering to such an abstract criterion that trivialises 
positivism in the ways commented before.  
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Following this line of argument through, as judges adjudicate on hard cases in which 
criticism will be administered regardless of the outcome of the case,
127
 the more plausible 
proposition is one which judges rely on non-conventional principles of political and personal 
morality and their ‘own moral and political convictions’,128 as opposed to a conventional 
practice to dispose of hard cases.  
Kramer is however correct to note, in line with his positivist commitments, that such 
convictions need not be moral in tenor.
129
 However, leaving aside the fact that as the scope of 
investigation is limited to cases with an inherently ethical content like Sidaway and Chester 
(and thus it is far more likely that judges who use their own convictions to rely on moral 
principles for the sake of terminating disputes are going to use convictions which are moral in 
tenor
130
), if Kramer does wish to contend that in some circumstances there can be a consensus 
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of conviction, though those convictions need not be moral in tenor,
131
 then his critique that 
Dworkin fails to understand the distinction between disagreements over application of certain 
criteria and the content of criteria has disappeared. We are left with a theory that has to 
potentially give up its conventionalist stance to allow for the facts of hard cases, facts to 
which Kramer himself adverts. More importantly, the main tenet of his theory, the 
Incorporationist criterion, has all but disappeared. Finally, even if it was to be conceded there 
could be some legal systems or authoritative decisions which are grounded on convictions 
that are not moral in tenor,
132
 what would this system look like and operate in practice? As 
Guest notes: 
It is difficult to see how one could “ground” a legal argument by using a principle of, 
say, racial “purity”, based on hate, prejudice, mistake, mere repetition of the views of 
others, cosmological “truths”, weird psychology, and so on. Could you coherently 
determine whether a racially “pure” citizen had been “prejudiced” by the incorrect 
application of such principles? It makes neither rational nor moral sense.
133 
Last, other arguments Kramer makes show another potentially more serious problem that 
threatens his Incorporationism. Kramer is so prepared to show officials may be adhering to 
the Incorporationist criterion, even if they misidentify the correct moral principles in a 
particular case,
134
 he seems at one point to abandon the notion that a sufficient condition for a 
norm to be considered as a legal norm is its correctness as a moral principle. He notes in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
not present a particularly large problem. That is because, as the thesis is dealing with bioethical principles, these 
principles, and thus convictions, are by necessity moral.  
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replying to the charge that ‘the officials’ Rule of Recognition is Incorporationist only in its 
content and not in its effects’,135 that:  
legal officials who persistently choose the wrong moral principles when coming to 
grips with hard cases might nonetheless be invoking some set of principles with 
substantial regularity…In any event, so long as the courts achieve a significant 
measure of uniformity in their invocations of norms for hard cases, there will be a fact 
of the matter concerning the norms which the sundry courts are generally disposed to 
apply in such cases.
136
 
What seems to matter here is the effect of the Incorporationist Rule of Recognition, but at the 
cost of its content. Kramer now seems to be emphasising that there will be some 
incorporation of moral principles that judges will be disposed to follow, simply because there 
is a regular practice of these principles being invoked.
137
 Kramer seems to be allowing for 
moral principles to be incorporated into the law solely on the basis of their regular invocation, 
as opposed to being concerned with their content.
138
 But ‘[w]hatever might be established 
empirically about [ ] norms…nothing normative would follow directly from this finding’.139 
We need to look at the content of that principle, not just how regularly that principle has been 
used. This is arguably a more serious problem than modest Incorporationism resting upon a 
trivial abstract convention.
140
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Thus, even if we concede judges are guided by the same criterion,
141
 this still runs Kramer 
into trouble in relation to other aspects of his theory. The comments intended to rebut the 
claims that a modestly Incorporationist Rule of Recognition cannot exist highlight the sheer 
abstractness of the criterion on which such a regime has to be based. This trivialises 
positivism by eliminating the idea of a convention itself, making legal reasoning indistinct, 
and being so abstract so as to encompass any morally justifiable course of action as 
conventional, no matter how radically divergent from other practices.
142
 More specifically, 
Kramer is so adamant in defending his theory of law at all costs that the arguments he himself 
uses lead to some striking conclusions. Most notable is that Kramer’s theory collapses into 
Dworkin’s. Alternatively, his positivistic stance can only be saved by abandoning his 
conventionalist stance, which is the basis of his modest Incorporationism. Finally, separately 
from all this, Kramer comes close to denying that a norms’ correctness as a moral principle is 
a sufficient condition for it to be incorporated into “the law”, and all that is required instead is 
a regular procedure of invoking some set of moral principles.
143
 Therefore, if judges are to be 
provided with a decision-making framework to come to a legally and ethically responsible 
decision in cases like Sidaway and Chester, Kramer’s theory of law cannot be used. 
This chapter shall finally go on to look at the second theoretical distinction between Kramer’s 
and Dworkin’s theories of law. That is, Dworkin contends every hard case has a right answer, 
whereas Kramer asserts there are some hard cases with no single correct resolution. It shall 
also be highlighted how Dworkin’s contention that there is a single right answer in hard 
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cases
144
 alleviates a number of problems highlighted in Miola’s three-element analysis in the 
previous chapter. An overall conclusion to the chapter shall then be provided, which will 
begin to set out the more positive reasons why Dworkin’s theory of law proves a better 
framework to integrate with a bioethical theory to form a mutually complementary 
framework that is able to provide a theoretical explanation of how courts have the ability to 
realise the possibility of taking a more proactive role in coming to a legally and ethically 
responsible decision in hard cases with an inherently ethical content. This will lead on to the 
investigations to be conducted in chapter three of this thesis. 
5. One right distinction? 
If Kramer’s arguments concerning right answers and hard cases are valid, then this threatens 
to undermine Dworkin’s adjudicative principle of integrity. This is important, because if there 
are problems with both Kramer’s and Dworkin’s theories of law, we cannot use either to 
provide the best explanation of how to use moral principles to come to a legally and ethically 
proactive responsible decision in inherently ethical hard cases. Many of the negative effects 
of judicial deference to the medical profession in cases involving inherently ethical matters 
identified in the previous chapter may not be remedied.  
Again, this distinction concerns the notion that ‘Dworkin has long affirmed that there is a 
uniquely correct answer to every legal question or virtually every legal question that might 
arise in any particular jurisdiction’.145 By contrast, Kramer contends there can be ‘hard cases 
with no uniquely correct solutions’.146 The cases he has in mind are explained in his article, 
When is There Not One Right Answer?
147
 The problems involve ‘moral vagueness’,148 
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resulting potentially in a ‘sorites paradox’,149 and ‘[i]ncommensurability and value 
pluralism’.150 Regarding the latter, Kramer’s solution is that ‘[f]ully consistent with 
[Dworkin’s] thesis is the spectre of inescapable wrongness; sometimes, the uniquely correct 
response to a moral problem lies in opting for the lesser of the two wrongs’.151 In addition, it 
is also noted ‘[w]hat is crucial here is that conflicting moral obligations will remain operative 
regardless of whether there is a determinately correct choice to be made between them’.152  
These situations threaten to undermine Dworkin’s notion of there being one right answer to a 
particular case. However what is being considered are ‘aspects of moral situations’.153 Thus, 
whilst it may look problematic for Dworkin at this point, the sting can be taken out of many 
of Kramer’s issues. 
Indeed, at least with regards to the problem of incommensurable values, both Kramer’s and 
Dworkin’s potential solutions look remarkably similar. Incommensurability occurs when 
there are two moral duties or principles, neither of which is more important than the other, 
and they are not of equal importance. This leads to no uniquely correct answer in this 
particular scenario.
154
 Though space precludes a detailed discussion, first, Kramer notes that 
his conception of moral objectivity is very close to Dworkin’s;155 ‘[a]s should be plain, the 
scale of the determinacy or indeterminacy in the moral realm is a moral matter’.156 Second, 
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he states ‘[i]ncommensurability as understood here is a property of moral ontology rather 
than purely of moral epistemology. That is, it consists in a mind independent state of 
unrankability rather than in an epistemic incapacity to detect rankings that nonetheless 
obtain’.157 
Thus, the way to deal with problem Kramer introduces is by looking at Kramer’s own moral 
ontology. This is similar to Dworkin’s in that moral objectivity is a matter of moral argument, 
but is also different as Kramer subscribes to ‘conflicts between moral duties…[in] a plurality 
of ethical values’.158 Both these strands provide the positive argument Kramer needs to make 
this declaration of indeterminacy, as opposed to uncertainty.
159
 Kramer goes on to state ‘[a] 
defender of Dworkin will have to maintain either that the conflicts among the values are 
always ultimately illusory or that those conflicts are always ultimately generative of a 
determinate overall moral relation between the two courses of conduct under 
consideration’,160 and further ‘notwithstanding that uncertainty and complexity are distinct 
from incommensurability, anyone who suggests that those phenomena are never 
accompanied by incommensurability is straining credulity’.161 
However, in relation to Kramer’s claim there are fundamental conflicts between moral duties, 
given his adherence to moral objectivity being a matter of moral argument, one way to argue 
against this is to show there are good moral reasons why this way of describing moral conflict 
is inapposite. Such a task is undertaken in chapter five, when discussing B&C’s ethical theory 
more explicitly. Second, in relation to his contention of “straining credulity”, it seems 
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sufficient to ask why this is the case, As Dworkin notes ‘[n]o such argument is supplied only 
by citing the obvious fact that there are many values and that they cannot all be realised…For 
the question remains…which choice is nevertheless best?’. 162 Regardless, as noted above, 
values being ‘incommensurably counterbalanced does not amount to being negated’.163 
Therefore, if moral duties still operate in a particular scenario, and because moral facts cannot 
“just” be true (alternatively, they cannot be barely true), we always need a reason why a 
moral or legal proposition is true. It thus seems like a morally better scenario is one in which 
in the case we look to work through our apparent conflict by reinterpreting the values at play 
to resolve the dilemma, looking to come to a more responsible decision; we are looking to 
arrive at a greater integrated understanding of our moral and legal responsibilities. We cannot 
simply think that there is an incommensurable conflict at the beginning of our 
deliberations.
164
 Further, as Dworkin notes, it might also be the case that it turns out the best 
interpretation of the pertinent values, and thus the best way to attend to the underlying moral 
responsibility, requires they conflict in a particular scenario. However, this would then mean 
the values have been reconciled in a different manner, rather than having to accept this as a 
fact-of-the-matter. There would be a deeper collaboration which shows conflict in certain 
scenarios.
165 
Kramer also discusses how the imprecision of many moral concepts may lead to a sorites 
paradox, and thus no right answer. A sorites paradox can be seen in the following example: 
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Premise 1: As there is a 99.999% inherent risk of nerve damage during surgery, it is an 
unreasonable surgery to perform, even if the patient consents. 
Premise 2: A surgery in which there is a 99.998% inherent risk of nerve damage is still an 
unreasonable surgery to perform, even if the patient consents. 
If someone was to try and distinguish both these percentages of risk, it is a reasonable 
inference it would be morally arbitrary to do so. But, by repeated application of this latter 
premise, if someone was to try and pin down the point at which the surgery does not become 
inherently risky, they would proceed backwards until reaching 0%. There is no non-arbitrary 
line which could distinguish the point at which the surgery is not inherently risky. Therefore, 
within the distinction between an unreasonable/reasonable risk is a borderline area of 
imprecision. It is within this borderline area that there is no uniquely correct answer as to 
how instances of unreasonable/reasonable risk are to be classified.
166
 
But, given both Kramer and Dworkin subscribe to the idea that moral objectivity is a matter 
of moral argument, both theories of law can deal with this problem in a similar style. As an 
overarching preliminary to this point, the writings of MacCormick provide a basic essential 
function of courts that both Kramer and Dworkin would agree on, even if they do not believe 
it to be the essential function. According to MacCormick ‘[t]he…function or point of courts 
and judges who staff them is the hearing and determining of issues for trial under law 
whenever a binding decision is required on a case competently brought to court’.167 Kramer 
notes that ‘in hard cases with no uniquely correct solutions, all the [modestly] 
Incorporationist officials will be acting in accordance with their Rule of Recognition so long 
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as the moral principles which they invoke and the outcomes which they favour are within the 
range of acceptable principles and outcomes’.168 Similarly, in responding to ‘The Challenge 
of Internal Skepticism’169, Dworkin looks to counter the sceptics challenge, who, as an 
example, ‘insists that the law of accidents…is so shot through with contradiction that no 
interpretation can fit more than an arbitrary and limited part of it’.170 He notes we may have 
to come to a decision where we settle on a particular choice because although we believe the 
impulse behind each of the two competitive principles is attractive, one impulse behind a 
certain principle may be more powerful given the particular circumstances.
171
 The finality for 
Kramer and Dworkin in both of the decisions here can be seen.  
Kramer is also correct to note we cannot insist that a sorites paradox is an area of epistemic 
uncertainty if that moral principle is wholly unknowable, as it would have no normative 
purchase in real life.
172
 Regardless of this, we still need to try to work through this conflict by 
reinterpreting the values at play to come to a more responsible (legal and moral) decision.
173
 
It is only when we have come to the realisation at both a court and legislative level that it 
would be administratively impossible to reach certain decisions on the basis of individual 
factors, we must adopt some pragmatic solution, like Dworkin highlights above.
174
  
Indeed, at least one case has arisen in English law where a problem was put forward 
resembling a sorites paradox, and an approach taken to the problem similar to that discussed 
above. In Waverley Borough Council v Fletcher
 175
, the issue was who was rightly entitled to 
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a medieval brooch found nine inches beneath the surface of land; either the council, or the 
defendant who had used his metal detector to find the brooch.
176
 It was good authority that if 
an object is found on as opposed to under the land, then the owner of that land must ‘manifest 
[ ] an intention to exercise control over a building and the things which may be upon or in it 
so as to acquire rights superior to those of a finder’.177 However, it was also good authority 
that if an object was found under the land, then it was to be treated as part of the land itself.
178
 
So in the instant case, following this, the council would have the better claim. However, in 
Waverley, both counsel for Fletcher and the trial judge contended they  
could see no reason in common sense why the better possessory claim should depend 
upon whether an object was found on or in ground. [Counsel] gave as one of a 
number of examples in support of his argument, a lost watch on a muddy path which 
might within a day or two become covered by a thin coating of mud. Why, [they] 
asked, should the landowner's claim be different and stronger when the watch finally, 
but only just, disappears from sight?
179 
Most importantly here Auld LJ responded by noting that:  
As to borderline cases of the sort mentioned by [Counsel], potential absurdities can 
always be found at the margins in the application of any sound principle. It is for the 
trial judge to determine as a matter of fact and degree on which side of the line, on or 
in the land, an object is found.
180 
Thus, these aspects of moral situations do not trouble Dworkin’s theory of law. Given this, 
Dworkin’s contention there are right answers to hard cases alleviates a couple of problems 
                                                          
176
 Thompson, Modern Land Law (4
th
 edn OUP 2009) 9. 
177
 Parker v British Airways [1982] QB 1004 at 1018, per Donaldson LJ. 
178
 ibid at 1010. 
179
 Waverley (n175) at 345A-B. 
180
 ibid G (emphasis added). 
90 
 
highlighted in the course of Miola’s analysis in the last chapter. Though Miola notes medical 
ethics is in a fragmented state which allows the conscience of the individual medical 
practitioner to fill the void left by the fragmentation of discourse,
181
 on Dworkin’s theory of 
law a true proposition is one which coheres best with those fundamental principles of 
political morality.
182
 This means if there are certain principles inconsistent with that 
proposition that come from competing sources, or cannot be mutually explained by that 
proposition, such principles can be set aside, in the sense they no longer feature as part of the 
truth conditions of a particular proposition of law.
183
 Therefore, rather than there being so 
many principles to cancel each other out, Dworkin’s theory of law alleviates this problem by 
showing which principles are pertinent to the proposition in question.
184
 Moreover, 
Dworkin’s theory of law does give us a method, as far as judicial decision-making is 
concerned, for prioritising or choosing between different categories of discourse, as his 
interpretive methodology enables us to discuss which past political decisions and principles 
bear on the instant case, as integrity is both forward and backward looking.
185
 Finally, all the 
foregoing points show Miola may have misconceived the pertinent issues in his three-element 
analysis, as detailed in chapter one. If we are to use Dworkin’s theory of law, then the 
discussion might be more usefully cast as asking not which principles enshrined in medical 
ethics discourse can we use and bring into “the law” (in some external sense) to come to an 
ethically responsible decision, but which principles, by virtue of their necessary status in the 
truth conditions of propositions of law, can we apply to come to a legally and ethically 
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responsible decision in hard cases, which may be reinforced by referral to medical ethics 
discourse on the basis of our sophisticated ethical theory.  
6. Conclusion 
In concluding, this chapter has looked to identify what role moral principles play in hard 
cases like Sidaway and Chester. It has shown a detailed picture can be built up regarding the 
role of moral principles (and their effects in practice) by looking at the opposing theories of 
modest Incorporationism and the adjudicative principle of integrity. This is important because 
it was highlighted in the conclusion to chapter one and at the beginning of this chapter that a 
key connection between the problems identified in the previous chapter and a starting point 
for a theoretical explanation as to how judges can take a more proactive role in hard cases 
with an inherent ethical content was by building up a detailed explanation as to the role of 
moral principles in hard cases. However, this chapter has also shown Kramer’s and 
Dworkin’s two theories are opposing, and there are important basic differences concerning 
each theory’s broader commitments and explanations of legal practice. These differences at 
the more abstract level filter down and impact upon debates at more specific levels, including 
the discussion concerning the theoretical basis of how judges can take a more proactive role 
in recognising the ethical nature of judicial decision-making, and confidently coming to a 
legal and ethically responsible decision. Indeed, in some circumstances these differences 
filter down into differing explanations for the roles that moral principles play in hard cases. 
Therefore, this chapter has also shown that in order to provide an interlinked, integrated legal 
and ethical framework to show how judges can be more proactive in recognising the ethical 
nature of judicial decision-making and coming to a legally and ethically responsible decision, 
then Kramer’s theory of Incorporationism must be rejected. This account of moral principles, 
whereby they are external to “the law” and are then incorporated, does not show 
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appropriately how courts have the ability to realise the possibility of being more proactive in 
cases like Sidaway and Chester. These problems stem from the Incorporationist criterion 
itself, a criterion that has shown to be so abstract as to be of little use.
186
 Moreover, Kramer is 
so obstinate in defending his theory of modest Incorporationism that arguments he actually 
uses runs his theory into further problems. Indeed, this seems to stem from a general problem 
of positivism in particular; ‘even if we look casually at the practice of law, we will observe 
that that what counts as law within that practice frequently requires the deployment of 
normative argument, so it is unlikely that a methodology concentrating solely on a descriptive 
criterion will be able to perform the task set for it’.187 Finally, the chapter then considered the 
second distinction between Dworkin and Kramer’s theory of law, concerning hard cases and 
right answers. It showed how Dworkin’s theory of law can largely take account of Kramer’s 
claims that in some circumstances there can be hard cases with no right answer.
188 
This chapter has also begun to outline Dworkin’s interpretive commitments and his 
interpretive theory of law. Though it has partially been shown why Dworkin’s theory of law 
is to be preferred, a more positive account of why law as integrity is the appropriate legal 
framework to be used needs to be provided. This will include showing the main strength of 
Dworkin’s theory is the suitability for the purposes of this thesis of elements Dworkin takes 
to be central in his interpretive theory. In postulating law as an interpretive concept, Dworkin 
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argues the practice necessarily has some sort of point, or some value underlying that 
particular practice. Further, the interpretive account of law ‘encourage participants of 
practices not to “fix” meanings or purposes but to engage constructively in producing a moral 
outcome in the resolution of disputes’.189 These elements are beneficial for the purposes of 
providing a theoretical explanation of how judges can come to a legally and ethically 
responsible and proactive decision in hard cases. For example, because a particular value is 
able to be postulated as underpinning a social practice (for Dworkin that value for law being 
integrity) we are able to use that particular value, and the demands that value makes in 
figuring out which propositions of law are true, as a reference point to integrate the particular 
ethical theory into a mutually reliant framework, and situate both theories in the same 
network of values, relative to one another.
190
  
However, this account presupposes that Dworkin’s value of integrity is the appropriate value 
that we should see the concept of law through. Thus, a more thorough interpretive 
investigation as to whether integrity is the value we should see law through, and how to best 
understand the value of integrity and, more broadly, Dworkin’s idea of constructive 
interpretation, needs to be undertaken. These two areas of investigation shall form the main 
points of the next chapter. These investigations will continue to further dissolve the paradox 
identified in this chapter, and answer the central research question. They will allow us to 
further formulate and build up more explicitly and specifically the legal framework that can 
be integrated with the ethical framework, so as to provide confidence to judges in relying on 
their convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics to come to a legally and 
ethically responsible decision.
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Chapter 3 
1. Introduction: Is law best seen through integrity or justice? 
This chapter will continue to build on the findings of the previous chapter and present a more 
positive account of why Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity is the appropriate legal 
framework to answer the central research question set. It shall do so in the context of 
considering whether the concept of law should be seen through the value of justice or 
integrity
1
 and interpretively assessing ‘the moral weight of integrity’.2 Though the previous 
chapter concentrated on the ‘adjudicative principle of integrity’,3 the discussion here shall be 
widened to encompass integrity as a value in its fullest sense. Examination of this question is 
important for a number of reasons.   
The previous chapter identified and examined the role moral principles play in hard cases. 
This discussion provided a suitable starting point for the theoretical explanation as to how 
courts have the ability to realise the possibility of recognising the ethical nature of judicial 
decision-making, and confidently coming to a legally and ethically responsible decision in 
cases with an inherently ethical content. More specifically, it was argued at the end of chapter 
one the main way judges are going to be able to perform this task adequately is through being 
provided with a theory which lays open the structure of judges’ decisions4 and is also able to 
explain ‘what counts as good, strong, supportive evidence for a [moral] belief’.5 This task 
was formulated in light of an analysis of José Miola’s findings in Medical Ethics and Medical 
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 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1986) 225. 
4
 ibid 265. 
5
 Susan Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Blackwell 1992) 23 (hereafter 
Evidence) 1. 
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Law: A Symbiotic Relationship;
6
 analysis of two important cases surrounding the area of 
informed consent/risk disclosure, Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
7
 and Chester 
v Afshar;
8
 and analysis of developments in case law since Chester. This was all undertaken in 
chapter one. 
The previous chapter further argued if a legal framework was to be provided as part of a 
mutually interlinked, integrated framework with an ethical theory to show how judges can be 
more proactive in recognising the ethical nature of judicial decision-making, then Matthew 
Kramer’s theory of ‘modest Incorporationism’9 was inappropriate for such purposes. It also 
began to argue Dworkin’s theory of law provided a better framework to analyse current legal 
approaches by judges, and once integrated with ethical theory, this co-dependent framework 
could be used as an explicitly normative tool in the sense of explaining how  judges can 
confidently arrive at an ethically nuanced and sophisticated decision in legal cases with an 
inherent ethical content.
10 
The central research question of this thesis is: 
“Can an appropriate decision-making framework be provided to judges that 
recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making so as to provide confidence 
to judges in relying on their convictions in applying moral principles and medical 
ethics to come to a legally and ethically responsible decision?” 
To foreshadow discussions later in this thesis, Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress’s 
(hereafter B&C’s) four-principles theory will be taken as the starting point or paradigm of the 
ethical decision-making framework to be integrated with Dworkin’s theory of law. But, in 
                                                          
6
 José Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Hart 2007) (hereafter Symbiotic) 
7
 [1985] AC 817. 
8
 [2004] UKHL 41. 
9
 Matthew H Kramer, ‘Throwing Light on the Role of Moral Principles in the Law: Further Reflections’ (2002) 
8 Legal Theory 115, 130. 
10
 Miola, Symbiotic (n1) 9. For Miola’s ‘designation of ethical content’ (ibid) see footnote 7 in chapter 1. 
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order to best understand how B&C’s and Dworkin’s theories can be interlinked and 
integrated with one another, another more specific research question needs to be answered: 
“How should B&C’s four-principles approach influence cases with an inherently 
ethical content, when used as an example of Dworkinian principles in law?” 
This question is relevant because if we wish to use Dworkin’s theory of law as a normative 
tool in the sense above, a greater interpretive understanding is needed as to the underlying 
justificatory structure of Dworkin’s theory. It is not until this interpretive understanding has 
been reached that we can progress to answering the more specific research question 
immediately above, which in turn will go towards answering the central research question set. 
 The task of gaining a greater understanding of Dworkin’s theory of law shall be done by 
considering another, more specific question: ‘what role does coherence play in [Dworkin’s] 
own account of law in Law’s Empire and elsewhere?’11 This question is important because 
integrity is best understood through the idea of coherence. This has many important 
consequences. The following two chapters will show the best interpretation of B&C’s 
writings is also based on a coherentist structure. Therefore, if both Dworkin’s theory of law 
and B&C’s writings concerning moral justification are (at least structurally) similar, this has a 
number of distinct advantages. Given that we are looking at the normative application of the 
four-principles approach as an example of how principles form part of the law in a 
Dworkinian sense, B&C’s theory being coherentist in nature has a strong degree of fit with 
Dworkin’s theory. Furthermore, in addition to the arguments of substance regarding why 
coherence best expresses the idea of integrity, we also do well
12
 to interpret Dworkin’s theory 
this way precisely because of this coherence between the two theories. It shall be shown that, 
                                                          
11
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Ronald Dworkin Replies’ in Justine Burley (ed), Dworkin and his Critics: With Replies by 
Dworkin (Blackwell 2004) 381 (hereafter Dworkin Replies). 
12
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 186. 
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on this model, if a particular course of action is justified by B&C’s theory, in turn this should 
mean that the legal proposition that embodies that coherent moral principle, according to 
Dworkinian theory, should be true.
13
  
It shall also be argued constructive interpretation is driven by coherence considerations, and 
as integrity is best understood through the characteristic of coherence, it is natural these two 
aspects of Dworkin’s theory fit together. These ideas therefore shine a new light on 
Dworkin’s argument that ‘[l]aw as integrity is…both the product of and the inspiration for 
comprehensive interpretation of legal practice’.14 
The chapter will also show, using the case of Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill (hereafter, the 
snail darter case
15
) how arguments of integrity, via coherence, are attractive despite Stephen 
Guest’s arguments that his theory of ‘law as justice’16 will bring us closer to the principle of 
‘equality of respect’17 than any other theory of law.18 Thus, the two main arguments that shall 
be established in this chapter are: integrity is the value that we should see law though; and 
constructive interpretation and integrity are best understood through the idea of coherence. 
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 Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Blackwell 1985) 117 (hereafter Introduction). 
What is meant by saying that a proposition of law is “true” shall be analysed later in the chapter. Specifically, 
see point 2.1.2., “Coherence, truth, justification and Dworkin”. 
14
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 226. 
15
 (1978) 437 US 153. 
16
 Stephen Guest, ‘Integrity, Equality and Justice’ (2005) 3 (233) Revue Internationale De Philosophie 335 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctlsfd/papers/integrity_equality_and_justice.pdf> 6 (online) accessed 27
th
 June 2014 
(hereafter IEJ). 
17
 ibid 7 (online). 
18
 ibid 6 (online). Given the number of assumptions Guest makes, this shows clearly his argument to be 
“internal” in character. See ibid 1 (online). It should also be highlighted that a prominent version of positivism 
was argued against in the previous chapter. 
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2. Understanding integrity through coherence 
2.1. What does coherence require? 
First, an explanation of what is meant by coherence as a property of justification of a system 
of beliefs, and what sort of coherence theory is being discussed needs to be provided.
19
 This 
provides a clear idea of what is involved when it is claimed that integrity is best understood 
through coherence, and relate the elements of coherence to Dworkin’s theory of law. 
2.1.1. The essentials of coherentism and a conception of coherence itself 
The explication of a particular conception of the concept of coherence that follows is a 
relatively uncontroversial one, with the differences lying in the detail. Even at this 
preliminary stage it must be noted that space precludes a detailed discussion of the concept 
itself.
20
 The conception of coherence discussed here shall use Laurence BonJour and 
Jonathan Dancy’s discussions, as they share common elements, and combining both will give 
an overall better picture. Lastly, for exposition purposes, it is worth noting that coherentism is 
often seen in opposition to foundationalism. 
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 Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (HUP 1985) 88 (hereafter, BJ, SEK). Attention 
should also be drawn to a key caveat. Joseph Raz highlights that ‘epistemic coherence-based explanations are 
not specifically legal … [as a] decision which coheres best with all legal propositions one believes may cohere 
less well than all of one’s believed propositions’ (Joseph Raz, ‘The Relevance of Coherence’ in Joseph Raz, 
Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, (Clarendon Press 1994) 279 (hereafter, 
Relevance). In contrast to epistemic theories, ‘constitutive coherence theories of law and adjudication … claim 
that coherence makes legal propositions true or judicial decisions right’ (ibid 279). 
20
 However, for an interesting suggestion regarding how consistency is not a necessary condition of coherence 
and that coherence is best understood as simply “sticking together” see Stephen Pethick, ‘Solving the 
Impossible: The Puzzle of Coherence, Consistency and Law’ (2008) 59 (4) NILQ 395. Though this formulation 
cannot be investigated fully and does raise interesting points, it is worth noting Dworkin’s point (in relation to 
moral beliefs) that ‘[f]latly contradictory convictions … provide almost no filter [on our decision-making will] 
even when each is sincerely held, because the choice between them, on any particular occasion, will be 
determined not by principle, but by other, unfiltered influences (Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs 
(Belnkapp Press of Harvard University Press 2011) 107-108 (hereafter JFH)). Whilst this argument is not 
directly on point, it does seem that freed from the condition of consistency, something like this (at least as it 
relates to moral beliefs) would be an issue for Pethick’s formulation. 
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2.1.1.1. Element 1: An asymmetrical and linear order of epistemic priority 
of justification versus a holistic, symmetrical and nonlinear relation of 
justification 
Foundationalism traditionally holds the direction of justification is linear and one way, 
flowing from those basic beliefs to the non-basic beliefs in the structure of justification. In 
contrast, the coherentist holds that fundamentally, justification moves ‘in some more 
complicated and multidirectional variety of a closed curve’.21 Coherentism favours a 
systematic relation of justification, whereby it is the overall context of a coherent system in 
which beliefs gain their justification by being related inferentially to other beliefs. The key 
idea is the relation is one of mutual support. In contrast to foundationalism there is no relation 
of epistemic priority or linear dependence in the system, with the direction of argument 
flexible in accordance with which beliefs have been challenged in a particular situation.
22
  
2.1.1.2. Element 2: The conception of the concept of coherence  
This holistic structure of justification is based on the concept of coherence, which itself has 
many elements and conceptions. Both Dancy and BonJour note at an intuitive level, a 
coherent set is one that, hangs, sticks, or fits together in a special way so that the system of 
beliefs is tightly structured as opposed to being conflicting and chaotic. Furthermore, ‘[i]t is 
reasonably clear that this “hanging together” depends on various sorts of inferential, 
evidential, and explanatory relations which obtain among the various members of a system of 
beliefs’.23  
                                                          
21
 BJ, SEK (n19) 89-90. 
22
 Dancy, Introduction (n13) 110; BJ, SEK (n19) 90-92. Bonjour also notes that ‘[t]he epistemic issue on a 
particular occasion will usually be merely the justification of a single empirical belief, or a small set of such 
beliefs… we may call this the local level of justification. But it is also possible, at least in principle to raise the 
issue of the overall justification of the entire system of empirical beliefs. We may call this the global level of 
justification’ (BJ, SEK (n19) 91) (emphasis in original).  
23
 Dancy, Introduction (n13) 110; BJ, SEK (n19) 93. 
100 
 
1. Consistency. With many conceptions of coherence, it is uncontroversial consistency is 
a necessary condition for coherence, and inconsistency is a serious sort of 
incoherence. But coherence is obviously not to be equated with consistency itself. 
BonJour highlights two ways in which a set of beliefs may have no significant degree 
of coherence, yet be highly consistent. There may be probabilistic inconsistency, as 
contrasted with logical inconsistency. For example, a system of beliefs which contains 
the belief that P is true and the belief it is extremely improbable that P is true may be 
logically consistent, but is less coherent than a system which does not contain the two 
beliefs which result in this probabilistic inconsistency. This is not to say probabilistic 
consistency can be entirely avoided, as improbable things do happen. Although 
BonJour’s description is content neutral, probabilistic inconsistency needs to be noted, 
as situations like this may commonly occur in the law. For example, a judge deciding 
the appropriate punishment for an offender may have a belief that the offender may 
re-offend, and also the belief that it is extremely improbable that the offender will re-
offend. Thus, Bonjour notes the two initial conditions for coherence are as follows: 
‘(1) A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically consistent. (2) A system of 
beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic consistency’.24 So our 
judge’s system of beliefs would be more coherent if (for example) when sentencing 
an offender, the judge held both the belief that the offender was likely to re-offend, 
and that it was extremely probable this was the case. 
2. Mutual explanation/entailment. Second, BonJour notes that although a particular set 
of beliefs may be free of contradiction, and thus perfectly consistent, more is needed 
                                                          
24
 Dancy, Introduction (n13) 110; BJ, SEK (n19) 95. It might also be added by way of refinement here that 
Kenneth Kress distinguishes between ‘[c]onsistency at a time [and] … Consistency over time’ (Kenneth Kress, 
‘Coherence’ in Dennis Patterson (ed) A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell 1996) 
533, 540). Though the emphasis will be on the former in this thesis, the discussion will be interlinked with some 
analysis regarding consistency over time. 
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to generate the idea of coherence between beliefs that is needed: ‘coherence must 
involve some sort of positive connection among the beliefs in question, not merely the 
absence of conflict’. The beliefs need to have ‘effective contact’ with one another, 
with the relation being one of inference. Again, with the difference lying in the detail 
between different conceptions of coherence, the issue that divides coherentists is how 
pervasive and tight such inferential connections are supposed to be.
25
  
At one end there is the idea of mutual entailment; the reciprocal relation holds 
whereby ‘every judgement entailed, and was entailed by the rest of the system’.26 
However, this is too strong for our purposes. Furthermore, understood traditionally, 
entailment is not a matter of degree. This seems to leave no room for the idea that as 
we improve our belief set, it in turn becomes more coherent.  The point is ‘we need to 
give a good sense to the idea that justification can grow’.27 Therefore, Dancy 
highlights an alternative account, whereby the connection is explicated in terms of 
mutual explanation. This is symmetrical in the required sense, and as explanations can 
improve in quality, this accounts for the growth of justification.
28 
In summarising all of this, BonJour notes two further conditions for coherence. They 
are: 
(3) The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of 
inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in 
proportion to the number and strength of such connections. (4) The coherence 
of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which it is divided into 
                                                          
25
 BJ, SEK (n19) 95-6. 
26
 Percy Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (Allen & Unwin 1939) 264. 
27
 Dancy, Introduction (n13) 111. 
28
 ibid 112. Nonetheless, this might be said to restate the use of entailment by Blanshard, as ‘for him, entailment 
only occurs within a system; and since the system determines the meanings of [propositions] p and q, it 
determines the strength of the link between p and q … Explanation thus reveals entailment, in Blanshard’s 
sense’. (ibid) (emphasis in original). 
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subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to each other by 
inferential connections.
29
 
So, for example, a set of propositions held by a judge which contained “this offence is 
a civil law offence”, “the standard of proof in UK civil law trials is the balance of 
probabilities” and “this is different from criminal law trials, in which the standard of 
proof is beyond all reasonable doubt” is more coherent than a set of propositions in 
which each individual proposition is irrelevant to one another and do not reinforce 
each other in the way above.
30
 
3. Explanatory connections. Building on the previous point, ‘[e]xplanatory connections 
are not just additional inferential connections among the beliefs of a system…they are 
inferential connections of a particularly pervasive kind’. This is brought out through 
the idea of an anomaly, the distinctive significance being ‘they undermine the claim 
of the allegedly basic explanatory principles to be genuinely basic, and thus threaten 
the overall coherence of the system in a much more serious way’. Nonetheless, this is 
not to equate explanatory relations with coherence, as the pertinent sense of coherence 
is bound up with the idea of justification. Thus, a final condition for the conception of 
coherence is: ‘(5) The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to 
the presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system’. Last, 
BonJour notes, in a point extremely applicable to law, ‘achieving a high degree of 
coherence may involve significant conceptual change’.31  
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 BJ, SEK (n19) 98. 
30
 ibid 96. 
31
 ibid 99-100. See Gerald Postema’s discussion of ‘integrity and regret’ (Gerald J. Postema, ‘Integrity: Justice 
in Workclothes’ in Justine Burley (ed), Dworkin and his Critics: with replies by Dworkin (Blackwell 2004) 296 
(hereafter, Workclothes)), underlying which is a concern with anomalies in the past content on the legal system 
for very similar reasons noted above, at 296-297. See Dworkin’s discussion of mistakes in law, in Ronald 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977) at 118-123 (hereafter TRS) which is also underpinned by 
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Although this is at best an intuitive grasp of one conception of coherence, it is sufficient for 
this thesis’ purposes. One final caveat needs to be provided before we investigate whether 
integrity, best understood via coherence, fits with Dworkin’s theory of law. 
2.1.2. Coherence, truth, justification and Dworkin 
Whilst it shall be argued integrity is best understood through coherence, clarification is 
needed on a particular point, though it cannot be investigated fully due to constraints of 
space. These arguments do not seek to equate coherence with integrity. The issue is best 
summarised by Jeremy Waldron:  
It is tempting to say that Dworkin’s jurisprudence is a coherence theory of truth in the 
domain of legal propositions. That temptation should be resisted. Apart from anything 
else, the coherence demanded by integrity is just one dimension of legal truth…there 
is no evidence of his subscribing to the view that incoherence is an inevitable 
companion of falsehood.
32
 
While in contrast, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin notes one demand of integrity is ‘a commitment 
to consistency in principle valued for own sake’,33 the point here is regardless of whether 
Dworkin’s theory of law is correctly seen as a pure coherence theory of truth, one of the main 
claims in this chapter is simply to show integrity is best understood through the idea of 
coherence. The caveat here is the conception of coherence above is in Dworkin’s theory 
bound up with a number of other issues.
34
  Therefore, it shall be more appropriate to look at 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
similar concerns as noted above, and Dworkin’s response to Postema in Dworkin, Dworkin Replies (n11) 386-
387.    
32
 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Circumstances of Integrity’ (1997) 3 Legal Theory 1, 6-7 (footnote omitted) (hereafter 
Circumstances). See also Gerald Postema’s discussion of integrity, where it is noted ‘[m]ost importantly, 
integrity does not assume that coherence is desirable in itself such that the more coherent a set of principles … 
the greater is the integrity of the practice in question’ (Postema, Workclothes (n31) 295). 
33
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 167.  
34
 Indeed, I am inclined to agree with Waldron’s conclusion, given Dworkin’s recent analysis of truth and 
integrity in Justice for Hedgehogs. There, Dworkin notes ‘[w]e can rescue philosophical arguments about the 
nature of truth if we can understand truth as an interpretive concept’ (Dworkin, JFH (n20) 173). Further, ‘[w]e 
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coherence in relation to justification, as opposed to truth. ‘A theory of justification identifies 
some characteristics that might be possessed by true beliefs. These characteristics are 
evidence of truth and not constituents of truth’.35 The basic claim in relation to justification is 
a proposition of law is justified if it coheres with those principles of political and personal 
morality that provide the best interpretation of other justified propositions of law in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
must interpret all these concepts—the entire family of truth concepts—together, trying to find a conception of 
each that makes sense given its relations with others and given standard assumptions about the values of truth 
and truthfulness’ (ibid 174). More specifically, ‘[o]ur theory of moral responsibility must be an appropriately 
concrete specification of our theory of moral truth’ (ibid 180). Finally, Dworkin also states that an implication of 
formulating an abstract account of truth which would allow us to construct less abstract theories for a particular 
domain is that ‘[a] truth theorist might then claim that his favoured theory supplies the best application of that 
more abstract theory to one particular domain … without thereby claiming that the same theory is also 
successful as an application of that abstract idea of truth to other domains’ (ibid 175). Therefore, on this 
account, a coherence theory of truth would be one candidate for truth in the domain of morality. However, a 
pure coherence theory of truth does not seem to fully capture the character of Dworkin’s interpretive arguments. 
Dworkin himself notes ‘the theory of moral responsibility I described in Chapter 6 [of JFH] would be a 
candidate application of the value theory to the more specific interpretive domain of morality’ (ibid 177). That 
theory is explicitly interpretive, and is discussed more in chapter 5 and is used to unite Dworkin’s theory of law 
with B&C’s ethical theory. Further, regarding the relationship between coherence and integrity, Dworkin’s 
recent writings in Justice for Hedgehogs shed further light on the relationship between coherence and the value 
of integrity, and casts doubt on the claim from certain theorists that treat integrity as synonymous with 
coherence, or who conflate coherence and integrity. See, for example, Susan L Hurley, ‘Coherence, 
Hypothetical Cases and Precedent’ in Scott Hershovitz (ed) Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of 
Ronald Dworkin (OUP 2006) 69-102 (hereafter Hypothetical), who (amongst other arguments) argues ‘Ronald 
Dworkin’s account of legal reasoning in Law’s Empire is an example of a coherence account’ (Hurley, 
Hypothetical (n225) 69). See also Susan L Hurley, Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity (OUP 1989) 262-
263 (hereafter Natural Reasons.); Robert Alexy and Aleksander Pecznik ‘The Concept of Coherence and its 
Significance for Discursive Rationality’ (1990) 3 Ratio Juris 130. Last, for an interesting comparative 
discussion, see Aldo Schiavello ‘On “Coherence” and “Law”: An Analysis of Different Models’ (2001) 14 (2) 
Ratio Juris 233 (hereafter On Coherence). Although this is in the context of moral responsibility (and thus there 
is no explicit reference to the legal value of integrity) Dworkin speaks about integrity as requiring two 
conditions: those of coherence and what he terms ‘authenticity’ (Dworkin, JFH (n20) 108). This latter condition 
means for Dworkin ‘we must find convictions that grip us strongly enough to play the role of filters when we 
are pressed by competing motives that flow from our personal histories’ (ibid). We must hold these convictions 
sincerely, and not for the sake of elegance, for this may then lead to arbitrary distinctions and differences rather 
than principled ones (ibid). See further Dworkin, JFH (n20) 101; 108; 120. These passages show the argument 
that integrity is best understood through coherence is different from saying that integrity and coherence are 
synonymous (Schiavello, On Coherence (n34) 240). As there are two conditions that are needed to be morally 
responsible, or are sufficient for moral truth (Dworkin, JFH (n20) 120), this is different from holding a pure 
coherence theory of truth. Dworkin states that ‘in political morality, integration is a necessary condition of truth’ 
(ibid 5-6). In contrast, a coherence theory of truth is defined as ‘it is that the coherence, and nothing else is what 
[a proposition’s] truth consists in’ (Ralph CS Walker, The Coherence Theory of Truth (Routledge 1989) 2 
(emphasis added)). In addition, this also means that, as the interpretation here still leaves room for the role of 
authenticity in integrity, that it is in fact a better interpretation than simply stating that integrity is in fact 
coherence. 
35
 Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, ‘A Revision of the Constitutive and Epistemic Coherence Theories in Law’ 
(2001) 14 (2) Ratio Juris 212, 218 (hereafter Revision). Though Dworkin does adhere to such a distinction, if 
however we are to see the concept of truth as an interpretive concept then such a sharp line between theories of 
truth and ‘proper investigative methodology, which are domain specific, cannot be drawn. Our approach 
recognises, on the contrary, only differences in degree in abstraction between the two kinds of theory’ 
(Dworkin, JFH (n20) 179). See also JFH (n20) 12-13; 37-38, 172-180. 
105 
 
contemporary legal practice.
36
 The idea that integrity is best understood via coherence means 
this discussion identifies coherence as a characteristic possessed by true propositions as 
evidence of their justification.
37
 Though Dworkin often talks about ‘the truth conditions of 
propositions of law’,38 given the technical connotations of the discussion above, these 
statements shall be taken to mean that what in fact Dworkin means is a proposition of law is 
justified if these particular conditions are fulfilled. A proposition of law can still be morally 
justified, even if there is a degree of incoherence. The proposition will not be false, but might 
be better described as a ‘sub-optimal’ solution. Nonetheless, this solution is still a moral 
one.
39
  
2.2. Integrity understood through coherence: does it fit? 
The previous section provided an explanation of which conception of coherentism shall be 
referred to and discussed in this chapter. This section shall analyse Dworkin’s ideas to show 
support for the view integrity is best understood via coherence. This will partially provide the 
more positive account of why Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity is the appropriate legal 
framework to answer the central research question set. 
It is important to provide a textual analysis of Dworkin’s writings because they provide the 
best understanding of Dworkin’s views. An analysis of these writings also shows they 
provide a large degree of support for the thesis that integrity and constructive interpretation 
are concerned with coherence, and coherence considerations fit our legal practices in general. 
This analysis can then be used to provide a detailed explanation of how (and on what basis) 
judges can be more proactive and confidently arrive at a responsible and sophisticated 
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 Ronald Dworkin, Justice In Robes (Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press 2006) 13-14 (hereafter JIR).  
37
 Rodriguez-Blanco, Revision (n35) 218. 
38
 Dworkin, JIR (n36) 13. 
39
 Guest, How to Criticise (n1) 9 (online). See Dancy, Introduction (n13) 110-142 for his discussion of 
coherence theories of justification and truth, and in particular 116-117 for his discussion of the link between 
justification and truth on a coherence account. See also BJ, SEK (n19) chapter 8. 
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decision in legal cases with an inherently ethical content. This analysis will also provide an 
important background and context when looking at the criticisms of Dworkin’s arguments in 
the latter parts of the chapter. 
Dworkin often talks about coherence in relation to integrity, and how coherence in law would 
be desirable. But this is often part of a larger discussion of the demands of integrity and law. 
Although the term coherence appears in these demands of integrity, the demand is not often 
developed substantially, in terms of the elements necessary for a coherentist justification as 
noted above.
40
 Thus, until it has been shown Dworkin actually wishes to endorse the 
conception of coherence in the technical sense outlined above, we cannot be certain that 
Dworkin’s demands of integrity which relate to coherence actually express an endorsement of 
coherence itself. We can agree with Raz coherence is at times used to indicate no more than 
the intelligibility of a principle or the cogency of an idea.
41
  
The section shall be broadly structured by arguments as they appear in Law’s Empire, whilst 
exploring the interconnections between Law’s Empire and Dworkin’s other writings. In 
Law’s Empire, each chapter builds upon one another to develop a clear and sustained answer 
to the aims it sets for itself.
42
 Due to constraints of space, other criticisms and arguments 
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 Joseph Raz deals explicitly with a very similar point in his discussion of Dworkin’s theory of law and its 
commitment to coherence. He notes ‘[t]he general feel of [Law’s Empire] suggests that coherence is to be 
striven for. Perhaps it is impossible to say in advance what degree of coherence is to be achieved. But the drift 
of the argument suggests that coherence is a distinctive advantage, and that therefore one should strive to end up 
with a view of the law that regards it as coherent as possible, provided not too much violence is done to other 
values’ (Joseph Raz, ‘Speaking with One Voice: On Dworkinian Integrity and Coherence’ in Justine Burley 
(ed), Dworkin and his Critics: with replies by Dworkin (Blackwell 2004) 288 (hereafter One Voice)). It is also 
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discussing the concept itself rigorously or explicitly. He notes that ‘[t]he central chapters of Law’s Empire do 
not simply present a theory … in a “take-it-or-leave-it” fashion. They highlight an important feature of political 
life in a pluralistic society … The adoption of that heuristic [integrity] is then identified, boldly with the very 
foundations of law, legality and legal rights’ (Waldron, Circumstances (n32) 4-5). 
41
 Raz, One Voice (n40) 286. This is the coherence that Gerald Postema strives for in his discussion of integrity. 
See Postema, Workclothes (n31) 295. Whilst Susan Hurley makes the suggestion that the arguments for integrity 
are also meant to be arguments of coherence (Raz One Voice (n40) 288; Hurley, Natural Reasons (n34) 262-
263) this is not being suggested here.  
42
 ‘This book refines, and expands and illustrates [his] conception of law. It excavates its foundations in a more 
general politics of integrity, community and fraternity. It tracks its consequences for abstract legal theory and 
then for a series of concrete cases’ (Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) vii- viii). 
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about and against Dworkin relating to coherence will only be touched upon where relevant to 
the discussion.  
2.2.1. Constructive interpretation 
Dworkin’s idea of constructive interpretation is a key element of his theory of law43. 
Dworkin’s commitment to constructive interpretation as a means of interpreting the social 
practice of law is what leads him to the value of integrity. A more thorough account of the 
coherence considerations underlying this idea in Dworkin’s theory shall be developed later 
on, in the context of Guest’s arguments that we should see law through the value of justice. 
Initially, constructive interpretation’s commitment to coherence in the technical sense above 
can be seen when Dworkin responds to Raz’s claim that his account supports an endorsement 
of strong monistic coherence. When Raz talks of monism in interpretation, he means social 
practices are in service of only one single point, and must be coherent with that single point.
44
 
Dworkin, however, views the issue differently. He notes ‘“purpose,” used in the singular, 
need not mean a single overriding ambition; someone acts with purpose even if his ambitions 
are complex and competing so that he must sometimes neglect one to serve another’. 
Furthermore, Dworkin believes ‘[a]ny suspicion that I had “monism” in mind should have 
been put to rest by the dozens of examples of constructive interpretation I gave that involve 
complexity and competition’, such as Dworkin’s discussion of local priority and inclusive 
integrity.
45
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 ‘General theories of law … for all their abstraction [ ] are constructive interpretations’ (Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire (n3) 90). 
44
 Raz, One Voice (n40) 285-286  
45
 Dworkin, Dworkin Replies (n11) 381. However, in Justice in Robes, Dworkin notes that ‘any legal argument 
is vulnerable to what we might call justificatory ascent. When we raise our eyes a bit from the particular cases 
that seem most on point immediately and look at neighbouring areas of law, or maybe even raise our eyes a bit 
and look in general … we may find a serious threat to our claim that the principle we were about to endorse 
allows us to see our legal principles in their best light. For we may discover that that principle is inconsistent 
with, or sorts badly with some other principle that we must rely on to justify some other and larger part of the 
law … [This is a problem] not just a matter of theoretical elegance but also of a matter of how a community 
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Constructive interpretation also makes further demands of coherence. When providing his 
example of courtesy, Dworkin highlights the two conditions for the interpretive attitude are 
that the practice of courtesy has some point, and the requirements of courtesy are sensitive to 
its point, ‘so that the strict rules must be understood or applied or extended or modified or 
qualified or limited by that point’. People seek to impose meaning on the institution and then 
restructure the practice in light of this meaning, with value and content becoming entangled.
46
 
Linking back into the essentials of coherentism and the conception of coherence, Dworkin’s 
idea that we must see the practice through a particular value of which the content of the 
practice is sensitive to this value has an important implication. The interpretive attitude 
makes the demand that those who hold this attitude must seek to rid the practice of 
unexplained anomalies in the system of rules, given the emphasis on re-structuring the 
practice in light of the value. It can be inferred the reasons behind re-structuring the set of 
rules in light of the value the practice is seen through are the same reasons BonJour highlights 
in relation to the distinctive significance of anomalies when discussing the concept of 
coherence. The anomaly in the set of rules undermines the claim that the value the practice is 
taken to serve is genuinely the value we should see the practice through. It is in this sense 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
committed to equal citizenship should govern itself’ (Dworkin, JIR (n36) 52-53). In terms of this idea’s fit with 
Dworkin’s arguments surrounding local priority, Dworkin notes that ‘[o]f course, I do not mean … that the 
threat will always or often materialise. Most of the time it will not, at least in a serious and time consuming way, 
and we can cheerfully proceed on the footing of what we might call very local priority … But justificatory 
ascent is always there, as it were on the cards: we cannot rule it out a priori’ (ibid 53-54). Given this, and the 
idea that coherence with fundamental principle is the driving force behind integrity, it could again be asked 
whether these passages show that Dworkin is in fact committed to, or at least inclined to, a different form of 
monism; understood here to mean that there is an elimination of unconnected sub systems (BJ, SEK (n19) 98) so 
that the legal system is “globally coherent” as opposed to “locally coherent” (Raz, Relevance (n19) 292). It does 
not mean that ‘all principles follow from one of their number’ (ibid 290). This is despite his explicit statement 
that ‘I am not a monist [in a Razian sense]’ (Dworkin, Dworkin Replies (n11) 381). It seems as though despite 
what Dworkin has said there are passages that reveal a desire or inclination for his legal theory to head in the 
stipulated monistic direction. For example, see Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 217; 251-253; 264-265; 404, and 
implicitly in TRS (n31) 129-130. Perhaps the better way to explain this is that there is a pull towards the 
stipulated form of monistic coherence (though it is not essential) in Dworkin’s theory, given that it provides for 
a greater degree of coherence. 
46
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 47-48. 
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Dworkin’s interpretive attitude in his account of constructive interpretation makes a key 
demand and has a key element of coherence bound up in it.
47
 
However, this is not to say the value is fixed. Dworkin contemplates in some circumstances 
integrity may not fit as the value the practice of law should be seen through. Dworkin 
imagines this in relation to a utopian state and when only a sceptical interpretation of the law 
is possible. In the former scenario, Dworkin believes ‘[i]ntegrity would not be needed as a 
distinct political virtue…Coherence would be guaranteed because officials would always do 
what is perfectly just and fair’.48 This is one place where Dworkin comes closest to equating 
coherence with integrity. In the latter scenario, a justification of different parts of the law 
would by necessity show a fundamental contradiction of principle, and there would be no 
value at all the law could be seen through, as there would be no possible way for any judge to 
find a coherent interpretation of law.
49
  
Dworkin’s main argument against this latter argument is ‘it would be a serious 
misunderstanding of the logic of principle to consider [two standards] contradictory’ and 
whilst in some cases ‘they will conflict…coherence does then require some nonarbitrary 
scheme of priority or weighting or accommodation between the two, a scheme that reflects 
                                                          
47
 In addition, this demand of coherence is apparent in the value of integrity itself. In Law’s Empire, Dworkin 
asks ‘is integrity only consistency…under a prouder name?’ Dworkin believes this is not the case as ‘[i]ntegrity 
demands that the public standards of community be both made and seen, so far as this is possible, to express a 
coherent scheme of justice and fairness, in the right relation. An institution that accepts that idea will sometimes, 
for that reason, depart from a narrow line of past decisions in search of fidelity to principles conceived as 
fundamental to the scheme as a whole’ (ibid 219) (emphasis added). 
48
 ibid 176. 
49
 ibid 176- 177; 273. For Dworkin’s discussion of the critical legal studies movement in general, see Law’s 
Empire (n) 271- 275. Indeed, see how Jeremy Waldron interprets and develops Dworkin’s ideas above explicitly 
into what he calls “the circumstances of integrity” in Waldron, Circumstances (n32) at 3-8. Gerald Postema’s 
discussion of the “circumstances of integrity” in Workclothes (n31) 299-301, is more expansive than Waldron’s, 
yet capture the main spirit of Waldron’s argument. Last, see also how Guest acknowledges this argument when 
explaining the role of integrity in Stephen Guest ‘The Role of Moral Equality in Legal Argument’ in François 
Du Bois (ed) The Practice of Integrity: Reflections on Ronald Dworkin and South African Law (Juta & Co., 
2005) <http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~uctlsfd/papers/the_role_of_moral_equality_in_legal_argument.pdf> 
20-21 (online) accessed 2
nd
 July 2014 (hereafter Moral Equality)). 
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their respective sources in a deeper level of political morality’.50 Here, there is an emphasis 
on the fundamental principles in the legal system operating themselves as the primary unit of 
justification. We can infer from this that some degree of coherence is necessary in order for 
the integrity as a value to even arise.  
Further, in highlighting integrity is sensitive and flexible to the best interpretation of the 
practice of law, this shows constructive interpretation itself makes another important demand 
of coherence. In some circumstances ‘achieving a high degree of coherence may well involve 
significant conceptual change’.51 As integrity is ‘[t]he meld between the legal materials and 
moral theory’,52 if it is the case the legal materials do not meld with moral theory in order to 
achieve the best interpretation of the law, this may require a re-think as to which value we 
should see the law through, so that we can meld both legal materials and moral theory 
together.  
This is not to say facts are significant in themselves, only that there is a possibility no moral 
case can be made for integrity,
53
 and this shows constructive interpretation encapsulates a 
further demand for coherence. The best interpretation/moral argument of the legal practice 
may require significant change conceptually, in order to embed certain well-established facts 
into the moral argument that makes for the best interpretation of legal practice. The value of 
integrity might therefore have to be revised or abandoned, as this value turns out to be the 
anomaly in the best interpretation of the current legal system.
54 
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 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 268- 269. See also Waldron, Circumstances (n32) 8. 
51
 BJ, SEK (n19) 100 (emphasis added). 
52
 Stephen Guest, Ronald Dworkin (Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory) (2
nd
 edn, Edinburgh University Press 
1997) 33 (hereafter RD). 
53
 Guest, How to Criticise (n1) 3-6 (online). 
54
 BJ, SEK (n19) 99-101; Guest, How to Criticise (n1) 3 (online). The same considerations underlie Dworkin’s 
discussion of courtesy when using it to highlight the distinction between concepts and conceptions. Though 
someone may state that the “very meaning” of courtesy is that of respect, Dworkin also goes on to note that this 
claim is not timeless, holding only because of a particular type of agreement that might ultimately vanish. These 
concerns further underpin Dworkin’s discussion of paradigms of courtesy (Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 70-73). 
Much the same point can also be made about Dworkin’s admission that ‘[p]erhaps some or all interpretive 
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2.2.2. Checkerboard solutions 
Dworkin’s argument concerning checkerboard solutions is one primarily intended to show 
the value of integrity fits our political practices.
55
 Thus, this argument is central to Dworkin’s 
theory. However, ‘[i]t is noticeable that Dworkin describes what is wrong with checkerboard 
solutions in a number of different ways, not all of which are clearly synonymous’.56 If these 
descriptions of what is wrong with a checkerboard solution are not synonymous, and 
checkerboard solutions can be best explained by appealing to concepts other than coherence, 
then this argues against one main point trying to be made in this chapter, that integrity is best 
understood through coherence. However, it shall be argued the real issue with checkerboard 
solutions is one of coherence. 
Initially, Dworkin uses the term ‘to describe statutes that display incoherence in principle that 
can be justified, if at all, only on grounds of a fair allocation of political power between 
different moral parties’S.57 Dworkin believes most of us would be dismayed by laws that, for 
example, prohibit abortion for women born in even years but not in odd ones, and more 
generally treat similar situations differently on the basis of arbitrary grounds when matters of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
concepts began their conceptual lives as criterial’ (Dworkin, JIR (n36) 264, footnote 7). To see a further 
nuanced discussion about the complexity and constraints of interpretation, ‘the critically argumentative and 
reflexive character of intellectual practices’ (ibid 44) amenable to a coherentist thesis, see Dworkin, JIR (n36) 
43-48, in the context of discussing Stanley Fish’s arguments in favour of pragmatism and against Dworkin. A 
similar discussion will be more thoroughly looked at when discussing Guest’s objections to Dworkin’s ideas 
surrounding constructive interpretation. 
55
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 178. Dale Smith has recently published a chapter, (Dale Smith, ‘The Many 
Faces of Political Integrity’ in Scott Hershovitz (ed) Exploring Law’s Empire: the jurisprudence of Ronald 
Dworkin (OUP 2006) (hereafter Faces) which looks at the issue of checkerboard solutions in detail. Smith goes 
on to argue ‘that Dworkin has failed to vindicate his claim that integrity should characteristically trump justice 
in cases where they conflict’ (ibid 119). Whilst this chapter deals with a similar argument concerning justice and 
integrity below, Smith’s analysis of checkerboard solutions shall be drawn upon to provide context when 
needed.  
56
 Smith, Faces (n55) 125. Smith gives us ‘a (by no means complete) sample: checkerboard solutions display 
“incoherence in principle”; checkerboard solutions “can be justified, if at all, only on grounds of a fair allocation 
of political power between different moral parties”; checkerboard solutions “treat similar [actions] differently on 
arbitrary grounds”, in situations where matters of principle are at stake; checkerboard solutions concern a single 
principle “which is affirmed for one group and denied for another”; checkerboard solutions “treat people 
differently when no principle can justify the distinction”; and checkerboard solutions do not give effect to 
anything that one can recognise as a principle of justice (even if one rejects that principle)’ (ibid) (citations in 
parentheses omitted). 
57
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 435 footnote 6. 
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principle are at stake. When matters of principle are at stake, the model we endorse is one 
where ‘the collective decision must nevertheless aim to settle on some coherent principle 
whose influence then extends to the natural limits of its authority’.58 Dworkin then asks 
whether checkerboard solutions are rejected on grounds of justice. Whilst Dworkin believes 
we are in the right neighbourhood, because ‘if checkerboard solutions do have a defect, it 
must lie in their distinctive feature, that they treat people differently when no principle can 
justify the distinction’,59 this does not reveal the whole picture. As the checkerboard solution 
will prevent some instances of justice (albeit perhaps not on any principled basis) it cannot be 
said that unless all instances of injustice can be eliminated, none must be. Therefore it seems 
there is no reason of justice to, in advance, reject the checkerboard strategy. Yet Dworkin 
notes that intuitively we still condemn it. This is not to say everyone would always condemn 
every checkerboard solution. If a person believed strongly enough abortion is always murder, 
they may rank the checkerboard solution above outright license, despite the checkerboard 
solution being incoherent in its compromise. However, if they rank the checkerboard solution 
last in other circumstances, Dworkin believes they still share the same intuition, but that this 
yields when the issue is a grave one. In addition, this intuition is also likely to be at work in 
more complicated rankings that might be made.
 60
 In light of this, Dworkin takes there to be a 
third political value at work: integrity. Integrity is the most natural explanation of why we 
oppose checkerboard solutions.
61
  
                                                          
58
 ibid 179 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
59
 ibid 180 (emphasis added). 
60
 Dworkin asks: ‘[w]ould you not think a statute prohibiting abortion except in the case of rape distinctly better 
than a statute prohibiting abortion except to women born in one specified decade each century? At least if you 
had no reason to think either would in fact allow more abortions? You see the first of these statements as a 
solution that gives effect to two recognisable principles of justice, ordered in a certain way, even though you 
reject one of the principles. You cannot treat the second that way; it simply affirms for some a principle it denies 
to others’ (ibid 183) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
61
 ibid 178-184. Smith uses the passage quoted at footnote 60 above as textual evidence that ‘the reason that we 
reject internal compromises is because they possess several flaws … a checkerboard solution both treats people 
differently in a way that is unjust and cannot be justified by reference to anything recognisable as a principle of 
justice’ (Smith, Faces (n55) 141) (emphasis in original). Though Smith regards this formulation as having a 
number of advantages, this way of putting matters still seems odd. If the solution cannot be justified by 
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All the direct quotes above concerning checkerboard solutions, whilst superficially may look 
inconsistent, show the main objection to such solutions is that they display what shall be 
called “incoherence with equality”. The common theme is that such solutions are anomalous, 
not just because in some ways they might be seen as illogical. They are anomalous because 
checkerboard solutions ‘undermine the claim of the allegedly basic explanatory principles to 
be genuinely basic’.62 Those basic principles in Dworkin’s theory of law are principles of 
equality. As he explicitly notes: 
law as integrity…supposes that law’s constraints benefit society not just by providing 
predictability or procedural fairness, or in some other instrumental way, but by 
securing a kind of equality among citizens that makes their community more genuine 
and improves its moral justification for exercising the political power it does.
63
    
Checkerboard solutions are anomalous because the political community would lose its 
legitimacy if the community characteristically adopted principles which do not satisfy the 
constraints on being a moral principle
64
 because the degree of incoherence is so great with the 
interpretive concept of justice, and because it would fail to show equal concern for all its 
members (of which integrity is essential to that equal concern).
65
 A principle displaying 
incoherence with equality would violate this principle of equal concern in the most flagrant 
way. This in turn shows why the fundamental principles of equality are so important, as this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
principles that do not even satisfy the conceptual constraints on being a moral principle (ibid 137), then there is 
a redundancy in the first half of Smith’s formulation. In failing to satisfy the moral conceptual constraints, the 
principle or principles supposedly “justifying” the checkerboard solution can do no moral work at all. Thus, it 
will necessarily be the case that a checkerboard solution will treat people differently in a way that is unjust, and 
thus the reference to the differential treatment being unjust is not needed.  
62
 BJ, SEK (n19) 99. 
63
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 95-96. 
64
 ibid 218; Smith, Faces (n55) 137, footnote 36. As Smith notes in the context of checkerboard solutions a 
‘“moral principle must mean a principle of justice, since Dworkin acknowledges that checkerboard solutions can 
be supported by recognisable principles of fairness’ (Smith, Faces (n55) 136). 
65
 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Response’ in Scott Hershovitz (ed) Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald 
Dworkin (OUP 2006) 297 (hereafter Response ELE).  
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highlights their legitimising and regulating function. The degree of incoherence is so great as 
to give rise to the anomalous problem of checkerboard solutions.  
To elaborate on the idea that the community must adopt principles which are ‘recognisably 
moral in nature’,66 what is required is we consider the concept of justice, and whether the 
principles satisfy the conceptual requirements for being a moral principle. Provided this is the 
case, it does not matter whether the principle(s) are valid under the correct conception of 
justice, as they will at least be able to do some moral justificatory work. Nonetheless, it is still 
a controversial issue as to what actual constraints are imposed by the concept of morality.
67
 
However, ‘principles of justice will…gain moral recognition—if they do—because they have 
a force independent of recognition. Someone has to do the recognising first’.68 But this 
discussion points back to issues of coherence. 
This can be seen if we ask why a principle gains moral recognition or if we ask a particular 
person why they recognise principle X as a principle of justice. In order to begin to formulate 
a response to this question and provide reasons for that answer that person must have in mind 
(however vague) a statement or proposition of the central concept of (or point of) justice. 
This is itself an interpretive question. The constraints on the concept of justice are sensitive to 
its point. Thus, moral argument is needed in order to show how the constraints on the concept 
of justice are sensitive to its point.
69
 This, in turn, will mean that when considering whether a 
principle is moral or not, further moral argument will be needed to ascertain whether the 
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 Smith, Faces (n55) 136. For example, ‘a person could regard the rape-abortion law [see footnote 60 above] as 
upholding a principle that is recognisably moral in nature. In other words, she could view her opponents as 
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 ibid 137,footnote 35; ibid, footnote 36. 
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 Guest, How to Criticise (n1) 6 (online). See Dworkin’s recognition of a similar point in Response ELE (n65) 
296. 
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principle is moral in nature, in light of the meaning and point of the concept of justice.
70
 If 
these points are correct, then it also shows the methodology of constructive interpretation is 
used throughout. Therefore, we see that the heart of the issue is a particular issue of 
incoherence in principle.  
What is implicit here is there is almost a continuum of “unjustifiability”. The checkerboard 
solution simply has no principle justifying it, making it clear the “unjustifiability” of the 
checkerboard solution, relative to the rape-abortion law,
71
 is distinctively anomalous. When 
correctly viewing the issue through the idea of coherence, this allows us to see the 
checkerboard solution revolves around this main conception here. The checkerboard solution 
displays incoherence with equality. It displays no coherence with ‘principles conceived as 
more fundamental to the scheme as a whole’.72 Further, because the principle itself purporting 
to justify the checkerboard solution has no degree of coherence with interpretive concept of 
justice then the principle cannot be regarded as moral. Thus, when a political compromise 
tries to use that principle as a justificatory basis for the differential treatment of parties in 
relation to matters of principle, the solution is an anomalous one according to Dworkin’s 
theory of law, because it displays incoherence with equality. It is in this sense both the issues 
(in relation to the interpretive concept of justice, and with Dworkin’s fundamental principles 
of equality) are bound up.  
This analysis complements Dworkin’s views on the matter. He states that:  
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 ibid 47. Given the foregoing discussion, we can use the textual support Smith highlights from Dworkin’s 
work regarding both ‘coherence in principle’ (Smith, Faces (n55) 133) and ‘recognisable principles of justice’ 
(Smith, Faces (n55) 135) to show that the view above has a great deal of support. See Smith, Faces (n55) 133-
139. Dworkin also notes that ‘[j]ustice and other higher order moral concepts are interpretive concepts, but they 
are much more complex and interesting than courtesy, and also less useful as an analogy to law’ (Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire (n3) 424, footnote 20).   
71
 Smith, Faces (n55) 136. See footnote 60  above. 
72
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n3) 219. Smith also explicitly recognises and dismisses this particular argument. See 
Smith, Faces (n55) 150.  
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I think…only a single principle [of integrity] is needed. I discuss checkerboard 
statutes (which are very rare) only to illustrate what I thought to be an obvious way of 
infringing a general principle of coherence…I would prefer a single ideal: integrity 
requires that the community’s law be justifiable through a coherent scheme of 
principle that provides an eligible interpretation of that law.
73 
To conclude, the problems associated with checkerboard solutions are best understood 
through arguments of coherence with the ‘principles conceived as more fundamental to the 
scheme as a whole’.74 These arguments go far in supporting the assertion that integrity is best 
understood through coherence. In turn, this also shows that coherence considerations fit our 
legal practices. Therefore, we can highlight these demands of coherence when looking to 
explain how judges can come to a legally responsible decision in cases with an inherently 
ethical content. 
2.2.3. Associative obligations 
It is important to look at how Dworkin’s ideas about ‘associative obligations’75 make 
demands of coherence in the technical sense above. Law’s Empire (for heuristic purposes) 
separates the discussion of ‘whether our political practices accept integrity as a distinct 
virtue’76 and whether we do well to interpret our politics in light of integrity.77 Only once 
both sides of the argument have been considered can it be said there has been a thorough 
interpretive investigation into how to best understand the value of integrity. This means a 
fuller picture can be built up as to the underlying structure of the legal framework to be 
integrated with the ethical framework to answer the central research question set. 
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 ibid 198. 
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 ibid 178. 
77
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At an overarching level, Dworkin highlights the link between integrity and community in the 
following way: 
Here, then, is our case for integrity…A community of principle accepts integrity. It 
condemns checkerboard statutes…[as] violating the associative character of its deep 
organisation. Internally compromised statutes cannot be seen as flowing from any 
coherent scheme of principle…They contradict rather than confirm the commitment 
necessary to make a large and diverse political society a genuine rather than bare 
community: the promise that law will be chosen, changed, developed and interpreted 
in an overall principled way.
78
 
Furthermore, the model of principle  
insists that people are members of a genuine political community only when they 
accept that their fates are linked in the following strong way: they accept that they are 
governed by common principles, not by rules hammered out in political compromise. 
Politics…is a theatre of debate about which principles the community should adopt as 
a system…Members of a society of principle accept that their political rights and 
duties are not exhausted by the particular decisions their political institutions have 
reached, but depend, more generally, on the scheme of principles those decisions 
presuppose and endorse.
79
  
The first important point about the foregoing passage is the emphasis on a system of 
principles the community should adopt. One of the main ideas of the conception of 
coherentism discussed is it is such a system of beliefs, or in this case principles, which is the 
primary unit of justification. It is clear in the passage above that particular principles are 
justified in a derivative way by being members of a system. We can see with the idea that the 
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principles are not only common to persons but are related to each of the other principles 
themselves there is a symmetrical, holistic and nonlinear relation of justification here, as is 
the case with a coherentist reasoning model. 
Additionally, the main aim of the interpretation of the model of principle itself, to ‘justify the 
assumption of true community we seem to make’,80 shows that in interpreting ‘a legal culture 
in which law is extrapolated in that way to secure integrity and equal concern’,81 coherence 
considerations are prominent. Here, there is ‘fidelity to principles conceived as more 
fundamental to the scheme as a whole’.82 This means the degree of coherence of the system 
of principles the community adopts will be greater. By explicit reference and attention to the 
fundamental principles in the system, the presence of unexplained anomalies in the content of 
the system is likely to be less. The ready analogy is in the process of reflective equilibrium, 
whereby ‘[t]he goal…is to match, prune and adjust considered judgements and their 
specifications to render them coherent’.83 This discussion can be linked back to the value of 
integrity by highlighting that Dworkin notes ‘a political society that accepts integrity as a 
political virtue thereby becomes a special form of community, special in a way that promotes 
its moral authority’.84 Integrity, therefore ‘has an intelligible role and moral force where 
justice is feasible and in dispute’85 only because those citizens accept they are governed by 
common principles and that politics is a theatre of debate about which principles the 
community should adopt as a system. For without this community and level of coherence, the 
particular circumstances in which integrity has moral force would not arise. 
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Last Dworkin notes, in discussing other potential arguments for integrity and beneficial 
consequences that may follow if the value is recognised, that: 
If people accept that they are governed not only by explicit rules laid down in past 
political decisions but by whatever other standards flow from the principles these 
decisions assume, then the set of recognised public standards can expand and contract 
organically, as people become more sophisticated in sensing and exploring what these 
principles require in new circumstances.
86
  
 The prominence of coherence becomes obvious when the quote is situated in the context of 
the discussion above. Here, it can be reasonably asked what would guide this discovery of 
what certain principles require in new circumstances. Given the importance of a system being 
the primary unit of justification, attention to the most fundamental principles of a scheme, 
and Dworkin’s ideas concerning ‘local priority’,87 considerations of coherence best explain 
this beneficial consequence of integrity.  
The foregoing section has shown how arguments of coherence are pervasive in Dworkin’s 
account of associative obligations. Because integrity as a value presupposes a community of 
principle, even though sometimes a legislature may choose justice over integrity and thus 
cause a degree of incoherence, this cannot be done characteristically. The legislature’s 
argument to legitimacy would be forfeited, and thus we would not be able to treat our 
community as a community of principle. The principles governing a community would not 
resemble a system as the degree of incoherence would be so great with the principles that are 
fundamental to a scheme as a whole. Nonetheless the adjudicative principle is still sovereign 
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over the grounds of the law, because no other view of what flows from past political 
decisions is admitted by integrity.
88
 
2.2.4. Overall conclusion 
In conclusion, a detailed account regarding the structural relations of justification in 
Dworkin’s theory has been created. The thesis that integrity is best understood through the 
value of coherence fits with Dworkin’s theory. Therefore, as Dworkin’s theory shall form 
part of the co-dependent framework explaining on what basis and how judges can arrive 
confidently at an ethically sophisticated decision in legal cases with an inherent ethical 
content, the type of legal demands the framework will make on judges if they wish to deal 
responsibly with a case are now clearer. Therefore, the task of showing how judges can be 
more proactive and responsible in such cases is also clearer. But, in order to fully complete 
the interpretive investigation, it now needs to be argued we do well to see integrity through 
the idea of coherence. This shall be done by analysing the interlink between integrity and 
coherence, in the context of objections to the claim that law is best understood through 
integrity. 
3. Justice does not work as well as integrity 
This chapter has provided an explanation of what we mean by coherence as a property of 
justification of a system of beliefs.
89
 Further, an analysis of Dworkin’s ideas to show support 
for the view integrity is best understood via coherence has been given. Throughout this latter 
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analysis, it has been consistently highlighted why such an investigation is essential to the 
larger aims of this thesis. This section shall show integrity is the value law should be seen 
through. This shall complete the more positive account of why Dworkin’s theory of law is the 
appropriate legal framework to answer the central research question set, and provide us with 
a complete understanding as to the underlying justificatory structure of Dworkin’s theory. 
Finally, this will answer the concerns raised at the end of chapter two, about not presupposing 
Dworkin’s value of integrity is the appropriate value law should be seen through. All this 
shall be done by looking at Stephen Guest’s arguments against integrity. Guest’s discussion is 
the most systematic and comprehensive discussion of the moral weight of integrity. In 
addition, if justice is the value law should be seen through, it can be reasonably asked why 
this is only one of four principles in B&C’s theory. By considering Guest’s arguments, we 
will be able to assess the moral weight of integrity in the most illuminating way.  
Guest argues on two grounds against Dworkin’s theory: 
first, that justice is a better model for law than integrity, and second, that even if 
integrity is the better model, that will only be on the contingent ground that integrity 
happens to best fulfil justice’s requirements in the real world…integrity is only a 
theory about what is second best to justice.
90 
Guest also believes there are problems with constructive interpretation. In looking at these 
problems, this will allow arguments relating to the role coherence has to play in this idea to 
be developed. How both constructive interpretation and integrity fit together can then also be 
explained, strengthening the argument that integrity is best understood through the idea of 
coherence. 
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The argument shall then use the snail darter case to show justice does not work as well as 
integrity. Guest’s theory of law as justice is not coherentist in character. Guest believes 
instead of engaging in coherentist reasoning, in hard cases the lawyer should argue the direct 
case of justice instead.
91
 However, both Guest’s and Dworkin’s theory of law are informed by 
the fundamental principle of equality of respect.
92
 The argument will show if Guest wishes to 
adhere to the fundamental principle of equality of respect, then Guest must opt for an 
interpretive account of law which sees the practice through integrity, not justice. What is 
important in securing equality of respect is the manner of legal argument, in particular the 
coherentist manner as demanded by integrity. This gives further sense to Dworkin’s idea that 
‘[i]ntegrity…is not second but first best’ and that judges need to recognise the demands 
integrity places on them, not simply ignore these demands and pursue justice according to 
their own lights on every occasion by weighing the different dimensions of equal respect for 
each case.
93 
3.1. “Equality of respect” 
First, however, Guest’s explicit claim is ‘the primary task of judges is to ensure there is just 
redress, subject to the general balancing judgements required in the fundamental principle of 
treating people as equals’.94 This principle is also called the principle of equality of respect. 
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As this is the fundamental principle in Guest’s theory of law, it will be beneficial to briefly 
analyse this principle and the idea that we must balance the judgements the principle requires, 
so as provide context for the forthcoming arguments. 
According to Guest ‘if we are to hold fast to an ideal of equality…we need to know more 
about, not the outcome for a person’s life, but how that person has been treated. This 
approach to equality understands it as a relationship between ourselves and others’.95 Guest 
notes ‘[i]t follows, I think that, if we take seriously the idea that we should treat others as our 
equals, we must also support a political structure that imposes a duty on the state to treat all 
of its citizens as equals…official powers will only extend as far as making decisions 
consistent with treating people with respect’.96 Also relevant here is that ‘[e]quality grounds 
institutions that are more appropriate to monitoring equality of respect than the legislature, 
such as the judiciary’.97  
 
Guest further states if the judiciary is to be deferential it must be deferential to the ideal that 
because the legislature has acted this itself instantiates equality, since the weight of 
democratic majority requires deference to what the legislature has done. This ideal is itself an 
elaboration of the principle of equality. In relation to the interpretation of statutes (important 
for our purposes later), the direction Guest gives to resolve a difficulty in interpretation is the 
correct interpretation is one which is able to best express the requirements of justice. Last, 
according to Guest, the reasonable expectation principle, or the principle of certainty is also 
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an expression of treating people as equals; ‘[i]f people are led to believe that they will be 
treated in a particular kind of way, then treating them fairly might require that they be treated 
that way.
98
  
Therefore: 
[W]hen a judge is asked to enforce a statute or precedent or permit an official action 
which he believes does not, in itself, treat all citizens with equal respect…[e]ach judge 
would weigh the competing demands of the different dimensions of equal respect and 
decide hard cases by declaring the law to be what, in that judges opinion, best achieved 
overall justice. This would not mean…judges rewrite the law to suit their own 
convictions: it rather means that they use their own convictions to state what, in their 
opinion, the law actually is…In neither case would the judge be constrained by any need 
to show that his weighting of these…dimensions of equal respect was reflected in the 
decisions of other judges in other cases.
99
  
3.2. Constructive interpretation 
This section shall now further argue constructive interpretation is structured by coherentist 
considerations. It is important to argue for this because though Dworkin believes the law is 
interpretive, it does not necessarily follow it is constructively interpretive; ‘even a 
preliminary account [of interpretation] will be controversial, for if a community uses 
interpretive concepts at all, the concept of interpretation will be one of them’.100 Therefore, 
‘[t]he strength or weakness of Dworkin’s principal thesis about the nature of law then rests 
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on…the move from interpretation to constructive interpretation’.101 Dworkin thinks this move 
is sound. He notes that ‘creative interpretation is not conversational but constructive. 
Interpretation of works of art and social practices…is indeed essentially concerned with 
purpose’.102 Dworkin then implements this interpretative methodology to justify state 
coercion, leading him to his theory of law as integrity.
103
  If we are able to show Guest’s 
problems with constructive interpretation can be solved by resort to coherentist 
considerations, we can maintain a constructively interpretive approach to law is still 
appropriate. 
Guest begins noting there are two ways the world can be viewed. The first is by clearly 
separating out a describable act and an ideal principle, so that the facts can be examined 
before a moral judgement of that fact is made. In contrast there is Dworkin’s interpretivism, 
whereby both the fact and its justification merge. However, Guest also states that as 
interpreters must have something there to interpret, it is not clear (when making sense of the 
law) whether interpreters are not first identifying a legal practice, then saying whether the 
practice is good or not independently of that practice. Guest therefore thinks the distinction 
between the fact and what justifies is still present, albeit in the background. Nonetheless, 
something must be gained by adopting Dworkin’s approach, as one of Dworkin’s main ideas 
is the law can only be seen through making an interpretive judgement. Whilst Guest 
highlights two advantages of the interpretive approach,
104
 more importantly here there is a 
disadvantage as well. If the fundamental principle of equality of respect does not guide the 
judge’s interpretation of the law in circumstances where the law departs from morality, the 
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judge will not be able to make sense of the law at all and consequently will not be able to 
come up with any interpretation of it.
105
  
Therefore, 
The question arises whether there is a distinction between arguing the direct case of 
justice and arguing the case in integrity. If the argument for “fit” carries no weight 
when the argument of “substance” is sufficiently strong, that suggests that “fit” and 
“substance” are just part of one continuum of moral argument because it is difficult to 
see how there could be any point at which “fit” could check “substance.106 
Guest also states that interpretation in all its forms looks like it needs something outside the 
interpretive process, relatively fixed in relation to the interpreter. However, in law, it is 
unclear what the “thing to be interpreted” is.  For example, in the case of a person 
interpreting the words on the page of a statute, these words would have no legal significance 
unless they were endowed with the status of a “statute”. Interpretation goes further down, as 
the correct way to appreciate the words as legislative is only if the legislature is democratic. 
The interpreters understanding of what the statute requires in a particular case originates from 
a general moral position they hold, derived from justice about the moral force of democracy. 
But the interpretive process, merely by the device of holding interpretations in check, cannot 
account for the distance between interpreter and the thing interpreted. Otherwise 
interpretation keeps on going down, forms a regress, and we become lost. Things cannot go 
down, and there must be something that anchors interpretations in the outside world. Guest 
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also contends that since in principle we can draw a line for interpretive concepts, and we 
cannot draw a line for justice, justice is not an interpretive idea. Since justice is not an 
interpretive idea, if law is a form of justice, law itself is not a practice which we interpret 
constructively. Instead, the better model is conversational interpretation.
107
   
Guest’s arguments are subtle and interlinked, as he looks to play on integrity’s conservatism 
(integrity’s ‘function, its special virtue is to constrain’108), and the problems he perceives 
regarding constructive interpretation. The latter shall be dealt with first. It is only by arriving 
at a proper understanding of the role of constructive interpretation that we will be able to 
understand why we need to argue, not the direct case of justice, but the case of integrity 
instead.  
It seems Guest is beginning ‘with something that he takes to be a correct statement of the law 
as it stands…and then transforms that statement creatively so as to move the law closer to 
what it ought to be’.109 Although Guest notes this interpretive process derives from a previous 
moral position the interpreter holds, his initial assumption is the process, indeed 
interpretation in all its forms, needs something outside of the interpretive process that is 
relatively fixed.
110
  
But the interpretation of law does not need something outside the interpretive process. The 
issue is whether an account of interpretation can fix the thing to be interpreted whilst not 
requiring that thing (whatever it may be) to stand outside the process of interpretation. This 
can be done borrowing again from coherentist reasoning in epistemology. The analogy shall 
use the term “conviction” as opposed to “belief”. The term “conviction” is employed by 
Dworkin, and understood by Guest as informing which interpretation of law a judge should 
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apply to the case at hand.
111
 Before this it is necessary to introduce a distinction Dancy 
highlights, between antecedent and subsequent security. ‘Antecedent security is security 
which a [conviction] brings with it, which it has prior to any consideration of how well it fits 
with others or of the coherence of the set…[s]ubsequent security is security which a 
[conviction] acquires as a result of its contribution to the coherence of the set’.112 
It is clear interpretation employs our own moral and political convictions in relation to ‘the 
rules and standards taken to provide the tentative content of the practice’.113 These 
propositions and practices can be part of the interpretive process. Furthermore, we might 
have an attitude toward these propositions, whereby we demand more than others might 
before we reject those rules and standards,
114
 as we believe these standards are what is 
“really” required to better serve the justification of our practice.115 However, over time, one 
can come to have further convictions about those initial convictions, not in some first-
order/second-order way, but merely have convictions that are separate to those initial 
convictions. In turn, this may lead to the rejection of the initially held convictions about “the 
rules and standards”. However, if the attitude above is taken, the removal of an initial 
conviction will require more to justify it because both these propositions and convictions are 
part of the interpretive set of practices too, of which we have a particular attitude. So in this 
sense, the object of interpretation remains relatively fixed for the interpreter and will have a 
greater degree of security, but it will be an analogous form of subsequent, not antecedent 
security, and thus its security is to be seen entirely in terms of security within the interpretive 
process, not standing outside the process.
116
 Further, ‘there is no asymmetry created by 
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accepting that all beliefs have some degree of antecedent security, provided that the 
antecedent security they enjoy is everywhere of the same sort’.117  
This structure also provides a retort to Guest’s other contention with constructive 
interpretation; interpretation cannot continue on an infinite regress and the idea of holding 
interpretations in check cannot accommodate the distance between the thing interpreted and 
the interpreter. This latter argument has clear similarities to the ‘epistemic regress 
problem’118 in epistemology. Likewise, given the structure of interpretation above, it should 
be responded to in kind by adducing coherentist considerations. Why must ‘interpretations go 
down and down (or up and up)’?119 This presupposes there is a linear order of dependence 
regarding interpretation. But, given the structure of interpretation above, it is apt to respond 
this presupposition is wrong. Interpretation requires the adoption of a holistic view, whereby 
it is a system of convictions and interpretations which is the primary unit of justification. 
There is no relationship of priority and posterity between particular interpretations, but 
instead a reciprocal dependence within the system.
120
 This can still account for ‘distance 
between the interpreter and the thing interpreted’121 if we take care to notice the distinctions 
in levels of subsequent security adverted to earlier. 
Therefore, we can agree that interpretation is derived from a general moral position the 
interpreter holds, but in a better way, both on accounts of fit and substance, with Dworkin’s 
ideas. Interpretation for Dworkin takes on a symmetrical, coherentist character. If all this is 
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true, the role coherence plays within constructive interpretation should be explicit, pervasive, 
and supports the foregoing discussion of the underlying justificatory structure of Dworkin’s 
theory.  
Further, as it has been shown throughout this chapter integrity is understood best through 
coherence, and constructive interpretation is best regarded as displaying elements of 
coherentist reasoning, Dworkin’s idea that integrity is ‘both the product of and the inspiration 
for comprehensive interpretation of legal practice’122 is given new meaning and sense. As 
coherentist considerations underlie Dworkin’s idea of constructive interpretation, and the 
value of integrity, it is natural the two ideas fit together and complement each other. Given 
the best way to interpret social practices is a constructive one, an interpretive process in 
which (ideally) the rules and standards of the practice cohere with its particular point, it 
follows that the best implementation of that methodology is through a value best understood 
through the idea of coherence. There is a consistent demand of coherence made throughout 
the entire legal framework. A clear explanation is therefore possible as to how and on what 
basis judges can confidently arrive at a legally responsible decision in hard cases with an 
inherent ethical content. 
It now remains to be shown integrity is the value law should be seen through. The snail darter 
case shows considerations of coherence both fit better and are more attractive than Guest’s 
idea of arguing the case of justice directly in a non-coherentist manner.
123 
3.3. Integrity, justice and the snail darter 
Even if law as justice is able to explain and resolve the issue in the snail darter case by ‘a 
direct appeal to the most fundamental principle of justice’124 (which it can do only in an 
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unnatural way), an appeal to integrity is able to explain the snail darter case in a way that 
accords better with arguments of substance surrounding the fundamental principle of equality 
of respect. Integrity itself is a key component of equality of respect. Integrity assumes we can 
make sense of and enforce collectively the demand that we deny no one the respect we give 
to others according to our own convictions about what this fundamental principle means. 
Further, instructing judges to act according to integrity means they will pursue this 
demand/goal as effectively as can be done, because integrity and equal respect require 
integration and coherence. Yes, there will be disagreements on what integrity means, but at 
least there is an understanding they must pursue coherence with those principles most 
fundamental to the system as a whole, as opposed to none at all. If judges were allowed to go 
after justice directly according to their own lights, people would be cheated of the demand of 
coherence/integrity that is part of equality of respect in the long run.
125 
One main problem, however, is presenting this argument in a suitable manner. Guest notes 
‘[i]t is not at all clear that arguments about what justice requires would be any more 
controversial than arguments about what integrity requires’.126 Further, Guest believes many 
of Dworkin’s arguments that law as integrity provides a realistic base for legal argument 
could also be satisfied (albeit in a different way) by law as justice.
127
 Last, as the arguments 
here are interpretive arguments, this means Guest’s theory may not be ‘fully responsive to 
descriptive criticisms which take the form: this is not actually how judges behave’.128 
Initially, it seems as though the last point has to be conceded. Space precludes a detailed case 
analysis in relation to whether the law should be seen through justice or integrity (best 
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understood through coherence). However this argument here, coupled with the arguments 
concerning constructive interpretation and those that have shown integrity is best understood 
through coherence, should provide a great deal of support in favour of integrity, despite only 
concentrating on one case. In addition to this, the argument here correctly proceeds on an 
interpretive basis. Whilst questions of fit will arise, this is one dimension of interpretation, 
and like was seen with the coherentist structure of constructive interpretation, can constrain 
arguments of substance in a complex coherentist interaction.
129
 
3.3.1. The snail darter 
There are many reasons why the snail darter case is being used. First, Dworkin believes this 
case provides an instance of theoretical disagreement in law.
130
 Second, Dworkin uses it as 
his main example to show how integrity demands cases be resolved involving statutes.
131
 As 
Guest is (despite the arguments above to the contrary) an advocate of Dworkin,
132
 he cannot 
(for want of not substantially criticising Dworkin) argue the snail darter case is one that does 
not show theoretical disagreement in law, nor cannot be resolved by reference to integrity. 
Most importantly though, it seems hard to describe the issue and resolution of the case by ‘a 
direct appeal to the most fundamental principle of justice’.133 
In 1973, in the United States there was a national climate of great concern relating to 
conservation. In that same year the Endangered Species Act (hereafter ESA) was passed by 
Congress. The ESA authorises the Secretary of the Interior to denote species that would be 
endangered by the destruction of some habitat critical to their survival. Once this designation 
has occurred, Section 7 of the ESA requires that: 
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All other Federal departments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of 
this Act by…taking such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or 
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered 
species and threatened species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of 
such species which is determined by the Secretary…to be critical.134  
 
An opposition group of conservationists were against the Tellico Dam and Reservoir 
construction projects of the Tennessee Valley Authority (hereafter TVA) ‘not because of any 
threat to species, but because these projects were altering the geography of the area’,135 with 
narrow ugly ditches being created from streams to produce a perceived unneeded increase in 
hydroelectric power. It was discovered the Tellico Dam, almost finished and costing over one 
hundred million dollars, ‘would be likely to destroy the only habitat of the snail darter, a 
three-inch fish of no particular beauty or biological interest or general ecological 
importance’.136 The Secretary was then persuaded to designate as endangered the snail darter, 
and the conservationists then brought proceedings to enjoin the dam.
137
  
TVA argued: 
[T]he statue should not be construed to prevent the completion or operation of any 
project substantially completed when the secretary made his order. The phrase 
“actions authorised funded or carried out” should be taken to refer to beginning a 
project, not completing projects begun earlier.
138 
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This claim was supported by various acts of Congress, which continued to appropriate funds 
for the Tellico Dam, and suggested it be completed. These appropriation measures were all 
taken after the Secretary declared completing the dam would destroy the snail darter. The 
Supreme Court ordered the dam be halted, with Justice Lewis Powell writing a dissent for 
himself and Justice Blackmun.
139
  
3.3.2. Can law as justice explain the snail darter? 
As noted above, it seems hard to describe the issue and resolution in this case by recourse to 
law as justice, regardless of whether the snail darter is seen as having either instrumental 
value or intrinsic value.
140
  
Guest would frame the issue by asking what rights the statute has created, though matters of 
policy are pertinent to this decision.
141
 It is noted by the Court the respondents in the case 
were a Tennessee conservation group, persons who used the Little Tennessee Valley area 
affected by the dam and a regional association of biological scientists.
142
 The petitioners in 
this case were TVA, and the majority opinion of the Court asked two questions: ‘(a) would 
TVA be in violation of the Act if it completed and operated the Tellico Dam as planned? (b) 
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agreement with the majority’s (perceived) instrumental approach. He notes that ‘[a]lthough the snail darter is a 
distinct species, it is hardly an extraordinary one. Even icthyologists [sic] familiar with the snail darter have 
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if TVA’s actions would offend the Act, is an injunction the appropriate remedy for the 
violation?’143  
Therefore, it may simply seem like these are the two parties between whom the judge weighs 
the different dimensions of equal respect and decides what would best achieve overall justice. 
However, the Court often indicates the real political, policy based issue is a matter of abstract 
justice. For example, the Court explicitly considers the problem whether ‘in this case the 
burden on the public through the loss of millions of unrecoverable dollars would greatly 
outweigh the loss of the snail darter’.144 The majority decision notes their interpretation  
of the Act will produce results requiring the sacrifice of the anticipated benefits of the 
project and many millions of dollars in public funds. But examination of the language, 
history and structure of the legislation under review here indicates beyond doubt that 
Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.
145
 
This is despite the majority of the Court noting that ‘neither the Endangered Species Act nor 
Art. III of the Constitution provides federal courts with the authority to make such fine 
utilitarian calculations’.146 Indeed, Dworkin also frames the issue as ‘whether the Endangered 
Species Act gives the [S]ecretary of the [I]nterior power to halt a vast, almost finished federal 
power project to save a small and ecologically uninteresting fish’.147 
Saving the snail darter does not seem to present that great an issue of justice when an 
instrumental value-approach is taken and the ecological importance of the snail darter is 
considered. It could not be argued the conservationists were being treated callously and not 
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‘in accordance with real equality’148 if they were denied a right to save an ecologically 
uninteresting fish. But this does not accurately capture the legal issues. The conservationists 
were not arguing they had a right the dam be enjoined because of the instrumental value of 
the snail darter. The quotes above show the Court recognises this as well. 
However, even if an intrinsic value-approach is taken (though again the conservationists 
concern was not primarily with the snail darter
149
), the complexity of the issues highlighted is 
not captured by (as Guest’s theory directs) asking (and trying to work out directly): “‘if we 
assume that the statute “spoke” to all people as equals’150, is it possible to read the statute in a 
way that says the dam must be enjoined? Or does the project lie outside the scope of the 
Act?” What does it mean to say the statute should be read so as to take account of the duty of 
the legislature to treat people in accordance with equality of respect, and if it does not we 
should minimise the equity deficit of the decision?
151
 Could the judge hold “the law forbids 
completion of the dam, because deciding it does not would too grossly deny (the 
conservationists? American citizens in general?) equal respect by substituting the judgement 
of the elected representatives, during a time of great national concern about conservation, for 
the judges’ own judgement of morality”?152 This is despite various acts of Congress after the 
Secretary of the Interior’s decision suggesting the dam be completed, and the House 
Appropriations Committee specifically stating: ‘“[i]t is the Committee’s view that the 
Endangered Species Act was not intended to halt projects such as these in their advanced 
stage of completion”’?153 Alternatively, could the judge hold “the law does not forbid 
completion of the dam, possibly because the fish is ecologically uninteresting, but more 
importantly as this too would not treat all citizens with equal respect, as ‘a democratically 
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elected legislature is the appropriate body to make collective decisions’154 about the 
appropriation of public funds, which should not be wasted”?155 In order for Guest’s theory to 
take account of these complexities, the sorts of considerations that would be brought to bear 
on the case would push us towards Dworkin’s theory of integrity. 
However, even when the larger question of justice is considered, whether a statute designed 
to stop and reverse the trend toward species extinction is to come at any cost even if vast 
sums of public money are to be wasted,
156
 integrity is still a more attractive option in relation 
to arguments of substance surrounding the fundamental principle of equality of respect. In 
response to Guest’s statement that ‘[i]f the argument for “fit” carries no weight when the 
argument of “substance” is sufficiently strong, that suggests that “fit” and “substance” are 
just part of one continuum of moral argument because it is difficult to see how there could be 
an point at which “fit” could check “substance”’,157 the relationship between these elements 
is more complicated than this, and that in a way, we cannot have arguments of substance 
without those arguments of fit. It is not just that a purported constructive interpretation is 
attractive if it is consistent with previous settled law. Equality (where a community is divided 
in political opinion) demands that, informed by our own convictions concerning equal 
respect, we deny no one the respect we give to others. These demands are best realised in law 
through coherence considerations, and enforcing that demand collectively via integrity. 
Coherence requires the minimisation of the presence of unexplained anomalies within the 
context of the larger legal system, that (ideally) there be a set of underlying principles that 
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can justify many parts of the law, and that the relation of justification is symmetrical and 
holistic in character. Vital parts of constructive interpretation and legal reasoning are missed 
if we go directly to the problem with law as justice, thus cheating people of elements of the 
fundamental principle of equality of respect.
158
 
3.3.3. Law as integrity and the snail darter 
This section shall go on to summarise how Hercules decides the snail darter,
159
 and further 
explore how arguments of coherence better explain how integrity is able to take into account 
later decisions of Congress in this case. The role of coherence here complements Dworkin’s 
discussion of the snail darter. 
Hercules’ method, at its most basic, is that statutes must be read in the way that follows from 
the best justification of a past legislative event. He is trying to show a piece of social history 
in its best light, meaning his interpretation must justify the legislative process as a whole and 
must be sensitive to his convictions about the ideals of political integrity and fairness as they 
apply to legislation in a democracy. As Hercules is justifying a statute, he is able to take into 
account justifications of policy. Integrity requires Hercules to develop for the ESA a 
justification that runs throughout the statute, and is consistent with other legislation in force. 
This would seem to require that the justification of the ESA is consistent with the National 
Environmental Policy Act 1969 (hereafter NEPA).
160
 The majority of the Court held that:  
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[T]he two statutes serve different purposes. NEPA essentially imposes a procedural 
requirement on agencies, requiring them to engage in an extensive inquiry as to the 
effect of federal actions on the environment; by way of contrast, the 1973 Act is 
substantive in effect, designed to prevent the loss of any endangered species, 
regardless of the cost.
161 
However, both statutes seem to have, as an underlying policy justification, the protection of 
the environment (in a broad sense).  This justification is best seen as a demand for coherence. 
There is a demand the justification be mutually explanatory, with the direction of justification 
dependent upon the legislation in question.
162
 Furthermore, this policy can be specified in the 
case of the ESA to the protection of endangered species. Hercules then describes a competing 
policy, that public funds should not be wasted. However, he has to look at the statute’s text to 
see whether the policy of protection, with this qualification, justifies the rest of the statute. 
The majority certainly did think not. They noted that ‘[t]he plain intent of Congress in 
enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the 
cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of 
the statute’.163   
Most importantly, in contrast with Guest, Dworkin notes that ‘[n]or does the fate of the snail 
darter, however important Hercules believes this to be, involve any question of principle, of 
rights particular citizens might be thought to have against others or the community. It is a 
question of what state of affairs is best for everyone’.164 Thus, for reasons of fairness, 
Hercules’ interpretation in this situation must be sensitive to public opinion, as revealed in 
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legislative statements. Hercules will also be attentive to the convictions legislators express 
because they themselves are political decisions. For example, formal committee reports, 
which played such a large part in the case itself, are to be treated as acts of the state 
personified. They report the convictions of legislators, and contextualise the statute. Thus, as 
integrity demands the state act with coherence, Hercules must make sure the state does not 
say one thing, whilst enacting another.  
But Dworkin is at his most brief at this point. Dworkin believes Hercules should take the later 
decisions of Congress, which further appropriated funds for the Tellico dam and stated they 
did not believe the ESA was applicable, into account. Dworkin seems to imply these 
statements can serve two purposes: to give us an indication of public opinion, and be seen as 
a political act of the state personified. Dworkin further notes this is important as the life of a 
statute is not fixed according to law as integrity. Thus overall, Hercules 
thinks that reading the statute to save the dam would make it better from the point of 
view of sound policy. He has no reason of textual integrity arguing against that 
reading, nor any reason of fairness, because nothing suggests that the public would be 
outraged or offended by that decision. Nothing in the legislative history of the bill 
itself…argues the other way, and the later legislative decisions of the same character 
argue strongly for the reading he himself thinks best. He joins the justices who 
dissented in the case.
165 
The point here is appeals to the concept of coherence can better explain how integrity is able 
to take into account the later legislative decisions, despite the misgivings of the majority of 
the Court. They noted: 
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Expressions of committees dealing with requests for appropriations cannot be equated 
with statutes enacted by Congress, particularly not in the circumstances presented by 
this case. First, the Appropriations Committees had no jurisdiction over the subject of 
endangered species, much less did they conduct the type of extensive hearings which 
preceded the passage of the earlier Endangered Species Acts, especially the 1973 Act. 
We venture to suggest that the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
and the Senate Committee on Commerce would be somewhat surprised to learn that 
their careful work on the substantive legislation had been undone by the simple—and 
brief—insertion of some inconsistent language in the Appropriations Committees 
reports.
166
 
The principles and policies behind the Appropriations Acts could be looked at to see what 
would make those statutes (interpreting the whole legislative process) the best they could be, 
and then compare this coherent sub system with sub system of principles and policies 
underlying the ESA, to get at something like the Court talks about above. However, if no 
place was found at all for the Appropriations Acts as part of our coherent set of policies, 
principles and legislative history that underlies the justification of the ESA (there is a 
qualification that public funds not be wasted), this would be both inconsistent with the 
Appropriations Acts, and more importantly, those Acts would be an unexplained anomaly in 
relation to the policy that public funds should not be wasted. This is regardless of the fact that 
the Appropriation Acts ‘have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for 
authorised programs’167 and the Court stating that ‘the special appropriation for 1978 of $2 
million for transplantation of endangered species supports the view that the Committees saw 
such relocation as the means whereby collision between Tellico and the Endangered Species 
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Act could be avoided’.168 The Court used the evidence of the Appropriations Committees and 
Appropriations Acts passed by Congress to show why there should not be an implied repeal 
of the ESA.
169
 In the Court showing why there should not be an implied repeal, there are 
elements of what needs to be taken into account when looking at the case through integrity. 
The Court tries to make the legislative story of the Appropriations Acts the best they can be, 
but then uses this interpretation to reject the overall conclusion there should be an implied 
repeal of the ESA. But once we see that we have to make the ESA the best it can be, it seems 
like we must take these Appropriation Acts into account, not reject them and keep them 
separate from the ESA, as far as they have a bearing on the statute itself.  
3.3.4. Overall conclusion 
In conclusion, one main aim has been to argue integrity is the value law should be seen 
through, whilst also showing we do well to see integrity through the particular conception of 
coherence discussed above. This has been shown in the context of Guest’s argument that 
justice is the value law should be seen through. This section first looked at Guest’s arguments 
against constructive interpretation. His main concerns were interpretation in all its forms 
requires something outside the interpretive process, and the distance between the thing 
interpreted and the interpreter cannot be accounted for merely by the idea of holding 
interpretations in check, or else a regress threatens. It was shown how these concerns could 
be responded to using coherentist considerations. Furthermore, it was shown the conception 
of coherence discussed was the common underlying link between constructive interpretation 
and integrity. The argument then used the snail darter case to show if Guest wishes to adhere 
to his fundamental principle of equality of respect, integrity is the value law should be seen 
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through, because it directs us towards the coherentist manner of legal argument, and demands 
of coherence in the principle of equality of respect.  
4. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has argued along a number of different lines, but all with the aim of arguing two 
main points. First, integrity is the value law should be seen through, and second, integrity is 
best understood via a particular conception of coherence. Last, the chapter has sought to 
argue constructive interpretation has an essentially coherentist character. As integrity is best 
understood through coherence, and constructive interpretation is essentially coherentist, it is 
natural this value and this methodology overlap. All the while, it is clear these questions have 
been interpretive and internal to Dworkin’s theory of law. 
These conclusions are important because we can now be confident Dworkin’s theory is the 
appropriate legal framework to use to answer the central research question. A clear 
interpretive understanding as to the underlying structure of Dworkin’s theory has been 
developed, with coherence considerations pervasive throughout. Therefore we can explain 
and show (at least legally) how judges can be more proactive and confidently come to a 
responsible decision in cases like Sidaway and Chester.  
Moreover, it has been adverted to at many points throughout the discussion in this chapter 
that judges are able to rely on the soundness of their own convictions in applying moral 
principles and medical ethics.
170
 Thus, using Dworkin’s theory of law can further dissolve the 
paradox identified in the previous chapter. Finally, as the legal framework that shall be used 
as part of the integrated framework to answer the central research question has been analysed, 
this now means the other side of this integrated framework, the ethical framework, needs to 
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be looked at. As we have a greater understanding of Dworkin’s theory, we can progress to 
answering the more specific research question: 
“How should B&C’s four-principles approach influence cases with an inherently 
ethical content, when used as an example of Dworkinian principles in law?”  
in order to understand how B&C’s and Dworkin’s theories can be interlinked and integrated 
with one another. This will in turn go towards answering the central research question. 
Therefore, the next chapter shall begin to answer this specific research question, by starting to 
analyse and re-interpret B&C’s bioethical theory, that framework to be integrated with 
Dworkin’s theory of law.
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Chapter 4 
1. Introduction 
The previous two chapters established Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as the appropriate 
legal framework to answer the central research question of this thesis. This conclusion was 
reached through an analysis of two more specific research questions: “What role do moral 
principles play in hard cases?” and “Is law best seen through integrity or justice?” This 
chapter will begin to analyse the ethical decision-making framework to be integrated with 
Dworkin’s theory of law.  
The starting point for the ethical theory to be used is Tom L Beauchamp and James F 
Childress’s (hereafter B&C’s) four-principles theory. This ethical theory has been chosen as 
it is one of the most widely-known. However, a clearer grasp of B&C’s four-principles 
approach is needed because it is not problem-free. It needs to be reinterpreted to show the 
best structure B&C’s theory can take, much like is the case with Dworkin’s theory of law. 
Therefore, the more specific research question that shall be answered in this chapter is: 
“What is the best interpretation of B&C’s framework with regards to moral 
justification so as to come to an epistemically responsible decision regarding a moral 
course of action?” 1 
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 The specific research question has been formulated deliberately in this way to specify the type of justification 
that is required to answer the central research question, to come to the best understanding of B&C’s framework, 
and integrate B&C’s framework with Dworkin’s theory of law. That type of justification is epistemic 
justification, or more specifically, moral-epistemic justification. This type of justification requires the 
appropriate choice of justificatory standards in order to be able to evaluate moral beliefs to determine whether 
they fit and are justified by the relevant available evidence, and to provide a means of bringing about true 
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injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is due’(Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ‘Coherentist Epistemology 
and Moral Theory’ in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (eds) Moral Knowledge? New Readings in 
Moral Epistemology (OUP 1996) 137) (emphasis in original) (hereafter Coherentist). 
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This chapter shall show the best interpretation of B&C’s writings is one based on a 
coherentist structure. Because of the common structural base between Dworkin’s theory of 
law and B&C’s ethical theory, this has a number of benefits; in particular being able to show 
that if a course of action is justified by B&C’s theory, this should mean the legal proposition 
that embodies this coherent moral principle is (according to Dworkin’s theory) true.2  
This chapter will answer the specific research question by looking at one integral part of 
B&C’s theory; their formulation of the ‘common morality’.3 This is to examine whether 
B&C’s formulation of the common morality is able to function in the way they wish, and 
fulfils the roles they believe it performs. It is important to consider these issues because of 
how important the common morality is for B&C in justifying their four principles and more 
concrete moral judgments. The chapter will first outline the common morality as B&C 
formulate it. It will be shown a reasonable interpretation of B&C’s common morality yields 
three essential claims. They are: (1) the common morality forms a basis for B&C’s theory, 
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 Tom L Beauchamp & James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7
th
 edn, OUP 2013) 3 (hereafter 
B&C, PBE). This chapter will primarily use the 7
th
 edition of PBE, as it is B&C’s most recent edition of PBE, 
and is thus closest to their current thinking. This chapter will not look to reference the 6
th
 edition of PBE. This is 
because B&C’s the 7th edition formulation of the common morality is substantially similar to the 6th edition 
formulation of the common morality. Where there are differences however, these are better dealt with when 
discussing how to integrate B&C’s and Dworkin’s theories together. Therefore, these differences are discussed 
in chapter 5, point 4.3., “B&C’s theory of the common morality is based on a constructive interpretation: B&C’s 
four interpretive values secure the norms of the common morality”. However, where appropriate, the chapter 
will reference the 5
th
 edition of PBE (Tom L Beauchamp & James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 
(5
th
 edn, OUP 2001)) for comparative purposes. Whilst the common morality also appears in the 4
th
 edition of 
PBE (Tom L Beauchamp & James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (4
th
 edn, OUP 1994)), B&C’s 
current version of the common morality has moved away from the 4
th
 edition formulation. The claim in the 
fourth edition, that ‘[a] common morality theory takes its basic premises directly from the morality shared in 
common by members of a society’ (B&C, PBE 4th edn, ibid 100) shares many characteristics with B&C’s more 
recent claim that ‘particular moralities present concrete, nonuniversal and content-rich norms’ (B&C, PBE 7th 
edn (n3) 5). In addition, Beauchamp himself has written an individual article on the common morality (Tom L 
Beauchamp, ‘A Defence of the Common Morality’ (2003) 13 (3) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 259 
(hereafter Defence)) and also a new chapter in Tom L Beauchamp, Standing on Principles (OUP 2010) 
(hereafter SOP) entitled ‘From Morality to Common Morality’ (ibid 189). The goal of this latter chapter is ‘to 
identify and provide a limited defence of the three forms of justification of claims about the common morality’ 
(ibid 189). However, it shall not be endeavoured to bring the PBE 7
th
 edition formulation of the common 
morality into line with this article and this chapter. This is because, as Rauprich notes, the model presented by 
Beauchamp involves some quite radical changes (Oliver Rauprich, ‘Common Morality: Comment on 
Beauchamp and Childress’ (2008) 29 Theor Med Bioeth 43, 45) (hereafter Comment). Nonetheless, this does 
not mean it will not be examined how Beauchamp’s work may inform B&C’s formulation of the common 
morality.  Perhaps it is because of the very nature of PBE, being co-authored, that there may be elements and 
statements of the common morality in PBE that are inconsistent and even contradictory. 
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(2) the common morality plays a justificatory, foundational role in itself, and (3) B&C join 
the common morality together with reflective equilibrium in a compound approach to 
justification.
4
  
Space precludes a detailed analysis of whether the common morality fulfils all these roles. 
The chapter will thus focus upon the most important role of the common morality for the 
purposes of this chapter and thesis. Whilst B&C may succeed (although this is controversial
5
) 
in showing the common morality is universal in nature,
6
 it shall be analysed whether B&C’s 
common morality is able to make use of ‘foundationalist moral theories’.7 B&C note many of 
the claims made about the common morality ‘are usually associated with so called 
foundationalist moral theories rather than coherentist theories, whereas we have often 
indicated the vital role of coherence through the process of reflective equilibrium’ and ‘a 
common-morality approach [does not sit well with] traditional understandings of a pure 
coherence theory’.8 These remarks could form a response to claims raised by critics that the 
abstractness of the norms in B&C’s common morality means it is unable to provide 
justificatory force for one line of moral argument over another.
9
 B&C could argue that 
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supposed fact that the four principles—respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice—are 
norms of the common morality’ (Herissone-Kelly, Determining (n5) 584). 
7
 B&C, PBE 7
th
 edn (n3) 408. 
8
 ibid. 
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 This is because, first, many of the moral norms B&C appeal to in PBE (most noticeably when criticising other 
ethical theories) are ‘content-rich’ (ibid 5), and second, as the common morality’s norms are so ‘content-thin’ 
(ibid), this means ‘each of [two] opposing positions can be traced back to a common principle discoverable in 
the common morality’ so that the common morality ‘provides little, if any justificatory advantage to either 
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regardless of the abstraction of the common morality’s norms, they play an important 
justificatory, foundationalist role in B&C’s approach to justification; ‘[r]eflective equilibrium 
needs the common morality to get off the ground, and so is in no position to offer a 
justification for it’.10  
Criticism of B&C viewing the common morality as foundationalist has revolved around two 
points. First, precisely because the common morality is foundationalist, it is not ‘well 
compatible with a standard coherentist justification’.11 Second, the stronger claim is ‘this sort 
of bifurcation [with reflective equilibrium] is neither necessary nor desirable’,12 and B&C 
‘should give up the foundational account’13 of the common morality in favour of a pure 
coherentist approach through the mechanism of reflective equilibrium.
14 
The first point is true. But this argument does not mean the position B&C defend is 
theoretically invalid. It shall be argued B&C are arguing for a different position altogether. 
B&C seem to defend an analogous version of ‘moderate foundationalism’,15 in comparison to 
both ‘strong foundationalism’16 and ‘weak foundationalism’.17 Therefore, in order to 
formulate an appropriate answer to the second question, this leads directly to whether the 
common morality is able to make use of foundationalist moral theories, in particular their 
version of moderate foundationalism.  
In order to answer this question it is necessary to turn away from B&C’s writings to consider 
foundationalism more generally as a structural position regarding justified beliefs.
18
 Once this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
side’(John D Arras, ‘The Hedgehog and the Borg: Common Morality in Bioethics’ (2009) 30 Theor Med Bioeth 
11, 20 (hereafter Borg)).  
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analysis has been undertaken, however, it will become obvious B&C should give up the 
foundationalist form of the common morality they advocate. It will be argued 
foundationalism is not viable as a structural account of justification.
19
 Laurence BonJour 
contends ‘there is no way for an empirical belief to have any degree of warrant which does 
not depend on the justification of other beliefs’.20 It will be shown this argument is as 
applicable to moral beliefs. Further, it will be shown how BonJour’s arguments are 
compatible with Dworkin’s writings on law and morality, and generally what other 
philosophers have called ‘moral realism as a moral doctrine’;21 the objectivity of morality is a 
moral matter that rests on moral considerations and convictions.
22
 Whilst this is not a decisive 
argument against foundationalism, it does mean B&C’s common morality theory requires a 
better explanation regarding the structure of moral justification. Given they note ‘we support 
a version of a third model, referred to as “reflective equilibrium”…sometimes characterised 
as…coherentism’,23 it shall be investigated whether a fully-fledged commitment to (moral) 
coherentism without the foundationalist aspects B&C note would be best.  
In order to frame this further investigation, it is necessary to look at one main objection that 
persuades B&C ‘to accept a version of reflective equilibrium as our primary methodology 
and to join it with our common-morality [i.e. foundationalist for purposes here] approach to 
considered judgements’,24 even though B&C treat it only briefly. This is B&C’s presentation 
of the ‘“isolation problem”’.25 B&C note that ‘[a]lthough justification is a matter of reflective 
equilibrium in [their model], bare coherence never provides a sufficient basis for justification, 
because the body of substantive judgements and principles that cohere could themselves be 
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morally unsatisfactory’.26 A line of reasoning shall be developed in response which includes 
the idea that ‘whether being appropriately sensitive to the facts involves our views being 
sensitive to our experiences depends in large part on whether our beliefs concern matters that 
we believe to be discoverable through experience. When it comes to morals…the relevance 
of experience is at least questionable’.27 The discussion will then show ‘causal efficacy or 
empirical viability as a necessary condition for the reality or knowability of any 
phenomenon’ should not be insisted upon,28 but instead, ‘there are compelling moral grounds 
for a proposition affirming the reality of many moral values’.29 Thus, even if moral principles 
have no causal effects in our forming of moral convictions, there are still sound (moral) 
reasons for thinking moral values objectively true.
30
 Thus, given the choice above, B&C 
should adopt a pure moral coherence theory of justification.
31 
2. B&C’s common morality position outlined 
First, it is necessary to provide an outline of B&C’s common morality theory. B&C look to 
introduce the common morality at the very beginning of PBE. They note:  
All persons living a moral life know several rules that are usually binding: not to lie, 
not to steal others’ property, to keep promises, to respect the rights of others, and not 
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 The foregoing introduction has not noted in much detail the role constructive interpretation plays with regards 
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to kill or to cause harm to innocent persons…[however] debates do occur about [these 
principles’] precise meaning, scope, weight and strength, often in regard to hard moral 
cases.
32 
From this uncontroversial starting point, B&C note ‘the set of universal norms shared by all 
persons committed to morality [is] the common morality. It is not merely a morality, in 
contrast to other moralities. The common morality is applicable to all persons in all places, 
and we rightly judge all human conduct by its standards’.33 B&C highlight a number of 
norms in the common morality, though they also note this is not a complete list. Those norms 
include examples such as do not kill, tell the truth, do not steal, and obey the law. In addition, 
B&C believe the common morality contains standards different from rules of obligation. 
They further give ten virtues that are recognised in the common morality, including 
nonmalevolence, integrity, truthfulness, and lovingness.
34
  
B&C further clarify their position by noting an important caveat. They note that their 
common morality theory should not be thought of as ahistorical,
35
 but instead: 
the common morality is a product of human experience and history and is a 
universally shared product. The origin of the norms of the common morality is no 
different in principle from the origin of the norms of a particular morality for a 
profession. Both are learned and transmitted in communities. The primary difference 
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is that the common morality has authority in all communities, whereas particular 
moralities are authoritative only for specific groups.
36
 
B&C highlight the link between their four principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence and justice and the common morality by noting ‘[t]he common morality 
contains moral norms that are basic for biomedical ethics…The set of moral principles 
defended in this book [PBE] functions as an analytical framework intended to express general 
norms of the common morality that are a suitable starting point for biomedical ethics’; ‘[o]ur 
larger framework…encompasses several types of norms: principles, rules, rights, and 
virtues’.37 
Peter Herissone-Kelly takes the foregoing passages to come to the following accurate 
description regarding the relationship between the common morality and B&C’s four 
principles, known as the ‘favoured subset model’.38 The common morality is a set of norms 
shared by all persons committed to morality. “Norms” is a general term of which there can be 
different types (obligations, virtues etc). So, the common morality has several subsets of 
norms, including the common morality’s principles. The common morality’s principles might 
have more than four members, but these four particular principles have been chosen due to 
their relevance to bioethics.
39
  
From this, it should be clear why the common morality is so important for B&C’s theory. 
These quotes show the common morality is the source of and the ultimate justification for 
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B&C’s four principles and people’s more concrete moral judgments.40 Yet, B&C elaborate 
further on the vital roles it plays in their bioethical theory. Initially, in their chapter ‘Method 
and Moral Justification’,41 B&C note their ‘thesis is that reflective equilibrium needs the 
common morality to supply initial norms, and then appropriate development of the common 
morality requires…reflective equilibrium, a method of coherence’.42 So, ‘[t]his supposed 
common moral ground is thought to be the substantive source and constraining framework 
for coherence formation i.e., the moral foundation upon which their theory is built’.43 Linked 
into this is the claim that the common morality is the ‘starting point and normative 
framework for moral theory construction in combination with a coherence theory of moral 
justification’.44 Similar interpretations come from John Arras, who notes ‘Beauchamp and 
Childress have adopted a…conception of the common morality as providing ultimate 
justification for the account they give of the so-called principles of bioethics…[Further,] 
Beauchamp and Childress [embrace] a conception of the common morality embedded in 
ordinary pre-theoretical experience, as the source of the very principles whose implications 
they had so deftly explored in previous editions [of PBE]’.45 Last, B&C ‘offer a hybrid 
approach to moral justification’46 and B&C ‘accord common morality a special place 
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shielded from the jostling involved in the quest for coherence through wide reflective 
equilibrium’.47 
Therefore, there are three essential claims made by B&C about the common morality. The 
first is seen in their statements where the common morality is spoken of being the 
“substantive source”, “moral foundation”, and “starting point” of B&C’s theory. These show 
the common morality forms a basis or source on which B&C base their theory, and provides 
norms for which more specific theory formation can begin. The second is seen with the 
quotes that the common morality is ‘the constraining framework for coherence formation’,48 
provides “ultimate justification”, the common morality is a substantive source,49 and on a 
justificatory interpretation, a “moral foundation”. These quotes show the common morality 
plays a justificatory, foundational role in itself. Last, the quotes that the common morality is 
‘a normative framework for moral theory construction in combination with a coherence 
theory of moral justification’,50 and B&C offering ‘a hybrid approach to moral justification’51 
show B&C joining the common morality together with reflective equilibrium in a compound 
approach to justification.
52 
Finally, given the above, it can now be further made clear why an analysis of B&C’s 
common morality and the roles it performs is important. B&C take the common morality as 
the source of the four principles in their framework. In addition, along with reflective 
equilibrium, B&C make use of the common morality as one of the main justificatory 
standards to evaluate moral beliefs. Because B&C use the common morality as one of their 
main structural standards, it needs to be analysed whether this standard is appropriate, in 
terms of its form. This is not just to see whether the form is compatible with Dworkin’s 
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theory of law, but also whether the form the standard takes means B&C’s common morality 
cannot be used to show whether moral beliefs are justified. If B&C’s common morality 
cannot perform the roles it is intended to perform, this casts doubt on the standard itself. But, 
chapter five will show the common morality as a source of the four principles interpretively 
has merit.  
This analysis of the failure of the common morality to perform the roles B&C ascribe to it 
needs to be undertaken. If this standard can be reinterpreted to take a better form, the 
common morality may then actually be able to do some justificatory work (though by the 
very nature of the common morality it may not be able to do much). This reinterpretation will 
also give a better explanation of why the common morality, through the four principles, 
should have normative force. All of the analysis here therefore goes towards explaining and 
clarifying both how (in dealing with matters of form) and why judges should be more 
proactive in dealing with the inherent ethical and legal issues in cases like Sidaway and 
Chester. If judges are to rely on the soundness of their own convictions in applying moral 
principles (and wish to employ these convictions to reinforce their discussions by referral to 
medical ethics discourse) in cases with an inherently ethical content, they need to know what 
the appropriate standards are for justifying a moral belief. They also need to know what 
demands those standards make. This chapter and the next will establish this. 
3. B&C, foundationalism and coherentism 
B&C’s common morality theory has been outlined, with their three essential claims 
highlighted. The first criticism of B&C’s view that the common morality is foundationalist 
needs to be examined. That criticism is the common morality is not ‘well compatible with a 
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standard coherentist justification’.53 This is because B&C are actually advocating a version of 
moderate foundationalism.  
3.1. B&C’s tension: coherentism 
First, B&C talk of considered judgements as ‘those worthy of belief independent of whether 
they can be supported by reasons’.54 Further, B&C note ‘bare coherence never provides a 
sufficient basis for justification, because the body of substantive judgements and principles 
that cohere could themselves be morally unsatisfactory’.55 It is because of this ‘reflective 
equilibrium needs the common morality to supply initial norms’56. Related to this is the claim 
‘[w]e cannot justify every moral judgement in terms of another moral judgement without 
generating an infinite regress…The way to escape this regress is to accept some judgements 
as justified without dependence on other judgments’.57 Finally, B&C note ‘[t]hese claims are 
usually associated with so called foundationalist moral theories’.58  
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B&C’s approach ‘differs in important ways from more standard accounts of reflective 
equilibrium’.59 Oliver Rauprich notes he does ‘not deny that the common morality model can 
be supplemented with an appeal to coherence. But one has to realise that this appeal is very 
different from, and even compromises the very idea of, standard coherence theories’.60 He 
goes on to note ‘[w]e cannot hold the idea that moral beliefs can only be justified with regard 
to their coherence and mutual support and at the same time grant foundational privileges to a 
certain set of norms that is supposed to be constitutive of morality’,61 and that ‘treating 
coherence as a side restraint is different from justifying moral norms by virtue of their levels 
of coherence and mutual support rather than with regard to a moral foundation’.62  
Arras adopts a similar line of argument. He notes ‘[s]ince standard approaches to reflective 
equilibrium in contemporary moral theory are resolutely non-foundationalist and 
unbifurcated in this way…it is reasonable to ask just how plausible a hybrid approach is and 
what it actually accomplishes for reasoners in practical ethics’.63 Alternatively, ‘[a]nother 
way of putting this question is to ask why [B&C] find it necessary or helpful to distinguish 
sharply the norms of the common morality from what Rawls called our “considered moral 
judgments”’.64 Last, Arras asserts ‘we should recall that the process of reflective equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
common morality on the basis that the norms in the common morality are ‘considered judgements that are the 
most well-established moral beliefs’ (B&C, PBE 7th edn (n3) 407) (emphasis added). But the commonality of a 
moral norm indicates noting about its reliability or justificatory force (Rauprich, Comment (n3) 52). See, for 
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is maximally inclusive. If…you think that it currently overlooks some crucial pieces of the 
moral picture…then this method simply asks you to toss it into the mix alongside all our 
other beliefs’.65 
It therefore seems B&C’s approach is incompatible with a standard coherentist justification. 
This is used by other theorists as a platform to launch further attacks on B&C’s common 
morality theory.
66
 However, this argument by itself does not mean the position B&C defend is 
theoretically invalid. Indeed, B&C’s position might more plausibly be construed as a version 
of moderate foundationalism.  
3.2. B&C’s tension: traditional and weak foundationalism 
First, a taxonomy of foundationalist positions needs to be provided.
67
 BonJour’s writings are 
again useful. He notes ‘[o]ne way of distinguishing specific versions of foundationalism…is 
in terms of the precise degree of non-inferential epistemic justification which these “basic 
beliefs” are held to possess’.68 BonJour takes moderate foundationalism to involve the claim 
that ‘the noninferential warrant possessed by basic beliefs is sufficient by itself to satisfy the 
adequate-justification condition for knowledge’.69  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reflective equilibrium. There he notes that ‘[e]ven our considered moral judgments are deemed to be only 
provisionally fixed points’ (ibid) (emphasis in original). 
65
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In contrast, BonJour notes ‘[h]istorical foundationalist positions typically make stronger and 
more ambitious claims on behalf of their chosen class of basic beliefs. Thus, such beliefs 
have been claimed not just be adequately justified, but also infallible, certain, indubitable, or 
incorrigible’.70 Last, BonJour highlights ‘many recent proponents of foundationalism have 
felt that even moderate foundationalism goes further than is necessary with regards to the 
degree of intrinsic or noninferential justification ascribed to basic beliefs. Their alternative is 
a view which may be called weak foundationalism’.71 According to this view, the basic 
beliefs in question possess a degree of justification which is insufficient to satisfy the 
adequate-justification condition for knowledge on its own. This very low degree of epistemic 
justification means they fail to qualify as acceptable justifying premises for further beliefs. 
These “initially credible beliefs” are simply that, as opposed to fully justified. Nonetheless, 
weak foundationalism is still a version of foundationalism. It still holds there are basic beliefs 
which have a relatively low, but nonetheless some degree of, noninferential epistemic 
justification. However, the justification of basic beliefs (and nonbasic beliefs) in weak 
foundationalism can be amplified by appeal to the concept of coherence.
72 
Given this brief taxonomy, B&C’s position does not initially appear to sit within a strong 
foundationalist account. However, there are indications within B&C’s writings that may cast 
doubt on this. In their discussion of moral change as it relates to the common morality, B&C 
note ‘[i]t would be dogmatic to assert without argument that the basic norms of morality 
cannot change, but it is difficult to construct a historical example of a central moral norm that 
has been or might be valid for a limited duration’.73 Further, ‘[a]s circumstances change, we 
find moral reasons for saying that a norm has new specifications or valid exceptions or can be 
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outweighed by other norms’.74 Analysing these statements, it is arguable that as B&C assert 
that the norms themselves in the common morality are highly unlikely to change, the position 
B&C present is a version of strong foundationalism. 
However, such a view would be incorrect, for two reasons. First, as Feldman notes when 
discussing strong foundationalism, (what he labels “Cartesian foundationalism” as he uses 
Descartes version of foundationalism as the prime example
75) Descartes ‘thought that 
everything else that is justified must be deduced from the justified basic beliefs. Thus, he held 
that to get justified beliefs…you must combine basic beliefs in ways that guarantee the truth 
of those [further] beliefs about the world’76 as our basic beliefs are either indubitable or 
infallible.
77
 However, this is not B&C’s position. B&C, in justifying moral norms, ‘accept a 
version of reflective equilibrium as [their] primary methodology and…join this model with 
[their] common-morality approach to considered judgements’.78 There is no deduction in the 
required strong foundationalist sense. Further, whilst this passage does not tell us directly 
about the status of the norms of the common morality, it seems to imply the norms of the 
common morality are not to be regarded as ‘in some sense indubitable, or free from all 
possibility of error’.79 B&C readily admit ‘In at least one notable respect moral change in the 
way we use norms in the common morality has occurred and will continue to occur. Even if 
the abstract norms do not change, the scope of their application does change’.80 
However, B&C’s position does not sit with weak foundationalism either. Although it is stated 
‘weak foundationalism represents a kind of hybrid between moderate foundationalism’81 and 
coherentism, and this may look superficially similar to B&C’s appeals to both the common 
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morality and reflective equilibrium, the key difference turns on the idea of basic beliefs (in 
B&C’s case, the norms of the common morality) being ‘sufficient…to satisfy the adequate-
justification condition for knowledge’.82 Whilst the basic beliefs in weak foundationalism are 
unable to satisfy such a condition,
83
 B&C, in endorsing a ‘hybrid approach to moral 
justification’,84 clearly think the norms of the common morality can be adequate justifying 
premises. This is a main claim of moderate, not weak, foundationalism. 
This section has shown B&C’s writings on the common morality do not sit with either a 
strong or weak foundationalist position. Therefore, the best interpretation of B&C’s position 
so far regarding the common morality and moral justification is that they advocate a moderate 
foundationalism. This is despite the prominence B&C attach to the process of reflective 
equilibrium. This is because ‘[t]he central difference [between foundationalism and 
coherentism] is not over the possibility of indefeasible justification; it is over whether 
justification may be nonderivative in a sense implying that some beliefs have some degree of 
justification not based on coherence with one or more others’.85 The foundationalist is able to 
appeal to the concept of coherence, even for the justification of basic beliefs.
86
 What ‘a 
coherentist will still deny [is] there is an epistemically privileged set of beliefs that enjoy 
their privilege independently of their inferential connections’.87 Thus, as long as the basic 
beliefs have some degree of noninferential justification, this can be further augmented by an 
appeal to the concept of coherence, but is still classed as a foundationalist theory.
88
 Thus, 
because of B&C’s key claim that the considered judgements of the common morality are 
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justified without dependence on other judgements,
89
 the best interpretation of their position 
so far, for the reasons above, is that they advocate a moderate foundationalism. 
Therefore, though the critique that B&C’s common morality does not sit well with standard 
coherentist accounts is interlinked with the stronger claim that this combination of common 
morality and coherentism is unnecessary and B&C should adopt a pure coherence theory of 
justification, we must take the second question on its own merits. B&C do defend a 
theoretically viable position.
90
  
This second question can now be dealt with directly. In order to ascertain whether the 
common morality is able to make use of B&C’s version of moderate foundationalism, 
foundationalism as a structural account of justification, independently of B&C’s writings, 
needs to be explored. Though it is noted by Audi that ‘[f]oundationalism and coherentism 
each contain significant epistemological truths’,91 there may be arguments against 
foundationalism that mean B&C should give up the foundational role of their common 
morality approach. If the arguments below are correct, these go towards showing 
foundationalism is implausible as a structural account of justification.  
4. Arguments against foundationalism 
BonJour’s arguments shall again be considered. These arguments shall also be broadened to 
show how they are sufficiently general in tenor to apply to moral beliefs as well. In its 
original formulation, BonJour contends ‘there is no way for an empirical belief to have any 
degree of [epistemic] warrant which does not depend on the justification of other empirical 
                                                          
89
 B&C, PBE 7
th
 edn (n3) 407. 
90
 Indeed, it seems to be a good thing B&C defend a version of moderate foundationalism, as there are 
arguments that can be made against both strong and weak foundationalism, regardless of whether 
foundationalism generally is acceptable (BJ, SEK (n1) 27). For arguments against strong foundationalism, see, 
for example, BJ, SEK (n1) 27-28. See also Feldman, Epistemology (n69) 55-60 and Dancy, Introduction (n2) 
58-62. For arguments against weak foundationalism, see BJ, SEK (n1) 29. 
91
 Audi, Structure (n18) 117. 
163 
 
beliefs’.92 BonJour continues by noting ‘the fundamental role which the requirement of 
epistemic justification serves in the…concept of knowledge is that of a means to truth; and 
accordingly that a basic constraint on any account of the standards of justification for 
empirical knowledge is that there be good reasons for thinking that following those standards 
is at least likely to lead to truth’.93 Therefore, ‘that feature, whatever it may be, by virtue of 
which a particular belief qualifies as basic must also constitute a good reason for thinking that 
the belief is true’.94 More precisely, BonJour puts the argument in schematic form, with φ 
representing the distinguishing feature of basic belief B:
95
 
(1) B has feature φ. 
(2) Beliefs having feature φ are highly likely to be true. 
Therefore, B is highly likely to be true.
96
  
Whilst the argument above is in logical form, it may be expressed interpretively so it applies 
to moral beliefs by asking why it is ‘beliefs having feature φ are highly likely to be true’.97 
Even by BonJour’s own arguments, the idea of “having a feature” is misleading. The 
argument starts to look as if the “feature” itself is simply some conventional criterion, and 
that we simply need certain conventional criteria to be ‘justified in believing this feature is a 
truth indicator’,98 when in fact these ideas are better explained by the notion of reasons, as 
seen when BonJour gives a ‘more explicit statement of this basic antifoundationalist 
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argument’.99 For purposes here, premises (1)-(4) are most relevant, though the argument shall 
be set out fully. The argument is as follows: 
(1) Suppose that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is, empirical beliefs which are 
(a) epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification does not depend on that of any 
further empirical beliefs. 
(2) For a belief to be epistemically justified requires there be a reason why it is likely 
to be true. 
(3) For a belief to be epistemically justified for a particular person requires that this 
person be himself of cognitive possession of such a reason. 
(4) The only way to be in cognitive possession of such a reason is to believe with 
justification the premises from which it follows that the belief is likely to be true. 
(5) The premises of such a justifying argument cannot be entirely a priori; at least one 
such premise must be empirical. 
Therefore, the justification of a supposed basic empirical belief must depend on the 
justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (1); it follows there 
can be no basic empirical beliefs.
100 
Applying this argument by analogy to moral beliefs, the argument shows a person must, in 
order for her belief to be epistemically justified, bring and be in possession of her own 
independent convictions
101, ‘internal to the evaluative domain’102 in question (in this case, the 
domain of moral beliefs). The analogy can be pushed by noting the “reason” BonJour is 
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discussing in premises (2) and (3) is to be correctly identified as the “feature” in the brief 
schematic argument set out above. Then, we can push the analogy with premise (4) by asking 
why the believer is ‘justified in believing this that this feature is a truth indicator’.103 When 
this is asked, and when both the brief schematic argument and fuller argument are linked 
together, the “feature” which appears in the schematic argument functions as a reason itself 
for thinking that the belief is likely to be true, as well as the believer needing a further reason 
to ‘be justified in thinking that this feature [or reason] is a truth indicator’,104 all the while 
both of these components being arguments for the belief in question. Again, these reasons 
must be internal to the evaluative domain. 
In addition, given BonJour notes ‘the basic role of justification is that of a means to truth’,105 
this shows first the concept of justification has some point and, secondly, the requirements of 
the concept of justification are sensitive to this point.
106
 Further, because ‘the fundamental 
role which the requirement of epistemic justification serves in the…concept of knowledge is 
that of a means to truth’,107 the concept of knowledge is able to yet further explain why the 
concept of justification exists, and also what justification requires, so that ‘[v]alue and 
content have become entangled’.108 The immediate point of justification is to achieve truth, 
yet it might also be put that justification is sensitive to its mediate point, which is to produce 
knowledge, or propositions we may know. Such an analysis makes use of ideas fundamental 
to Dworkin’s account of constructive interpretation. 
BonJour continues by noting that ‘in order to reject the conclusion of this argument, as he 
obviously must, the foundationalist must reject one or more of the premises…a tenable 
version of foundationalism must apparently reject either premise (3) or premise (4). Both of 
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these approaches have in fact been attempted’.109 The first line of argument, which rejects 
premise (3), is known as externalism; some set of facts which are external to the believer and 
his conception of the situation  may ultimately justify a belief. The second, and more 
traditional, line of argument is to reject premise (4). One approach contends that while the 
basic beliefs in question are indeed the most basic beliefs, they are not in fact the most basic 
cognitive states in question. These basic states, described often as “immediate 
apprehensions” or “direct awarenesses”, are said to be “given”. Indeed, it is these states, 
which do not require justification themselves and have the capacity to confer justification 
upon basic beliefs, that are involved with regards to the believer’s cognitive grasp of the 
premises required for justification.
110
  
As B&C do not even consider the possibility of something like externalism, and also the 
limits of space, the discussion shall be confined to one counter argument against BonJour’s 
antifoundationalist argument. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord contends that ‘if a person’s holding of 
a belief is to count as justified, the belief must in fact be held because it is justified, but she 
needn’t have any beliefs to the effect that her belief is justified. What matters is that she 
believes as she does because of her evidence’.111 
But we can agree with Sayre-McCord that ‘[w]hat matters is that she believes as does 
because of her evidence’;112 her moral beliefs count as both the evidence, and the ‘reason 
why [the moral belief in question] is likely to be true’.113 There is a consensus of independent 
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conviction with regards to moral beliefs, internal to the evaluative domain. The best way to 
understand the justification of moral beliefs is through the idea those beliefs and reasons 
function as the reasons for a belief’s epistemic credibility (as the justification for believing a 
particular reason or feature is a truth indicator
114
), as those truth-indicators themselves 
(amongst with other conditions) and as a person’s evidence, in a complex interpretive, 
coherentist interaction. This shall be shown more when discussing a response to the isolation 
problem below, and in the next chapter. 
To conclude this section, the foregoing discussion has shown there are problems with the 
foundationalist account of justification, problems which apply to all versions of 
foundationalism.
115
 The argument above was broadened to show how it was sufficiently 
general in tenor so as to pertain to moral beliefs as well. If this interpretation and rebuttal is 
correct, this argument seems to throw foundationalism as a structural account of justification 
into doubt. The key conclusion from the argument is ‘there can be no basic…beliefs.’116 
Therefore, to answer the second question outlined earlier, whether B&C’s common morality 
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is able to make use of their version of moderate foundationalism, it is clear it cannot. 
Foundationalism (at least according to these arguments) is not an appropriate standard of 
epistemic justification. Thus, B&C’s common morality theory cannot perform its 
foundational role.
117
 Further, because B&C’s common morality cannot fulfil the foundational 
role ascribed to it, this also impacts upon the common morality’s first and third roles, as set 
out earlier; the common morality forming a basis for B&C’s theory and the joining together 
of the foundationalist common morality together with reflective equilibrium.  
But this argument has only shown what structural standard B&C’s common morality cannot 
use/take. The second question/claim highlighted earlier goes on to state B&C’s combination 
of foundationalist common morality and coherentism is unnecessary and B&C should adopt a 
pure coherence approach to justification. Therefore, a more positive case must be made for 
coherentism as the appropriate standard B&C’s common morality theory should adopt. 
Whilst this involves a degree of reinterpretation of B&C’s theory, this reinterpretation 
provides the best structure for B&C’s common morality theory. This positive case shall be 
made by responding to B&C’s version of the isolation problem. It shall be shown that, with 
regards to moral beliefs, the isolation problem for coherentism is no problem at all. 
5. Coherentism and the isolation problem 
It is important to respond to B&C’s version of the isolation problem because if this problem 
is not solved, it could mean something like foundationalism has to be accepted (as B&C do), 
despite the problems noted above.
118
 Again, whilst B&C devote very little space to this 
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problem, nonetheless, the argument is powerful enough to persuade them to accept ‘reflective 
equilibrium as [a] primary methodology and to join it with [the] common-morality approach 
to considered judgements’.119  
Initially, B&C note ‘[a]lthough justification is a matter of reflective equilibrium in [the model 
they accept], bare coherence never provides a sufficient basis for justification, because the 
body of substantive judgements and principles that cohere could themselves be morally 
unsatisfactory’.120  However, the isolation problem can be turned into a stronger form. Whilst 
B&C note simply ‘bare coherence never provides a sufficient basis for justification’,121 why 
consider the idea of foundationalism at all if all B&C are looking at is bare coherence? A 
stronger argument would go along the lines of how BonJour puts it. He states ‘such a view 
seems to deprive…knowledge of any input or contact with the nonconceptual world, making 
it extremely unlikely that it will accurately describe that world’,122 regardless of the degree of 
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coherence. Whilst BonJour discusses this in relation to empirical beliefs, the problem needs 
to be looked at in relation to moral beliefs.
123
 
5.1. Moral beliefs and the isolation problem 
First, as the common morality’s norms cannot play a foundational role, and as B&C raise the 
isolation problem, B&C only have (seemingly) two other options available to them. B&C can 
either seek to embrace non-moral basic beliefs or, alternatively, B&C can accept a pure 
coherentist account with regards to moral beliefs. Either way, B&C must give up the 
foundational role of the common morality as they describe it. It shall now be argued that 
B&C should embrace a fully-fledged moral coherentist approach. They should not embrace 
non-moral basic beliefs.  
The reason is found in preliminary form in Sayre-McCord’s discussion of the problem. 
Sayre-McCord argues, ‘whether being appropriately sensitive to the facts involves our views 
being sensitive to our experiences depends in large part on whether our beliefs concern 
matters that we believe to be discoverable through experience. When it comes to morals…the 
relevance of experience is at least questionable’.124 
In order for moral coherentism to deal with the isolation problem there is a key premise that 
must be rebutted. That premise is as follows: in order to defuse the isolation problem as 
regards moral beliefs, we must allow a role for empirical experience in the way it is 
contended we need to defuse the problem as it relates to empirical beliefs. We must allow a 
role for noninferential, non-moral basic beliefs. But the validity of this premise depends upon 
the correct conception of objectivity we take towards moral beliefs. If moral truth is a matter 
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of moral argument,
125
 then we do not need to allow a role for empirical experience in the way 
the premise contends; we can achieve moral truth solely through the use of moral argument. 
Therefore, if the foregoing is true, in relation to moral coherentism, the isolation problem 
actually presents no problem at all. Empirical experience is not necessary or required in the 
(admittedly vague here) pertinent sense for moral justification or moral truth. We need to 
defend this conception of objectivity of morality in two ways and against two arguments. The 
first defence is it needs to be shown in relying on this conception of moral objectivity, we still 
are able to make sense of better and worse ways of reasoning, in the sense that we can 
determine (in particular, in relation to moral values) which arguments are by their nature and 
content, objective.
126
 The second defence is even if moral properties have no causal effects in 
our perception and formation of moral convictions, we can still have sound reasons for 
thinking moral properties and values objectively true.
127 
In order to decide which option is more appropriate to B&C, the discussion will look first at 
the ‘domain specificity of objectivity’128 regarding morality (moral objectivity being purely a 
matter of moral argument
129
). The first argument at its most basic is as follows: we cannot 
really understand a discourse as actually being “objective” without relying on a sense of 
objectivity based on the natural sciences. One implication of this in relation to the isolation 
problem and moral coherentism is we must allow a role for empirical experience outside of 
our coherentist considerations, otherwise we can never be really sure we have reached an 
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objective truth or determination of a particular moral argument, at least when compared to 
other domains of discourse.
130
 
One variant of this argument shall be considered, one which focuses on Dworkin’s writings. 
It is important this is considered, as there would be little point integrating B&C’s theory with 
Dworkin’s theory of law and morality if Dworkin’s reasoning was unsound. In addition, if 
this argument can be overcome, this is useful to the larger discussion in numerous ways. 
First, it will affirm reliance in previous parts of the chapter on the idea that arguments about 
moral truth are matters of moral judgment only.
131
 Second, as will be seen later on, moral 
beliefs are causally inefficacious. Nonetheless, if we are able to show the domain specificity 
of objectivity holds, the objectivity of morality can be affirmed regardless of this quality. 
Last, the discussion will also show why a ‘Naturalistic…Conception of Objectivity’132 (a 
conception of objectivity based on the natural sciences) should not be relied on in relation to 
moral beliefs. These arguments all go towards defusing the isolation problem as it applies to 
coherentism and moral beliefs. Coupled with the arguments against foundationalism it is still 
able to be maintained the best interpretation of B&C’s position regarding their common 
morality theory is a coherentist one. 
5.2. Brian Leiter’s challenge—The “Chocolate Convention” 
The argument comes from Brian Leiter. Leiter begins by stating ‘I want to review what 
Dworkin has said about objectivity and why it has seemed to many philosophers to be 
wrongheaded’.133 Leiter thinks what Dworkin is really getting at when distinguishing 
between internal arguments of or within morality and external arguments about morality 
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(when he distinguishes between internal and external scepticism
134) is ‘really best understood 
as the difference between a Naturalistic versus a Non-Naturalistic Conception of 
Objectivity’.135 The former claims ‘objectivity in any domain must be understood on the 
model of the natural sciences, whose objects of study are objective in the sense of being 
“mind independent” and casually efficacious (i.e., in making a causal difference to the course 
of experience)’,136 whereas the latter ‘denies that the type of objectivity found in natural 
science is the relevant type of objectivity to aspire to in all domains’.137 Last, Leiter asserts 
that he ‘will argue that the Non-Naturalistic Conception (at least the…Dworkin version) is 
not an adequate account of objectivity’.138 
The most important argument Leiter analyses for our purposes is Dworkin’s contention 
external arguments about morality (those purporting to rely on no moral claims at all and thus 
stand outside of morality
139) ‘make either preposterous [unintelligible] or question-begging 
demands on moral discourse’.140 The demands are ‘preposterous because [they] would 
commit us to what Dworkin calls “the absurd moral field thesis”’141. The “moral field thesis” 
is as follows: 
the universe houses, among its numerous particles of energy and matter, some special 
particles—morons—whose energy and momentum establish fields that at once 
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constitute the morality or immorality, or virtue or vice, of particular human acts and 
institutions and also interact in some way with human nervous systems so as to make 
people aware of the morality or immorality or of the virtue or vice.
142 
From this, Leiter asks whether Dworkin is entitled to dismiss the externalist demand for 
conformity with a scientific epistemology on the grounds it supposes the moral-field thesis.
143
 
Leiter states ‘it seems he is not. If the demand that moral properties find a place within a 
scientific epistemology leads to the “absurd” moral-field thesis, the sceptic might well 
conclude that this just shows there can be no moral facts’.144 The key point for discussion is 
‘[w]hat Dworkin really needs is an argument against the sceptical demand that moral facts be 
made to fit the requirements of a scientific epistemology. This, in a nutshell, is the crucial 
issue for Dworkin’s whole position’.145  
Leiter notes ‘perhaps there are the beginnings of such an argument in the writings under 
consideration. Consider, for example, one of the ways Dworkin frames his repudiation of the 
“best explanation” test of a scientific epistemology’.146 Dworkin’s claim is:  
Since morality and the other evaluative domains make no causal claims…such 
[scientific] tests can play no role in any plausible test for them. We do need tests for 
the reliability of our moral opinions, but these must be appropriate to the content of 
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these opinions. That is why an epistemological challenge that comes to nothing more 
than insisting that moral properties are not physical properties must fail.
147
 
Leiter takes Dworkin to endorse the idea that ‘[t]he epistemology of any domain must be 
sufficiently internal to its content to provide reasons, viewed from the perspective of those 
who begin holding convictions within it, for testing, modifying or abandoning those 
convictions’.148 Leiter further interprets Dworkin as claiming this ‘covers those domains 
which don’t make causal claims; for these domains we need a Non-Naturalistic criterion of 
objectivity’.149 Finally, Leiter tries to get at what Dworkin is really thinking in the following 
passage: 
So you, Mr Sceptic, have shown that moral properties do not figure in our best 
explanatory picture of the world, that they do not deserve a place in a suitable 
scientific ontology—that is all well and good, but it is hardly of much concern to me. 
For even though “moral wrongness” is not a property that slavery possesses 
objectively (in your Naturalistic sense of that term) it is still the case that my 
arguments for the wrongness of slavery are strong and persuasive ones and that you 
have given me no argument to cease believing that slavery is wrong. Who cares (as it 
were) about the ontological status of moral facts: what I want to know is whether you 
have a good (i.e., internal) argument that slavery is not wrong?
150 
But, ‘[i]f this is what Dworkin’s view comes to, then it is important to recognise that his real 
position is not that external scepticism is unintelligible, but that it is irrelevant…The only 
objectivity that “counts”, as it were, resides in the potentialities of this moral argument’.151 
The important issue at this point is Leiter’s contention that if Dworkin is a Non-Naturalist 
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about objectivity, he believes that Dworkin does not have a substantial argument against the 
Naturalist conception of objectivity, ‘against the sceptical demand that moral facts be made to 
fit the requirements of a scientific epistemology’152, except the irrelevance argument above. 
Leiter believes this argument does not suffice to defeat the external sceptic. He shows this by 
introducing his two main arguments against Non-Naturalism as a conception of objectivity. 
The most important for discussion is we will often be unable to make sense of better and 
worse ways of reasoning, and get no purchase on the idea of a discourse being “objective”, 
unless we implicitly rely on the Naturalistic sense of objectivity.
153
  
Leiter asks us to imagine a practice arises involving making arguments about the merits of 
either chocolate or vanilla ice cream. He also asks us to imagine a hegemonic consensus (or 
convention) arises, in which everyone comes to find the reasons for chocolate ice cream 
being the better flavour more persuasive. The convention always supports the conclusion 
chocolate is the better flavour. This is known as the “Chocolate Convention”. Leiter believes 
‘[a]ccording to Non-Naturalism we should have to say that it is an objective fact that 
chocolate is better than vanilla’,154 precisely because everyone comes to find the reasons for 
chocolate more persuasive. But this conclusion strikes Leiter as odd, as intuitively, the taste 
of ice cream flavours is best understood as a subjective matter. However, the important thing 
for Leiter is he believes ‘we can only articulate this intuition by appeal to an external 
conception of objectivity, by appeal to the notion that any particular discourse…must 
ultimately answer to the facts, Naturalistically conceived’.155 But, ‘[t]he Chocolate 
Convention simply can’t do that, since there are not objective facts about the “tastiness” of 
ice cream flavours to answer to’.156 Leiter goes on to make the more general point that 
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‘Naturalistic Objectivity is relevant to assessing the objectivity of most domains of discourse 
precisely because it is always possible for hegemonic conventions of argumentation…to 
grow up around nonfactual matters’.157 
Whilst Dworkin has considered something very similar to this example already,
158
 Leiter, 
however, would not seem happy with this response. He continues by noting ‘[t]he Non-
Naturalist, however, has no resources for responding to this possibility, no way to say that a 
hegemonic convention of reasons is, in fact not, objective. Yet it seems quite implausible that 
objectivity should accrue to judgements solely in virtue of the fact that they are not 
successfully challenged’; ‘[h]ow do we know that our “moral reasoning” is, itself, not a 
hegemonic convention like the Chocolate Convention? Isn’t that precisely what is at issue 
here?’ Leiter concludes by noting that he does not see a way the Non-Naturalist can answer 
this without begging the question.
159 
Nonetheless, there is a way out for Dworkin. Leiter’s claim is (in essence) that we must 
appeal to something outside the particular discourse, what might be called an ‘independent 
layer’,160 or we risk a vicious circularity in trying to separate out cases of mere hegemony of 
subjective properties, and cases of actual objective properties.
161
 But if this is the case, then 
this is a problem which has elements of the isolation problem built into it. Thus, one is able to 
respond in kind. Indeed, Dworkin has dealt with a similar problem when discussing Stanley 
Fish’s arguments. Put succinctly, ‘Fish raises the important question of whether Dworkin can 
continue to draw the distinction between “fit” and “substance”, once he admits that whether a 
matter is one of “fit” is itself an interpretive matter, so subject to similar, if not identical, 
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vagaries as to questions of substance. Both fit and substance are interpretive questions. So is 
there a distinction worth saving here?’162 
As Guest notes ‘[t]he answer is yes. Our judgements about interpretive matters such as 
literature and law, are complex, containing many elements of constraint. Overall judgments 
we make are the result of various sorts of judgments, some of which are independent 
judgments acting as a constraint on others’.163 As Dworkin notes himself, ‘[i]t is a familiar 
part of our cognitive experience that some of our beliefs and convictions operate as checks in 
deciding how far we can or should accept or give effect to others, and the check is effective 
even when the constraining beliefs and attitudes are controversial’.164 Just as coherentism (as 
seen in chapter three) adopts a ‘holistic and nonlinear conception of justification’, 165 whereby 
‘it is such a system of beliefs which is the primary unit of justification’166 and there is ‘no 
linear order of epistemic dependence’,167 such an approach can be adopted here. 
Thus, the reason it would be hard to imagine a “Chocolate Convention” is not because access 
is needed to some ‘external conception of objectivity’,168 but because using this complex 
coherentist interaction, we are able to appeal to aesthetic claims within the discourse, 
regarding ‘the character of a genuine aesthetic experience’.169 If there is scepticism over 
whether ice cream can have objective aesthetic value, this scepticism is better explained as an 
internal scepticism, and therefore presupposes the truth of some positive aesthetic claim.
170
 
However, this is not a problem, as the aesthetic debate here is able to take on an inclusive and 
holistic character.  
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Moreover, the “Chocolate Convention” example is misleading. It is misleading in that there 
are a number of features of morality that show Dworkin’s conception of objectivity is correct. 
First, morality has a social character; ‘morality…is the study of how we must treat other 
people’.171 It would therefore be amenable to link Dworkin’s claims regarding interpretation, 
and the richness his theory of constructive interpretation possesses, into the debates 
concerning morality. The next chapter shall do this. To be sure, the way Leiter describes the 
“Chocolate Convention” shows it has a social character too.172 But (predicated on the basis 
arguments about aesthetic styles and morality can be interpretive) we are able to show, even 
if we can imagine the “Chocolate Convention” arising, this agreement is better explained as 
one of mere hegemony, precisely because we have the resources in deploying interpretive 
arguments to show how debates concerning the various merits of ice cream flavours are not 
debates of objective (aesthetic) value, in the way that debates over (for example) justice are 
debates about the best way to express the value that people in social practices who share the 
concept of justice take that concept to describe.
173
 Indeed, it seems that what Leiter really 
needs is an example of a concept (moral, political or otherwise) social practice, aesthetic 
experience, text, poem, painting etc., whereby such agreement or disagreement is best 
explained through sharing a single interpretive concept, but turns out to be a case of mere 
hegemony. But, even if such an example could be thought up, it still seems odd to say we 
would not have the resources to show this is the case in the first place. 
Further dissimilarities are apparent. Regarding morality, it makes sense that we must consider 
each possibility of a moral issue as fully as we can and note its implications for the rest of 
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what we think and believe.
174
 We must take a position of moral responsibility.
175
 It does not 
make sense to say the same things about the flavours of ice cream. This position of moral 
responsibility has two implications. It means first, pace Leiter, if disagreements about 
morality do arise, they are genuine, and not merely illusory,
176
 in the holistic and inclusive 
sense described above. Further, when discussing particular moral propositions and doctrines, 
‘the main focus here is on the moral shortcomings of those doctrines’.177 Thus, we can only 
get purchase on the idea of moral discourse being objective when we are internal in this way.  
The very content of the beliefs we are dealing with, coupled with the moral and interpretive 
resources at our disposal, allows us to show the disanalogies between the “Chocolate 
Convention” and morality, so we can say the discourse about morality is objective, and the 
“Chocolate Convention” is a case of mere hegemony. Morality, unlike the “Chocolate 
Convention”, has a substantial, meaningful impact upon our lives.  
Thus, to conclude, it has been shown that in relying on the way coherentism functions, on the 
understanding of interpretive concepts, and on this conception of moral objectivity being a 
matter of moral argument, sense is still able to be made of particular discourses being 
objective and others being cases of mere hegemony, without recourse to a 
‘Naturalistic…Conception of Objectivity’.178 So, regarding moral beliefs and coherence, we 
do not need to allow a role for empirical experience in the way the isolation problem 
contends. All we have and need for thinking our moral reasons sound are further moral 
reasons.
179
 This goes towards showing the best interpretation of B&C’s writings is in line 
with a moral coherentist position. 
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But, in order to fully rebut the key premise in the isolation problem and show this conception 
of moral objectivity is the correct conception to take, a second argument needs to be 
explored. This argument takes as its starting point something Leiter, Dworkin (and 
importantly for what follows, Kramer) all agree on. All agree moral properties and values are 
causally inefficacious, in that moral facts have no causal effects in people forming 
convictions matching those moral facts.
180
 But, Leiter takes this argument to show that 
because moral facts have no causal effects ‘people…have no sound reason to think that any 
of their moral judgments is a correct report of moral truth’.181 This is a sceptical implication 
of Leiter’s holding of the idea ‘objectivity in any domain must be understood on the model of 
the natural sciences’.182 This argument links into the isolation problem regarding moral 
beliefs in a more indirect way; it argues against the conception of objectivity that enables us 
to argue we do not need to allow a role for empirical experience the way the isolation 
problem contends. What therefore needs to be shown is even if moral facts have no causal 
effects in our perception and forming of moral convictions, we can still have good reasons for 
thinking moral judgments objectively true.  
5.3. Moral properties—causally inefficacious? 
This section will briefly show how moral properties are causally inefficacious. ‘Quite a few 
philosophers…have posed queries about the existence or knowability of moral properties, by 
pointing out that such properties do not play any causal role in our perceptions of them’.183 
The discussion shall make use of two examples Kramer and Dworkin give, for consistency. 
Kramer begins by inviting us to ‘ponder a straightforward moral matter such as the moral 
impermissibility of an act of torturing a baby for pleasure. Any competent moral agent will 
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recognise that such an act is morally impermissible’.184 Most importantly here, Kramer notes 
‘any causal explanation entails counterfactuals that have to be intelligible if the explanation is 
to be satisfactory…However…things are not…unproblematic when we turn to the scenario of 
the moral agent and the torturing of a baby for pleasure’.185 What should be asked is 
‘whether, if the occurrent act of torturing a baby for pleasure had not been wrong, the 
competent moral agent would still have arrived at the judgment, that that act was morally 
impermissible’. But ‘in two respects, this counterfactual is deeply problematic’.186 It is 
problematic because ‘insofar as it can be answered, the correct reply to it is 
affirmative…Consequently, under any of the principal tests for casual efficacy, the moral 
property of wrongness would not be a cause of the agent’s censorious response to the torture; 
his response is the same irrespective of the presence or absence of that property’.187  Just as 
important is ‘the counterfactual question is largely unintelligible because…[n]obody 
competently engaging in moral reflection can conceive of a world in which some act of 
torturing a baby for pleasure is morally permissible’. Therefore, ‘the sheer inconceivability of 
the antecedent deprives the conditional of informativeness as a guide to causal efficacy’.188 
Kramer then provides a more knotty example of affirmative action. He notes ‘[i]n one respect 
the situation of significant moral disagreement surrounding affirmative-action programs is 
less disquieting than a situation in involving an utterly straightforward moral matter’.189 This 
is because 
any enquiry into the causal efficacy of the moral status of affirmative action does not 
generate any counterfactuals with inconceivable antecedents. The moral permissibility 
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of affirmative action programs in particular contexts is plainly conceivable, because 
some reasonable people under optimal conditions for moral reflection do or would 
believe that such programs in those contexts are morally permissible. Much the same 
can be said, mutatis mutandis, about the moral impermissibility of such programs in 
those contexts.
190 
Thus, due to the complexity of the moral problem at hand, Kramer, believes ‘the pertinent 
counterfactual question generated by the application of a causal criterion to the moral 
properties of affirmative action is fully intelligible’.191  
However, that the situation of affirmative action generates even an intelligible counterfactual 
question to test the causal efficacy of the truth of the matter (affirmative action’s fairness or 
unfairness) can be questioned.  
First, it is important to point out that in knotty moral situations and straightforward moral 
scenarios, the property of (for example) fairness supervenes upon the ordinary, natural facts 
of the scenario. This relationship has two important implications. First, in both complex and 
simple moral situations, ‘we cannot vary moral attributes without varying the ordinary acts 
that make up the case for claiming those attributes’.192 Second, this means the laws of nature 
do not govern the property of fairness, as is the case with those natural properties fairness 
supervenes upon.
193
 Both in simple and complex moral scenarios, ‘moral truth has neither [a] 
mental nor physical dimension’;194 ‘[u]nlike a proton, it is not a material entity or force’.195 
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The characteristics of moral truth do not change because the moral scenario becomes more 
complex. 
But, considering all of the foregoing, the idea that ‘[a]lthough the antecedent in that 
conditional question is false as a matter of moral necessity, it specifies a normative state of 
affairs that does not outlandishly elude all comprehension’196 can be further unpacked to 
show the counterfactual is unintelligible in the pertinent sense. This idea of the counterfactual 
being “intelligible” or not “eluding all comprehension” can be taken in two senses. To see 
this, as the pertinent issues surround moral truth, consider a situation where one person 
believes affirmative action is unfair, whereas another person considers it completely fair. In 
this scenario it is correct to say each person cannot comprehend the other’s belief is caused 
by the truth. If they could, what else could their own view depend upon to make it (even 
more?) true?
197
 To be consistent in describing the relationship of supervenience between 
moral and natural properties across all moral problems, it is correct to state it is unintelligible 
that the same set of facts can give rise to two equally true circumstances.  Just as is the case 
with torturing a baby for pleasure ‘the antecedent in that question is false as a matter of moral 
necessity’.198 This is the pertinent sense which Dworkin is using when he states ‘[w]e can’t 
sensibly ask whether you would still think affirmative action unfair even if it wasn’t unfair, 
and it is [this] question we would need to ask to test [the] claim that the unfairness of 
affirmative action has made you think it unfair’.199 In this sense Dworkin and Kramer are 
therefore agreeing. 
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However, Kramer then takes things further, asserting the state of affairs regarding affirmative 
action in the counterfactual is imaginable, and because of this, the counterfactual as a whole 
is intelligible. Such a state of affairs is imaginable because of ‘the complexity and fine 
balance of the considerations involved’,200 and ‘is [also] due to far-reaching differences 
among people concerning the identification and application of several major moral values’.201 
But, the idea of a normative state affairs being imaginable and the antecedent regarding moral 
truth being unintelligible can be separated out. Indeed, Kramer’s discussion lends support to 
this division. In such a particular context, as Kramer and Dworkin ascribe to the thesis that 
moral objectivity is matter of moral argument, the decision one person will reach regarding 
the fairness of affirmative action will be through the complex arguments and fine balancing 
of many moral values, as Kramer highlights. But, at this point, in order for a person’s view 
about the moral status of affirmative action to change, something nonmoral would have to 
change as well. This is not to disrespect the views of others, nor to claim that one’s view is 
not defeasible. Indeed, because several major moral values are applied and considered when 
deliberating about the fairness of affirmative action, it would be entirely consistent for one 
person to say, “I can imagine how affirmative action may be unfair in other particular 
contexts. But, in this particular scenario, as I have acted in the morally most responsible 
manner I can, I cannot comprehend a situation in which the moral status of affirmative action 
may be otherwise than what I believe it to be, all other nonmoral facts being equal”. Indeed, 
this is precisely why affirmative action, as a whole, is a more knotty moral problem; because 
of the consideration and application of many major moral values that may lead to right 
answers in other particular contexts. But it is consistent for a person to both be unable to 
fathom the antecedent in the counterfactual, and come to a morally responsible decision 
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regarding this particular context, and imagine other states of affairs in which the moral status 
of affirmative action may be the opposite to what she has concluded.
202
 
Nonetheless, it may be contended Kramer is talking about the same particular state of affairs 
being imaginable in the counterfactual. But to see why this cannot be the case, consider 
further (for example) the person who states the above believes affirmative action to remedy 
past discrimination. It might then be the case another person queries her stance. The most 
natural form this query would take would be something like: “But what if it turns out 
affirmative action does not remedy past discrimination? How would you view the status of 
affirmative action if such a matter was proved (empirically)?” Even if the reply to this 
question were her view would change subsequently, this would not be an argument against 
the antecedent regarding the moral status of affirmative action being unintelligible; it simply 
would be an implication of the relationship of supervenience described earlier. It would not 
describe precisely the same state of affairs; a particularly important nonmoral fact has 
changed. Finally, it is in this sense that one’s view about the fairness of affirmative action 
would be defeasible. Because the moral status of affirmative action is more contestable than 
torturing a baby for pleasure, the counterfactual may initially appear more intelligible. In fact, 
in the pertinent sense surrounding moral status and moral truth, in situations of moral 
complexity as well as moral simplicity, this is not so.  
Thus, although it has been shown Kramer’s conclusions regarding the intelligibility of 
counterfactuals in situations of moral complexity can be questioned (at least with regards to 
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regards to this second question, ‘[a] psychologist or social scientist or biologist might respond to that question in 
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affirmative action), the conclusion is still the same for Kramer and Dworkin; ‘in a situation of 
moral controversy as much as in a situation of moral consensus, the moral properties of 
courses of conduct do not possess any causal efficacy’.203 There is simply no way to test the 
causal efficacy of moral truths or properties, as we can make no sense of the counterfactual 
questions that must be asked in order to test causal claims, both in more simple and more 
complex moral problems.  
To conclude this section, using examples of a simple moral matter and a more knotty 
problem, it has been shown moral properties have no causal effects in forming convictions 
which match those properties or facts. No sense can be made of how such causal interaction 
would operate, about how the fairness of affirmative action could produce thoughts about 
itself.
204
 To link back to Leiter’s writings, he then uses these arguments to conclude ‘“there 
are no objective facts about value”’.205 It now needs to be shown how, using the conception 
of moral objectivity being a matter of moral argument, we can still have sound reasons for 
thinking moral convictions objectively true, despite the causal inefficacy of moral values. 
This will go towards showing we do not need to be ‘thorough-going empiricists’,206 when it 
comes to moral beliefs. This in turn shows that the isolation problem, at least as it applies to 
moral beliefs, does not present a problem for coherentism. 
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5.4. Is causal inefficacy therefore a problem? 
To build on the discussions of the causal ineffectiveness of moral values and how we can still 
have sound reasons for thinking our convictions objectively true together, and to steer the 
discussion back to Leiter’s writings, it is clear the former discussion ‘is driven by a fear of 
external scepticism’207 (or, in Leiter’s case, the opposite) with this in turn being driven by the 
fear we can have no reliable grounds for our moral opinions if moral values do not cause 
these.
208
 As Dworkin correctly contends (and as seen in Leiter’s discussion) ‘external sceptics 
embrace this second hypothesis’, what Dworkin terms the ‘causal dependence hypothesis’209 
(hereafter “CD”). Still, there is an important distinction between both hypotheses. The former 
claim, that moral facts do not cause our moral opinions, is a claim of scientific fact. The latter 
claim, however, is ‘a moral claim: about what counts as an adequate reason for holding a 
moral conviction’.210 
Whilst the foregoing discussed some of Leiter’s arguments against Dworkin in relation the 
domain specificity of objectivity regarding moral beliefs, the nature of Leiter’s scientific 
epistemology needs to be examined, in light of the foregoing arguments. This is important for 
many reasons. Firstly, Leiter’s writings tie into the issue of causal inefficacy. Secondly, these 
discussions can then be tied back into refuting the key premise in relation to the isolation 
problem. Finally, the discussion will further affirm ‘[m]oral realism…is a moral doctrine’.211 
Initially, we must note Dworkin’s analysis of “CD”:  
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A quick proof is available that CD is false: it refutes itself. I assume that CD cannot 
be restricted to the domain of morality. It can make sense, if at all, only as a general 
claim about knowledge. It must insist that we cannot form a reliable belief about 
anything…unless our belief has been caused by what it reports. So the hypothesis is 
victim to a paradox: if it is true, then we can have no reason for thinking it true.
212 
Fortunately, Dworkin’s line of reasoning is applicable to Leiter’s arguments. One main 
problem with Leiter’s argument’s is ‘what he repeatedly labels as a “scientific epistemology” 
should instead have been characterised as a “scientistic epistemology, or “scientific 
imperialism.” Though he articulates his scientistic approach incisively, it is in fact non-
scientific and…self-impugning’.213 ‘Leiter’s scientistic structures run afoul of their own 
injunctions. When Leiter queries the reality of moral properties, he is doing nothing that 
contributes to improving causal-explanatory accounts of the composition and workings of 
material entities and forces’. 214 In concluding, Kramer notes as ‘Leiter takes causal efficacy 
or empirical viability to be the decisive hallmark of what is real he has to regard his own 
division between the real and unreal as lacking in genuineness. That division has no scientific 
cash value’.215 
Moreover, despite Leiter’s comments, the idea we can have no sound reasons for thinking 
certain moral propositions are objectively true unless moral facts causally influence your 
moral judgement is not a direct claim about the truth of moral judgments. It does impact 
directly upon claims about certain reasons people have to believe judgements true. It is 
simply a claim about what reasons count as good reasons for the judgement we make. But, 
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what reasons count as good ones depends on the content of those judgments, meaning that 
any theory about adequate particular reasons for accepting a moral judgement must be moral 
itself.
216
 Thus the argument turns out to be one which fits in with the character of debate 
discussed throughout the chapter. Most importantly, ‘[w]e can accept it only if we make a 
compelling moral case in its favour. But we cannot…nothing turns on the best causal 
explanation’ of how we came to the opinions we may wish to test, or indeed, what tests we 
should use.
217
  
To tie into the discussions of moral epistemology throughout the chapter, Dworkin states ‘we 
might call a theory of moral responsibility by a grander name: we might call it a moral 
epistemology’.218 He then notes ‘[m]oral responsibility is also a moral matter…no theory of 
moral responsibility can plausibly denounce someone as irresponsible just because some 
embarrassing feature of his personal history best explains why he came to think his moral 
arguments good ones, provided those arguments are reasonable and adequately deep’.219 
More specifically with reference to Leiter’s writings, ‘a genuinely scientific epistemology is 
fully consistent with an affirmation of the reality of moral values. Though scientific 
experimentation cannot lend any support to such an affirmation, it likewise cannot cast any 
doubt thereon’.220 As science does not argue for or against the reality of moral properties, this 
allows the moral realist to have recourse to moral considerations and moral argumentation. 
Though Kramer sees this as question begging, in that it presupposes the reality of moral 
values while providing argumentative support for their reality, he is correct in noting the 
circularity is virtuous.
221
 This is even more so if we adopt the holistic and inclusive 
conception of justification discussed earlier. Last, Kramer is also correct to assert there are 
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‘overwhelmingly strong moral reasons for the reality of many moral properties. A proposition 
affirming the reality of the wrongness of genocide, for example, is a proposition affirming the 
wrongness of genocide’.222 Here, the position is one of moral and epistemic responsibility. 
All the arguments above shall now be tied together, to present a response to the isolation 
problem in favour of moral coherentism. 
5.5. The isolation problem and B&C’s writings 
It was noted before B&C have a choice between embracing either non-moral basic beliefs, or 
accepting a pure moral coherentism. Either way, given the critique of foundationalism above 
and of the common morality throughout this chapter, B&C must give up the foundational role 
of the common morality as they describe it. 
In order to defuse the isolation problem, the key premise needed to be rebutted was the 
contention we must allow a role for empirical experience. But this premise depends upon the 
correct conception of objectivity we take concerning moral beliefs. Therefore, the conception 
of moral truth being a matter of moral argument was defended in two ways. It was shown we 
can still determine moral arguments and discourse are objective in comparison to other 
domains of discourse without having to rely on a Naturalistic Sense of Objectivity. In 
addition, it was shown moral truths cannot cause moral judgements, yet we still are able to 
believe in the soundness of moral convictions concerning moral truth.
223
 Further, the 
discussion has highlighted reasons why we should not ‘insist on causal efficacy or empirical 
viability as a necessary condition for the reality or knowability of any phenomenon’,224 and 
that ‘CD, when applied in the moral domain, is itself a moral claim’.225 More generally, the 
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discussion has also analysed how ‘there are compelling moral grounds for a proposition 
affirming the reality of many moral values’.226 
Given all these claims, the best interpretation of B&C’s writings with regards to moral 
justification and their common morality theory is in line with a moral coherentist approach. 
Moreover, these arguments above can deal with the isolation problem as it applies to moral 
beliefs. In order to show how these arguments can deal with the problem, the discussion 
needs to briefly return to BonJour’s formulation, as it applies to empirical beliefs. He notes 
‘[n]othing about any requirement of coherence dictates that a coherent system of beliefs need 
receive any sort of input from the world or be in any way causally influenced by the world. 
But surely this is an absurd result. Such a self-enclosed system of beliefs…cannot constitute 
empirical knowledge of an independent world’.227 Indeed, Haack’s main argument against 
BonJour’s escape from the problem was it did ‘not guarantee experiential input’.228 But, the 
reason such input needs to be guaranteed is because of the type of belief in question. Here, 
there is an insistence ‘on causal efficacy or empirical viability as a necessary condition’,229 
because the beliefs being dealt with are empirical beliefs. But, when considering moral 
beliefs, the ideas surrounding the causal inefficacy of moral properties, and the arguments 
asserting ‘[m]orality is a distinct, independent dimension of our experience, and it exercises 
its own sovereignty’,230 provide good reason to believe ‘[w]hen it comes to morals…the 
relevance of experience’,231 is only important in the explanatory way Dworkin describes, and 
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has nothing to do when it comes to questions of justification regarding our moral beliefs.
232
 
We do not need to be empiricists at all when it comes to the latter questions. 
Therefore, the isolation objection has been successfully defused. What is more, coupled with 
the arguments against foundationalism, the best interpretation of B&C’s writings with regards 
to moral justification is in line with a coherentist approach. To return to B&C’s writings, 
whilst they note ‘[b]are coherence could be nothing more than a system of prejudices’,233 
coherentism can also be maximally inclusive, holistic and even interpretive in character. It 
can more than adequately deal with the problem the way B&C formulate it.  
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has set out to answer the specific research question: “What is the best 
interpretation of B&C’s framework with regards to moral justification so as to come to an 
epistemically responsible decision regarding a moral course of action?” As highlighted 
throughout the chapter, B&C make three essential claims about the common morality: the 
common morality forms a basis for B&C’s theory, the common morality plays a justificatory, 
foundational role in itself, and that B&C join the common morality together with reflective 
equilibrium in a compound approach to justification. The chapter then focussed on whether 
B&C’s common morality is able to make use of foundationalist moral theories. Whilst it was 
shown B&C do defend a theoretically viable form of moderate foundationalism, 
foundationalism itself as a not an appropriate or viable standard as a structural account of 
justification.  
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B&C’s version of the isolation problem was then examined. It was noted in raising the 
isolation problem, B&C have two options available to them; they can either embrace non-
moral basic beliefs or adopt a pure moral coherentism. It was shown that moral coherentism 
can deal with the isolation problem when taking seriously and considering in detail the way 
the system of beliefs interacts in coherentism, the nature and implications of interpretive 
concepts, and the conception of moral objectivity being a matter of moral argument.
234
 
Therefore, the best interpretation of B&C’s framework with regards to moral justification so 
as to come to an epistemically responsible decision regarding a moral course of action is one 
in which they adopt a pure moral coherentist approach. 
This conclusion is important for the larger aims of this thesis because we are now clearer 
about the underlying justificatory structure of the ethical decision-making framework to be 
integrated with Dworkin’s theory of law.  In turn, we can therefore be clearer in explaining 
the theoretical basis of, and showing how, judges have the ability to realise the possibility of 
taking a more proactive role in recognising the ethical nature of judicial decision-making, and 
confidently coming to a legal and ethically responsible decision in cases like Sidaway and 
Chester. The thesis is therefore closer to answering the central research question set because 
of the investigations undertaken in this chapter. But, in order to fully answer the central 
research question, B&C’s ethical framework and Dworkin’s theory of law actually need to be 
explicitly integrated with one another. The next chapter shall do this. 
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Chapter 5 
1. Introduction  
1.1. Conceptualisation 
First, the central research question of this thesis needs to be set out again:  
“Can an appropriate decision-making framework be provided to judges that 
recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making so as to provide confidence 
to judges in relying on their convictions in applying moral principles and medical 
ethics?”  
The previous chapters answered further questions necessary to fully answer the central 
research question. After setting out the fundamental issues motivating this thesis in chapter 
one, chapter two answered the question “What role do moral principles play in hard cases?” It 
was established Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law is an appropriate framework to analyse 
current approaches by judges. Chapter three highlighted a greater interpretive understanding 
was needed regarding the underlying justificatory structure of Dworkin’s theory. Therefore, 
the question posed was “Is law best seen through the value of justice or integrity?”1 It 
demonstrated integrity is interpretively best understood through the idea of coherence. It was 
also argued integrity is the value law should be seen through. The thesis then took Tom L 
Beauchamp and James F Childress’s (hereafter B&C’s) four-principles theory as a paradigm 
of an ethical decision-making framework, which led on to a more specific research question: 
“How should Beauchamp and Childress’s four-principles approach influence bioethical cases, 
when used as an example of Dworkinian principles in law?” Initially though, the thesis 
sought to gain a greater understanding of B&C’s four-principles approach by answering the 
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question “What is the best interpretation of Beauchamp and Childress’s framework with 
regards to moral justification, so as to come to an epistemically responsible decision 
regarding a moral course of action?” This investigation showed both Dworkin’s theory of law 
and B&C’s bioethical theory are best understood as structured by a coherentist framework. 
Given this common base, the question “How should Beauchamp and Childress’s four-
principles approach influence bioethical cases, when used as an example of Dworkinian 
principles in law?” can be answered fully. This in turn will mean the central research question 
can be answered in the positive, and achieve the main aims of this thesis. 
1.2. Aims of the current chapter 
In order to be clear about the aims of this chapter, it may be useful to summarise its 
conclusions in advance.  
Some further account of the structure of moral arguments that recognises the differences and 
similarities between law and morality/ethics is needed. This is will integrate B&C’s 
framework into Dworkin’s theory of law, and provide the further moral argument judges need 
to give them confidence they have acted responsibly.
2
 In order for B&C’s four-principles 
approach to be integrated into Dworkin’s theory of law, it needs to have certain 
characteristics. It needs to be coherentist in character, interpretive in nature, and interpretive 
in the right way (in the sense explained below). B&C’s theory satisfies these characteristics. 
At the broadest level, ‘[m]orality as a whole, and not just political morality, is an interpretive 
enterprise’.3 More specifically, B&C’s ‘common morality’4 theory is based on a constructive 
interpretation. It is in this sense B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way; their four 
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principles secure the norms of the common morality.
5
 Progressing with this specification,
6
 
though B&C define their theory as the four-principles approach, the four principles are better 
understood as four interpretive concepts and four interpretive values. They are ‘values [that] 
best justify what we accept as central or paradigm features of that practice’7 of bioethics. In 
addition, to link the thesis together, the best way for B&C to address the question of moral 
responsibility, or the moral-epistemic question
8
 is (as shown in chapter four) is by holding a 
coherentist framework.  
The specific research question this chapter intends to answer is “How should Beauchamp and 
Childress’s approach influence bioethical cases, when used as an example of Dworkinian 
principles in law?” Though the answer given will deviate from the question in contending 
B&C’s principles are best not seen as principles, this is to show how they may best influence 
bioethical cases, thus providing confidence to judges in relying on their convictions in 
applying moral principles and medical ethics. 
2. Supplementary features of Dworkin’s moral epistemology & why these are 
beneficial 
Initially though, further characteristics of Dworkin’s moral epistemology must be set out. 
This section shall progress on the claims made in chapters two (integrity is best understood 
through coherence) and four (‘there are compelling moral grounds for a proposition affirming 
the reality of many moral values’9). It shall then be shown why Dworkin endorses these 
characteristics. These supplementary features are beneficial for completing an integration of 
B&C’s bioethical framework into Dworkin’s theory of law that is mutually supportive 
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between the two theories.
10
 Later, the chapter will show because of B&C’s other 
commitments of their (reinterpreted) theory, they also adhere to these further characteristics 
of Dworkin’s moral epistemology.11 If B&C’s four-principles approach is interpretive, and is 
interpretive in the right way (in the sense discussed above), it is arguable B&C adhere to the 
same type of moral reasoning as Dworkin; moral reasoning is interpretive.
12
 Thus, whilst it 
shall be highlighted in this section why this account of responsibility is beneficial, this 
account also depends on arguments made later in the chapter. However, if those arguments 
are successful, they reinforce the arguments made here concerning the supplementary 
features of this conception of moral epistemology, and vice versa.  
2.1. Further characteristics of Dworkin’s moral epistemology & why Dworkin 
endorses these characteristics  
Dworkin begins by stating ‘[w]e can best approach the crucial question of how to think about 
moral issues—the question of moral epistemology—by studying the ordinary concept of 
moral responsibility’.13 Dworkin argues ‘the nerve of responsibility is integrity and that the 
epistemology of a morally responsible person is interpretive’.14 We need to pay attention to 
the question of moral responsibility because though others may be in disagreement with us, 
and we cannot compel them to be in agreement, we can expect that they have come to their 
decisions in a responsible manner. Our moral epistemology functions as piece in the jigsaw 
of our substantive moral theory, yet it must be separate enough and distinct to be able to 
utilise this theory in checking our reasoning in other parts of that jigsaw. Moral reasoning, 
indeed morality as a whole, is interpretive, with basic moral concepts being interpreted in our 
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moral judgments. These interpretations are tested by situating them in a large network of 
value to see if they satisfy the dimensions of fit and substance in regards to the best 
interpretations and conceptions of other concepts.
15
 ‘This requires that we seek a thorough 
coherence of value among our convictions. It also requires that we seek authenticity in the 
convictions that cohere: we must find convictions that grip us strongly enough to play the 
role of filters when we are pressed by competing motives that also flow from our personal 
histories’.16 
Many distinct characteristics of Dworkin’s theory of value lead him to this conception of 
moral epistemology, including his defence of ‘the metaphysical independence of value’17. 
Further, Dworkin’s commitment to the interpretive method means he ‘must try to show how 
the account of truth and responsibility [he offers]…fits not only moral interpretation but 
interpretation in general’.18  
Dworkin’s account of moral responsibility fits and is interpretive in the following way. 
Because moral properties supervene on ordinary properties (two worlds must differ in some 
nonevaluative manner as well if they differ in some evaluative way), there must be a reason 
why those moral judgements are true. A case for a particular moral proposition must be made, 
and our case helps to constitute or make true the particular moral proposition. Moral 
propositions cannot be just true in virtue of a brute fact. Further, given Dworkin’s adherence 
to moral truth being a matter of moral argument, that case must contain additional 
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propositions and judgements of value. The important question then becomes at what point 
this practice of justification comes to an end. Dworkin contends it is not that moral 
justification must end in virtue of a fundamental principle that is just true, but this process of 
justification ends when and if the argument ever meets itself.
19
  
This conception of moral responsibility fits with Dworkin’s larger interpretive commitments 
in the following manner. In an important taxonomy, Dworkin notes ‘I argue, then, that 
political morality depends on interpretation, and that interpretation depends upon value’.20 
Regarding interpretation, Dworkin asks himself two fundamental questions. First, ‘[w]hen do 
people share a concept so that their agreements and disagreements are genuine?’21 Second, 
whether a theory of interpretation general enough can be provided that covers various genres 
beyond politics including law, history, poetry and religion.
22
  
The former question is most significant for this chapter’s purpose. Dworkin’s response is ‘we 
share some of our concepts, including the political concepts in a different way: they function 
for us as interpretive concepts’23. The characteristics of this type of concept are important, as 
it shall be argued later in the chapter the four principles in B&C’s theory are best understood 
as four interpretive values and four interpretive concepts. Therefore, it is important to provide 
a brief exposition of the characteristics of an interpretive concept, so this exposition can be 
implemented later in the chapter.  
There are five key elements of an interpretive concept. Some of these characteristics have 
received a more sustained analysis in previous chapters, and therefore some elements will 
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receive more analysis here than others. Dworkin introduces the idea of an interpretive 
concept in the following way. He notes people share interpretive concepts because: 
[People] share social practices and experiences in which these concepts figure. We 
take the concepts to describe values, but we disagree, sometimes to a marked degree 
about what those values are and how they should be expressed. We disagree because 
we interpret the practices we share rather differently: we hold somewhat different 
theories about which values best justify what we accept as central or paradigm 
features of that practice.
24
  
Building on the claims made at point 5.2 in chapter four, the first key element of an 
interpretive concept is they have a social dimension. This is further reinforced when Dworkin 
notes ‘[w]e share an interpretive concept when our collective behaviour in using that concept 
is best explained by taking its correct use to depend on the best justification of the role it 
plays for us’.25 This characteristic is important because B&C also make clear that 
‘morality…refers to norms about right and wrong human conduct that are so widely shared 
that they form a stable social compact’.26 This idea of morality’s social dimension will 
become important when discussing how B&C’s theory is both interpretive and interpretive in 
the right way. An interpretive concept has a social dimension, ‘in the further sense that 
people who use them are best understood as interpreting the practices in which they figure’.27 
The second element of an interpretive concept is the type of agreement needed, known here 
as “agreement on paradigms”. Regarding interpretive concepts, Dworkin states we do not 
agree about how the “value” which people treat certain concepts (when they participate in 
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social practices) as serving should be portrayed. Further, regarding moral concepts, we agree 
that whilst these are values, we do not agree precisely about the character of these values.
28
 
However 
we agree sufficiently about what we take to be paradigm instances of the concept and 
paradigm cases of appropriate reactions to those instances, to permit us to argue, in a 
way intelligible to others who share the concept with us, that a particular 
characterisation of the value or disvalue best justifies these shared paradigms.
29
 
Further, ‘the kind of agreement that is required in the case of an interpretive concept is very 
different: it is not agreement on a decision procedure as a decisive test for instances. On the 
contrary, sharing an interpretive concept is consistent with very great and entirely intractable 
differences of opinion about instances’.30 It is the reasons behind the agreement that are 
important, not the fact of agreement itself. This shall be elaborated on with element four 
below. 
The third element is what shall be called the element of “different tests”. This goes to the 
heart of Dworkin’s idea of ‘theoretical disagreement’,31 but when brought back to its very 
basic idea is easy to explain. Consider the following quotes: ‘what about…the issue of law? 
Lawyers and judges seem to disagree very often about the law governing a case; they seem to 
disagree even about the right tests to use’.32 Further, ‘we must recognise at least one more 
family of concepts—a family that we share in spite of not agreeing about a decisive test. 
These are our interpretive concepts’.33 The common theme running through these quotes is 
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although we share the concept, we may use different tests to decide what that concept 
requires. To use a legal example, consider the differing tests used by various members of the 
House of Lords regarding how clear an “assurance” needs to be to found a claim of 
proprietary estoppel in Thorner v Majors.
34
 
However, simply using different tests whilst sharing the same concept is not enough for a 
concept to be justifiably labelled interpretive. For the main use of such a concept is as ‘a 
device for making sense of the inquiry, reflection, arguments and strategies that mark that 
domain’.35 This leads to the fourth element of an interpretive concept; the element of a “better 
account”. ‘It is in each case itself an interpretive question whether we make more sense of 
how the concept functions there on [the] assumption [the concept is interpretive] than we do 
on any competing assumption that declares agreement or disagreement spurious’.36 Because 
the analysis of a concept as interpretive is itself an interpretation, it is not enough participants 
in a social practice use different tests. Sense has to be made of the disagreement regarding a 
concept itself. We look to the practice using that concept to make the best sense of that 
disagreement. Just as the reasons behind the agreement were important for the element of 
“agreement on paradigms”, the reasons for disagreement relating to the concept are important 
too. As Dworkin notes:  
The question always remains, in spite of even very radical disagreement, whether the 
pattern of that disagreement is better explained by the hypothesis that those who 
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 [2009] UKHL 18. For example, Lord Walker held the assurance should be “clear enough” and this would be 
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disagree share a single interpretive concept and disagree about its character, or by the 
alternative hypothesis that the disagreement is illusory.
37
 
Dworkin then uses the example of justice. He notes: 
We fight campaigns, even wars about justice, and it is obviously false that if we only 
reflected on what we mean by the term, we would see that we really had nothing to 
disagree about. Because we share the interpretive concept of justice, we can recognise 
the theories of a great variety of political philosophers as competing conceptions of 
that concept.
38 
Here, Dworkin is appealing not just to philosophical but practical usage of the concept to 
provide an analysis of why it is better to understand the concept of justice as interpretive. 
This idea of providing different conceptions of a concept shall become important later on, as 
this will be a big indicator the four principles in B&C’s bioethical framework are better seen 
as four interpretive concepts and values. 
The last element is perhaps the most vital element of an interpretive concept, but has received 
the greatest analysis in chapters two and three. That is the element of value. Put simply, 
‘[i]nterpretivism advocates a way of “seeing” concepts, apparent from human practices, 
through values’.39 It is in this sense facts figure as part of the moral case to be made for that 
value. Facts are not significant in themselves, but are part of and embedded within moral 
judgments.
40
 The chapter shall later look at the interplay between an interpretive concept and 
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an interpretive value, as it seems a concept can be an interpretive concept and value at the 
same time. For example, B&C’s principle or concept of ‘respect for autonomy’41 can be seen 
through values itself, but is also a value that forms part of an ‘analytical framework of 
general norms derived from the common morality that form a suitable starting point for 
biomedical ethics’.42  
Finally, this conception of moral epistemology is beneficial for completing an integration of 
B&C’s bioethical framework into Dworkin’s theory of law, for three reasons; two theoretical, 
and one more practical in nature. 
First, the discussion above sets up certain arguments for rest of the chapter. If the 
epistemology of a moral person is interpretive and a person is morally responsible to the 
degree their various interpretations achieve an overall coherence, this means moral reasoning 
interprets moral concepts. Therefore new questions need to be asked; does it make sense to 
suggest there is a best interpretation of a moral concept or principle? As moral reasoning is a 
special case of a more general interpretive method, this suggestion does make sense.
43
 Both 
the arguments here and later in the chapter are therefore mutually supporting.  
This conception of responsibility is also beneficial because it makes very similar fundamental 
demands like those of integrity in law. As was seen in contending justice does not work as 
well as integrity as the value law should be seen through, the value of integrity accords better 
with arguments of substance surrounding the fundamental principle of equality of respect. 
Integrity itself is a key component of equality of respect.
44
 Dworkin makes many similar 
claims of substance regarding what it means to be morally responsible. He frames many of 
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these claims in terms of “evenhandedness”. For example, in discussing how rationalisation is 
a morally irresponsible course of action, Dworkin notes a person’s ‘behaviour is in fact 
determined by self-interest, not any principle that recognises the importance of other people’s 
lives. His alleged commitment does not promise evenhandedness because he will follow the 
principles he cites only when these serve his own interests’.45 In the most explicitly similar 
statement to integrity in law, Dworkin also notes: 
Community and civility nevertheless require a high level of tolerance. We cannot treat 
everyone who disagrees with us as a moral outlaw. We must respect the contrary 
opinions of those who accept the equal importance of all human lives but who 
disagree with us, in good faith, about what that means in practice.  We must respect 
them, however, only so far as they accept the burden of responsibility we have 
canvassed…because only then do they really accept that equal importance.46 
The point in highlighting these and other points
47
 which Dworkin talks about 
“evenhandedness” and how we should treat others in a genuinely respectful, principled 
manner,
48
 is it shows on this conception of responsibility treating others with equality of 
respect is a fundamental demand. Therefore, if B&C’s theory makes similar fundamental 
demands, then this makes for a seamless integration of their ethical framework and 
Dworkin’s theory of law, as there are similar demands made across the concepts of both law 
and morality. This conception of responsibility shows how both Dworkin and B&C have 
common roots in the interpretive concept of morality, and how that interpretive concept and 
its demands can be specified so as to both differentiate between and integrate Dworkin’s 
                                                          
45
 Dworkin, JFH (n2) 104. 
46
 ibid 113 (emphasis in original). 
47
 See “Ways Not to Be Responsible” in ibid 104-107. 
48
 ibid 107. 
207 
 
theory of law and B&C’s framework. This point shall form the basis of the discussion of how 
B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way.49 
Third, the more practical aims of this thesis are to provide judges with a decision-making 
procedure that gives confidence in applying medical ethics and relying on their moral 
convictions. The account of moral epistemology presented here and in other chapters rescues 
our confidence, despite the complexity of legal problems with an intrinsically ethical 
substance, that the particular legal and ethical propositions that seem best justified are in fact 
true. Judges can also prudently accept certain concepts have a best interpretation, and are able 
to test these interpretations by placing them in a network of value when addressing the legal 
and ethical issues in a particular case.
50
 Further, although judges may not analyse and 
evaluate their discussions in terms of interpretive concepts and interpretive moral reasoning, 
it is still important to highlight the concepts in use are in fact interpretive. It needs to be 
understood how and why judges argue and disagree, and whether these arguments and 
disagreements are genuine or not. Finally, the recognition of the explicitly interpretive and 
coherentist character of judges’ arguments acts as a guide in our own arguments when we test 
conceptions of concepts, such as shall be done later with B&C’s theory, and as was done in 
chapter three with the value of integrity.
51
  
Overall, this section has highlighted further features of Dworkin’s moral epistemology, and 
has shown why Dworkin endorses this conception of interpretive epistemology. It has shown 
how Dworkin’s theory of moral responsibility is interpretive, and how it fits in with his larger 
interpretive commitments. This latter discussion allowed the elements of an interpretive 
concept to be separated out, elements that will become important later in showing how and 
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why B&C’s theory is interpretive. This section has also shown why this conception of 
responsibility is beneficial. The main purpose behind both outcomes is to enable the chapter 
to show how and why B&C’s bioethical framework best integrates with Dworkin’s theory of 
law. However, in order to fully integrate B&C’s account into Dworkin’s theory of law, 
B&C’s theory needs to be shown to be interpretive and is interpretive in the right way. This 
will provide further reasons of substance regarding why B&C framework fits well with 
Dworkin’s theory of law and why it is the best decision-making framework for judges to use 
that recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making. The case for B&C’s theory 
being interpretive in nature shall now be made. 
3. B&C’s theory is interpretive in nature  
The previous section highlighted that if it is shown B&C’s theory is interpretive in nature, 
then important consequences follow; because of these commitments it is also sensible for 
B&C to embrace the same type of moral reasoning set out in the previous section, with all the 
benefits that conception brings. Further, if sense can be made of the idea the epistemology of 
a moral person is interpretive, then new questions need to be asked; whether it makes sense to 
suggest there can be a best interpretation of a moral principle or concept. This suggestion 
does make sense.
52
 This section shall show in detail how sense can be made of this claim, and 
will therefore progress from the conclusions in chapter four (a moral coherentist approach is 
the best interpretation of B&C’s framework with regards to moral justification53) to be able to 
fully integrate this framework with Dworkin’s theory of law. 
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This section shall focus on making a case for one main claim: although B&C define their 
theory as the four-principles approach, the four principles in B&C’s theory are better 
understood as four interpretive concepts and four interpretive values. They are ‘values [that] 
best justify what we accept as central or paradigm features of that practice’54 of bioethics. 
This in turn shows the concept of bioethics is an interpretive concept.  
Given constraints of space, this section shall consider only one of B&C’s four principles as a 
representative analysis of their bioethical theory to show their four principles are best 
understood as four interpretive concepts and values, linking back into the elements 
highlighted in the previous section regarding interpretive concepts. Though it does not 
necessarily follow that all four principles are best understood as interpretive concepts and 
values if only one principle is shown to be, the discussion will be substantiated with reference 
to B&C’s analysis of their other principles where appropriate to provide further context. The 
principle of respect for autonomy shall be considered. This principle is the main purpose the 
practices of informed consent are taken to serve and are sensitive to.
55
 It also underpins the 
discussion of the inherent ethical issues in the cases considered in chapter one (in particular 
Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
56
 and Chester v Afshar
57
). This principle shall 
also be subject to further analysis and applied to re-interpret Chester in the next chapter, to 
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show how judgments may be constructed under this decision-making framework. Further, 
there is obviously much more to B&C’s theory than simply a discussion of their four 
principles. Though B&C’s theory in its most complete sense is interpretive through and 
through, equally important aspects of their theory, such as their discussion of the issues of 
moral character and moral status, cannot be examined. Again though, no doubt if reference 
was made to the elements above regarding interpretive concepts, the discussions in both those 
chapters would be found to be interpretive in nature as well
58
. Last, this section shall look at 
some criticisms the four-principles approach, even in its reinterpreted version, needs to deal 
with. However, given constraints of space, general objections to seeing moral concepts as 
interpretive concepts cannot be discussed here.
59
 
3.1. B&C’s general interpretive commitments 
Initially, specific quotes can be introduced to show B&C accept the interpretive method in 
deriving their four principles, and accept the concept of bioethics is an interpretive concept. 
B&C derive their set of pivotal moral principles from the common morality. These principles 
function as a framework that forms the best starting point for the analysis of problems in 
biomedical ethics. In linking back into the elements of an interpretive concept, B&C have 
reached the conclusion these four principles are central features of the practice of bioethics 
via an interpretive exercise. B&C examine the coherence of moral beliefs and our considered 
moral judgments. Thus, B&C take it the practice of bioethics has value, that analysis of the 
paradigms of that practice leads to these values and that we make more sense of bioethics by 
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using these four principles as an analytical framework, looking at the way our moral beliefs 
cohere.
60
 
Specifically, B&C note regarding their four principles, ‘[m]ost classical ethical theories 
accept these norms in some form, and traditional medical ethical codes presuppose at least 
some of them’.61 Further, ‘[n]onmaleficence and beneficence have played a central role in the 
history of medical ethics. By contrast, respect for autonomy and justice were neglected in 
traditional medical ethics and have risen to prominence only recently’.62 Finally, B&C also 
note ‘[t]he four clusters of principles that we propose as a moral framework derive from the 
common morality, but when specifying and balancing these principles in later chapters, we 
will also call upon historical experience in formulating professional obligations and virtues in 
health care, public health, biomedical research and public policy’.63   
These quotes highlight many points. First, they show bioethics has a social dimension. B&C 
speak of the history of medical ethics, of ethical theories that are classical, of traditional 
codes of medicine. All of these terms presuppose we must look to the past and present for 
venerable paradigms, each of which tries to identify, in some circumstances more specifically 
than others, the character of the value bioethics manifests. These quotes also show B&C, in 
looking at these paradigms, are undertaking an exercise in which these codes and theories 
(collectively under the concept of “bioethics”) are seen in their best light. This is done by 
deriving their four principles, implicit in both older and recent paradigms, from practice 
itself. They are seeking to explain our collective behaviour in using the concept of 
“bioethics” by taking the correct use of the concept of bioethics to depend on these four 
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principles as a framework of general moral norms.
64
 In describing their principles as four 
clusters of principles, this provides further evidence an analysis of these principles as 
interpretive concepts and values is amenable to B&C’s theory. Further, that the various 
requirements of, say, respecting autonomy, may be sensitive to the value that that concept 
itself serves. B&C also note ‘[p]rinciples are more general and comprehensive norms than 
rules’65 and ‘[p]rinciples do not function as precise guides in each circumstance in the way 
that more detailed rules and judgements do’.66 Here again, B&C are alive to the possibility 
that because these principles are quite abstract, there might be the possibility of different tests 
being used to specify the principles themselves. 
In discussing the process of specification, B&C state ‘[s]pecification is not a process of 
producing or defending general norms such as those in the common morality; it assumes that 
the relevant norms are available. Specifying the norms with which one starts…is 
accomplished by narrowing the scope of the norms, not by explaining what the general norms 
mean’.67 Here, B&C leave open the possibility of using different tests for specification, and 
in doing so show the four principles are value-laden concepts. Yes, specification does not 
explain what general norms mean, but it is reasonable to infer some idea .of what value best 
exemplifies one of the four principles, in order to specify it at all. This idea is further 
reinforced with the example of specification B&C highlight regarding the rule ‘“Doctors 
should put their patients interests first’”.68 B&C highlight one study in which  
most physicians in the study apparently did not operate with the definition of 
deception favoured by the researchers, which is “to deceive is to make another believe 
what is not true, to mislead”. Some physicians apparently believed that “deception” 
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occurs when one person unjustifiably misleads another, and that it was justifiable to 
mislead the insurance company in [the study’s] circumstances.69  
Here there are competing interpretations of an initially specified norm. Further, given the 
context of the disagreement (whether it is deception to falsify information on insurance forms 
to ensure patients receive the best treatment available
70
) it is better to state this disagreement 
is not spurious. It is wrong to state ‘if we only reflected on what we mean by the term 
[deception] we would see that we really had nothing to disagree about’71 and the researchers 
and physicians in the study were simply talking past one another. Indeed, B&C explicitly 
recognise when disagreement involving moral problems does occur it is not spurious. They 
state: 
Conscientious and reasonable moral agents understandably disagree over moral 
priorities in circumstances of a contingent conflict of norms…Such disagreement does 
not indicate moral ignorance or moral defect. We simply lack a single, entirely 
reliable way to resolve many disagreements, despite methods of specifying and 
balancing.
72
 
Last, in stating ‘[d]ifferent parties may emphasise different principles or assign different 
weights to principles even when they agree on which principles are relevant’,73 here B&C 
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come closest to Dworkin’s idea of theoretical disagreement in law, whereby lawyers and 
judges disagree about the right tests to use in ascertaining the law governing a case.
74
 All of 
the foregoing passages make a strong case for the claim B&C accept the interpretive method 
with regards to their four-principles theory, that they impose purpose on the practices of 
bioethics to provide the best justification of the paradigm features of those practices.
75
 It will 
now be shown how their discussion of the principle of respect for autonomy is interpretive in 
nature. 
3.2. Respect for Autonomy 
When looking at the principle of respect for autonomy, B&C highlight the importance of the 
principle at many different points. They note ‘[w]e employ the concept of autonomy and the 
principle of respect for autonomy in this chapter largely to examine individuals’ decision 
making in health care and research, both as patients and as subjects’.76 B&C also implicitly 
bring out the importance of the principle when giving an overview of the concept of 
autonomy. They note ‘[a]t a minimum, personal autonomy encompasses self-rule that is free 
from both controlling interference by others and limitations that prevent meaningful choice, 
such as inadequate understanding. The autonomous individual acts freely in accordance with 
a self-chosen plan’.77 More explicitly, when discussing the demands of the principle of 
respect for autonomy, B&C note: 
To respect autonomous agents is to acknowledge their right to hold views, make 
choices and to take actions based on their values and beliefs. Such respect involves 
respectful action, not merely a respectful attitude. It also requires more than 
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noninterference in others’ personal affairs. It includes, in some contexts, building up 
or maintaining others’ capacity for autonomous choice while helping to allay fears 
and other conditions that destroy or disrupt autonomous action.
78
  
Although this discussion is quite content-thin, B&C contend these demands support a number 
of more specific rules that act as paradigms of what it means to respect autonomous agents 
and the decisions they make.
79
 In addition, B&C also note the scope of the principle of 
respect for autonomy is limited to those who can act in a sufficiently autonomous manner.
80
 
All of the foregoing passages show there is the potential for “agreement on paradigms” in 
regards to the principle of respect for autonomy. They also show if disagreement does arise 
regarding the concept, it is likely (given the importance B&C ascribe to the principle) this 
pattern of disagreement is better explained by the idea this disagreement stems from the 
sharing of a single interpretive concept whose value and character is disputed.
81 
Interestingly, B&C also point out how some writers view the current prominence attached to 
autonomy as problematic. These critics ‘charge that autonomy’s proponents sometimes 
disrespect patients by forcing them to make choices, even though many patients do not want 
to receive information about their condition to make decisions’.82 Such disagreement is 
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similar in manner to that of Dworkin’s in Law’s Empire. For comparison, see Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n31) 
165.  These similarities are not surprising, given (as Hart notes) justice ‘is both a virtue specially appropriate to 
law and the most legal of the virtues’ (HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, OUP 1994) 7). 
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beneficence, at ibid 204-205. 
81
 Dworkin, JFH (n2) 161. Indeed, see also B&C’s explicit acknowledgement of the possibility of interpretive 
disagreement surrounding the values of justice and beneficence, at B&C, PBE (n4) 249 and 203 respectively.  
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interesting because one way to view this disagreement is critics might be arguing bioethics is 
not best interpreted by including a norm of respect for autonomy. Alternatively, this is one 
instance of a clear difference between theorists regarding their own sense of what value(s) is 
central to bioethics, and the critics own roles in identifying and articulating those values 
central to the concept of bioethics.
83
 This is supported by B&C further arguing:  
The duty of respect for autonomy has a correlative right to choose but there is no 
correlative duty to choose. Several empirical studies of the sort cited by [critics] seem 
to misunderstand…how autonomous choice functions in a theory such as ours and 
how it should function in clinical medicine.
84
 
In articulating how critics’ arguments are misguided, B&C repeatedly emphasise one of the 
main purposes of the practice of bioethics is to ensure at least the choice, with regards to 
initial provision of information regarding medical circumstances and medical decision-
making, is the patients to make, whilst being sensitive to both cultural and worldview 
differences. Therefore, the concept of autonomy is fully consistent with, and enriched by, the 
idea of delegated authority to others to make medical decisions for the patient and inquiry by 
doctors about whether persons wish to make decisions and receive information. Thus, it is 
clear B&C impose this purpose (respecting the patients autonomy) on bioethical practices to 
make them the best possible example of practices they can be.
85
 Moreover, this shows it 
would not make sense to say if we only reflected on what we mean by “autonomy” we really 
have nothing to disagree about, because we are just using different criteria.
86
 It is better to see 
the principle of respect for autonomy as an interpretive concept and value.  
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A similar argument is highlighted by B&C when they note other writers have sought to 
interpret autonomy through the idea of relationships. Relational autonomy questions the 
model of autonomy which views the self as independent and having a rationally controlling 
will. These critics believe environmental interaction and certain determinants such as gender 
and race shape a person’s identity much more than is realised by the former model, which is 
charged with being unmindful of matters such as communal life and social context. This 
model highlights there is potential danger for persons to have their competencies and 
capacities impaired by certain relationships, and that we need to be on guard against this. 
B&C note they will analyse these problems through their three other principles of 
beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice, and this conception of autonomy is defensible as 
long as it does not pass over the key features of autonomy they discuss.
87
 Again though here, 
there is a difference between writers as to which values best address certain issues in 
bioethics, and how those values themselves are best characterised. Though B&C may come 
to the same conclusions as the relational autonomy critics, it is still important here to map out 
the distinctions in value and conceptions of concepts. It goes toward showing both bioethics 
and the principle of respect for autonomy are interpretive concepts. These distinctions may 
also be able to explain the reasons why writers may disagree on certain other issues, as 
bioethicists (and analogously, judges) disagree on the articulation of values central to 
bioethics, and therefore what responsibility they have in interpreting this and related 
concepts.
88 
Furthermore, a clear instance of theoretical disagreement regarding the concept of autonomy 
and the principle of respect for autonomy can be seen in the way B&C initially articulate 
these concepts themselves. They introduce this discussion by noting first: 
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Virtually all theories of autonomy view two conditions as essential for autonomy: 
liberty...and agency...However, disagreement exists over the meaning of these two 
conditions and whether additional conditions are required. How a theory can be 
constructed from these basic conditions is the first subject we will consider.
89
 
B&C go on to consider two theories: ‘split-level theories of autonomy’90 and their ‘three-
condition theory’.91 The former theory ‘requires having the capacity to reflectively control 
and identify with or oppose one’s basic (first-order) desires or preferences through higher 
level (second-order) desires or preferences’.92 B&C reject this in favour of their own account 
of autonomy, whereby they present three nonideal conditions to analyse autonomous action; 
choosers have to act intentionally, with understanding and without controlling influences. 
B&C believe this account is more coherent with the premise that the ordinary choices of 
competent persons (such as cheating on one’s partner or selecting indulgent snacks) are 
autonomous than the split level account. Reflective higher order identification can render 
many actions generally considered autonomous to be nonautonomous on the split-level 
theory
93
.  
There are clear elements of the interpretive concept built in to B&C’s argument that their 
interpretation of autonomy is the best interpretation of this moral concept and also part of the 
best interpretation of the principle of respect for autonomy. First, there is a clear discussion of 
different tests being used, even though the concept in question is shared. Second, B&C 
appeal to certain instances taken to be paradigms of the concept which allows them to argue 
in an intelligible manner with those who share the concept of autonomy their characterisation 
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best justifies these paradigms.
94
 In addition, it has already been shown how the better account 
of the concept of autonomy and the principle of respect for autonomy is one in which 
disagreement is not spurious, given the important implications of the concept. Last, it is clear 
B&C, in presenting their three ‘nonideal conditions’95 also take the concept of respect for 
autonomy itself to signify certain values. It is not just the case the interpretive concept of 
“bioethics” is seen through a number of values, but that the concept of autonomy and the 
principle of respect for autonomy are best seen as value laden, potentially with (and through) 
a number of other values as well.
96
  
Like the claim in chapter three (integrity is best understood via coherence) was intelligible 
and interpretive in nature, it is clear from the rest of B&C’s chapter that whilst the practice of 
bioethics is best seen (partly) through the value of respect for autonomy, this value is also an 
interpretive concept that can be further interpretively specified as well.  As B&C note: 
The intimate connection between autonomy and decision making in health care and 
research, especially in circumstances of consent and refusal, unifies this [discussion’s] 
several sections. Although we have justified the obligation to solicit decisions from 
patients and potential research subjects by the principle of respect for autonomy, we 
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have also acknowledged that the principle’s precise demands remain unsettled and 
open to legitimate interpretation and specification.
97
 
The foregoing quote shows B&C envisage there are going to be certain concepts linked to the 
value of respect for autonomy that might give rise to further competing tests. Such agreement 
and disagreement is again going to be interpretive and moral all the way down, given the 
large network of value that can be applied when discussing the best conception of these 
concepts.
98
 For example, B&C go on to discuss competing conceptions and varieties of 
autonomous consent,
99
 noting also ‘[c]ompetence in decision making is closely connected to 
autonomous decision making, as well as to the validity of consent’,100 and ‘[c]ompetence 
judgements have the distinctive normative function of qualifying or disqualifying persons for 
certain decisions or actions, but those in control sometimes incorrectly present these 
judgments as empirical’.101 B&C also discuss how ‘the primary justification advanced for 
requirements of informed consent is to protect autonomous choice’102 and how Onora O’Neill 
has argued the concept of informed consent is best understood through the ideas of 
preventing coercion and deception, not respecting patients’ autonomy.103 Here, there is 
further interpretive disagreement if we link this discussion back to the elements of an 
interpretive concept, just as there is when B&C discuss certain standards relating to the 
concept of disclosure and which standard is morally preferable,
104
 and when presenting more 
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controversial aspects of the principle of autonomy when discussing the concept of 
understanding.
105
 
Overall then, the principle of respect for autonomy (and associated concepts) is better seen as 
an interpretive concept and value. The best way to interpret B&C’s discussion regarding the 
principle of respect for autonomy is one showing they take the principle to have a social 
dimension (as it figures in bioethical practices), and there is sufficient agreement on paradigm 
instances of respecting autonomy that allows B&C to discuss different theories of autonomy 
(which informs the principle of respect for autonomy). This disagreement is also best 
explained through the idea of a sharing of a single interpretive concept whose value is 
disputed.
106
 These elements allow them to further discuss what values are central to 
biomedical ethics, whether bioethics is best interpreted as including a norm of respect for 
autonomy, and finally how the value of respect for autonomy can be further interpretively 
specified and linked to other concepts in a network of value. Indeed, as this discussion has 
substantiated this analysis by highlighting similarities with B&C’s discussion of the other 
three principles in their theory, this shows it is best to see all of B&C’s principles as 
interpretive concepts and values. B&C’s bioethical theory is interpretive all the way down. 
3.3. Criticisms of B&C’s theory  
Given the foregoing discussion, a number of criticisms levelled at B&C’s theory can be 
quickly dismissed. First, there has been a supposed lack of explanation as to why the four 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatments, at ibid 162-163. Here we see B&C using moral 
judgements about the moral status of venerable distinctions to argue that the best justification of the role that 
nonmaleficence plays for us in bioethics is one that does not accept these distinctions, but accepts B&C’s test 
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principles have not been ‘lexically ordered’.107 Given the reinterpretation above, an 
explanation is readily available. As the four principles are better seen as four interpretive 
concepts and values, this means a defence of some particular conception of one of the four 
principles must draw upon values beyond itself. It would be circular to appeal to the value 
itself in its own defence.
108
 Just as coherentism rejects the idea of linear justification, linear 
dependence and epistemic priority for a better account of a systematic relation of 
justification,
109
 B&C’s framework on this reinterpretation rejects a lexical ordering because it 
does not make sense to lexically order the principles. Their true nature and how they function 
means we must see them as holistically and interpretively related in the fashion of a jigsaw, 
or geodesic dome.
110
 
However, this response may be inconsistent with another commitment seen as 
uncontroversial by B&C but often highlighted as a criticism; B&C’s four principles can 
conflict with one another.
111
 B&C allow for value conflict at the most fundamental level. 
They note ‘we maintain throughout this book that various moral principles, rules and rights 
can and do conflict in the moral life. These conflicts sometimes produce irresolvable moral 
dilemmas’.112 B&C provide us with a number of instructive cases in their section entitled 
“moral dilemmas”, to show conflicts may arise. But, on reading PBE, it is unclear that B&C 
address why these conflicts arise. Given the tone of their book, it seems B&C accept this to 
be accommodating: ‘[e]xplicit acknowledgement of such dilemmas helps deflate unwarranted 
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expectations about what moral principles and theories can do’.113 But this never addresses 
how or why such conflict occurs. As such, their adherence to the idea principles can conflict 
begins to look like the following thesis: 
Moral conflict is real, and any theory that denies this is false to moral reality. Once we 
understand the nature of [for example, beneficence and respect for autonomy] we see 
that, in cases…they just do conflict. That conflict is not an illusion produced by 
incomplete moral interpretation; it is a matter of plain fact..
114
 
But on this reinterpretation of their theory B&C ascribe to the idea that the reality of moral 
judgements is a matter of moral argument,
115
 and the interpretive account of moral 
responsibility put forward earlier. Thus, the correct response to this line of reasoning is it is 
wrong to assert conflict is just a matter of plain fact. Moral claims cannot just be true in 
virtue of a bare fact. The better way to explain such conflict is to see our quest for moral 
responsibility as a constant reinterpretation and process. But this process sometimes seems to 
highlight apparent conflicts. This is not to say this conflict is deep and genuine. If we are 
committed to the interpretive conception of moral responsibility, the best way to try to work 
out that responsibility is to refine our conceptions of the two conflicting values. We seek 
coherence and not conflict. We confront this conflict by working towards eliminating it, 
hoping (in some circumstances, inevitable) conflict is merely temporary. The other possibility 
is when interpreting our values, the best interpretation is one in which it is required that they 
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conflict. But this does not collapse into the matter of plain fact thesis. It would show there is 
collaboration at a deeper level of two values that realises conflict as a substantive outcome.
116
 
This section has shown B&C’s theory is interpretive in nature. Although B&C define their 
theory as the four-principles approach, the four principles in B&C’s theory are better 
understood as four interpretive concepts and values. The section also dealt with criticisms 
levelled at B&C’s theory; it was shown that given their interpretive commitments, these 
criticisms could be overcome. Having shown B&C’s theory is coherentist (in chapter four) 
and interpretive, it remains to be shown B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way. This 
                                                          
116
 ibid 119-120. This notion of conflict links into another feature of B&C’s theory. B&C accept in some 
circumstances two specifications can be given, each equally meritorious as the other—a form of moral 
relativism in particular moralities (B&C, PBE (n4) 4; 19). But again, the important question is why B&C accept 
this form of moral relativism. They note ‘[i]n any problematic case, competing specifications are likely to be 
offered by reasonable and fair minded parties, all of whom are committed to the common morality’ (ibid 19). It 
seems again B&C wish to be accommodating. But, as B&C reject the idea historical facts about the 
commonality of a belief can contribute to its normative authority (ibid 419), why then accept the converse 
situation of diversity as contributing towards some form of relativism? ‘People, in their diversity, must decide 
what is true, and this is a matter of the justification of the conviction, not the best explanation of convergence or 
divergence’ (Dworkin, JFH (n2) 48). B&C need a positive argument for why they adhere to relativism in 
particular moralities. Relativism implies the ‘correct standards of interpretation are relative to different schools 
or communities of interpreters’ (ibid 145). This view is therefore ‘internally sceptical because it relies on the 
conviction that morality rises only out of the practices of particular communities’ (ibid 34 (emphasis added). For 
the definitions of internal and external scepticism, see footnote 134 in chapter 4). This sceptical stance needs to 
be contrasted with the true default position, that of uncertainty (Dworkin, JFH (n2) 91. Even without looking at 
the flaws of relativism as a moral position See, for example, Dworkin’s discussion in JFH (n2) at 146-147 and 
170-171. See also Kramer, Realism (n9) at 30-46), in the absence of a positive argument B&C’s commitment to 
relativism seems not to be a commitment to relativism at all, but a consequence of B&C trying to be overly 
accommodating. Further, until B&C provide a positive argument, it is better (given the above analysis) to see 
their theory as committed to the reality of moral judgements as a matter of moral argument, and the interpretive 
account of moral responsibility put forward earlier that forces us to work through apparent conflicts in value 
(Dworkin, JFH (n2) 10; 120. Finally and more specifically to this thesis, it may also be contended by way of 
criticism if B&C endorse the further characteristics of moral epistemology set out above, this may lead to giving 
up their four principles in favour of one vale, integrity, as Dworkin’s conception of responsibility leads him to 
the conclusion that ‘the nerve of responsibility is integrity’ (Dworkin, JFH (n2) 101). However, this is not the 
case. Dworkin makes it very clear, using the concept of law as an example, that although a certain concept may 
be interpretive, it does not follow Dworkin’s own theory of (legal interpretation or) truth conditions of 
propositions must be adhered to (Ronald Dworkin, ‘Response’ in Scott Hershovitz (ed) Exploring Law’s 
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correct question to ask is whether the four principles in B&C’s theory provide the best interpretation of the 
concept of bioethics, so that the truth conditions of a particular proposition in that domain are not only 
interpretive, but also interpretive with regards to the four values of respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence and justice. This has been answered in the positive. Finally, see also B&C’s interesting 
discussion of the moral virtue of integrity, which is very similar to Dworkin’s formulation regarding coherence 
and authenticity (Dworkin, JFH (n2) 108), and the conception of integrity discussed in chapter two, in PBE (n4) 
at 40-42. 
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will complete the integration of B&C’s bioethical framework into Dworkin’s theory of law, 
and provide judges with a decision-making framework that best recognises the ethical nature 
of judicial decision-making, and give them confidence in relying on their convictions in 
applying moral principles and medical ethics. 
4. B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way 
This section shall now go on to make the further case that ‘[m]orality is a whole, and not just 
political morality, is an interpretive enterprise’117. It shall do so by showing B&C’s theory is 
interpretive in the right way. B&C’s common morality theory is based on a constructively 
interpretive project. Further, just as integrity secures those fundamental principles of equality 
which make a community’s exercise of political power morally justified,118 B&C’s four 
interpretive concepts and values also secure these fundamental norms of the common 
morality, making the decisions and justifications in question more secure and genuine in an 
analogous way.
119
 B&C’s four principles are intrinsically linked to the common morality. The 
four-principles framework assumes the demand to solve problems in bioethics by reference to 
that morality shared by all persons committed to morality, applicable to all persons in all 
places, and all human conduct can be judged by is sensible. Further, solving bioethical 
problems using these four principles is the best way of implementing the norms of the 
common morality with regards to problems of bioethics, precisely because of their pertinence 
to bioethics. This latter conclusion has been reached through an interpretive exercise, by 
analysing the paradigms of bioethical practices (in a broad sense encompassing, though not 
limited to, traditional and contemporary professional medical ethics codes, traditional and 
contemporary ethical theories, various moral and bioethical methodologies, paradigms of 
what it means to act ethically in micro- and macro-level bioethical scenarios, and issues of 
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moral status and moral character). Our considered judgments, the way our moral beliefs 
cohere, and the best way to explain the disagreement that occurs when competing tests, 
theories and specifications are proposed to solve bioethical problems have also been 
analysed. These four principles are the best principles for solving problems in bioethics, and 
have been selected because they best express the values that the concept of bioethics should 
be seen through, having analysed those practices in which the concept figures.
120
 
This section shall first briefly look at the similarities between law and morality on the 
interpretive account developed in this thesis. This will partly show how morality is an 
interpretive enterprise,
121
 as highlighting the similarities between the concepts of law and 
morality will show there is a clear possibility this claim fits our practices. This section will 
then go on to discuss why ethics should inform the law. 
122
 More specifically, the section 
shall discuss why it is important B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way. This again will 
show there are benefits to seeing morality as an interpretive enterprise, and will show the 
fundamental principles this claim is built upon. Last, this section will show B&C’s common 
morality theory in the 7
th
 edition of PBE is based on an interpretive project. This will not only 
clarify the structure of B&C’s reinterpreted bioethical framework, but the relationship 
between Dworkin’s theory of law and B&C’s bioethical framework. In addition, this claim 
will also show the benefits to Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law and moral epistemology 
are prevalent throughout the entire framework constructed throughout this thesis. 
4.1. The similarities between law and morality on this interpretive account 
This section can only very briefly treat the similarities between law and morality, and will do 
so in a way amenable to the integration of Dworkin’s theory of law and B&C’s reinterpreted 
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bioethical theory. One very basic, but very important similarity on these accounts is both law 
and morality are argumentative.
123
 As it was shown above B&C’s four principles are best 
seen as interpretive values, B&C adhere to the same type of moral reasoning as Dworkin, that 
there can be a best interpretation of a moral concept or principle,
124
 it also reasonable to say, 
as is the case with law, the ‘“interpretive” attitude’125 holds for morality, the common 
morality (to be argued), and the concept of bioethics. Second, though it is clear we can take 
other domains of value seriously
126
, Dworkin also brings out the important practical points of 
the philosophical discussions about law and morality, and how the decisions we take in both 
these domains of value matter gravely. He notes: ‘[w]e want to live well and behave decently; 
we want our communities to be fair and good and our laws to be wise and just. These are very 
difficult goals, in part because the issues at stake are complex and puzzling and in part 
because selfishness so often stands in the way’.127 Likewise, B&C note generally practical 
ethics is the attempt to interpret general norms, and to use those norms in the course of 
deliberation for the purpose of addressing particular problems and contexts, be it practices 
and/or policies in professions, institutions, or government.
128 
Whilst these arguments are uncontroversial, they rely upon a more important premise that 
needs to be made explicit; the relationship between the concepts of law and morality 
themselves. It was argued in chapters two and three that Dworkin’s theory of law, with its 
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interpretive commitments, is a better theory because it explains the intricacies of hard cases 
and gives critical direction to judges in resolving arguments about what the law requires.
129
 
These arguments are important here because the best analysis of the concept of law is 
therefore as an interpretive concept. Dworkin’s interpretive methodology is also most 
appropriate for analysing the practice of law.
130
 This concept cannot be properly analysed 
except by seeing it located within an integrated web of political value and morality, as well as 
noticing the (other) social practices in which the concept figures.
131
 More explicitly, law and 
morality should not be seen as two separate systems, but as one continuous single system; law 
is a part of political morality, just as political morality flows from a more general personal 
morality. Political morality flows from personal morality because whilst political obligation 
is borne out of a relationship which holds among subjects of a political community, those 
subjects discharge these obligations through a separate collective entity. Political morality 
therefore looks at what is owed to others as individuals when we act, as a community, on 
behalf of and in that entity.
132
 However, as Dworkin notes, ‘[t]he more difficult question is 
how [law] should be distinguished from the rest of political morality – how these two 
interpretive concepts should be distinguished to show one as a distinct part of the other’.133 
This question highlights the differences Dworkin believes persists, despite believing that law 
and morality form a single system. He notes ‘[a]ny plausible answer will centre on the 
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phenomenon of institutionalisation’.134 Specifically, ‘the integrated account…distinguishes 
law from political morality, in effect, by defining a legal right to a right as a judicial 
decision’.135 
Therefore, given these similarities and this premise, there is a clear possibility of integrating a 
bioethical framework into an interpretivist theory of law. ‘Interpretivism…argues that law 
includes not only the specific rules enacted in accordance with the community’s accepted 
practices but also the principles that provide the best moral justification for those enacted 
rules’.136 However, in saying principles provide moral justification for those rules, these 
principles are going to be principles of political morality, as these principles are directed at 
those rules of law themselves. As Dworkin notes ‘any plausible conception of law…must 
suppose that local decisions have a force in fixing what law requires that they do not have in 
fixing what is just or unjust…any competent theory assigns such decisions much greater 
force in law than in morality’.137 This shows there is clear space for a bioethical component 
to be integrated into a theory of law that talks about the best justification of legal rules via 
principles of political morality, given the similarities and premise adverted to above. It now 
needs to be shown why it is important B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way, and 
argue for this claim itself. 
4.2. Why it is important B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way 
First, it has been argued that B&C adhere to the further characteristics of interpretive moral 
responsibility, with all the benefits this conception brings. In particular, one of those benefits 
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was this conception of responsibility makes very similar fundamental (moral) demands to 
those of integrity in law, those being we should treat others in a genuinely respectful, 
principled manner.
138
 In showing B&C’s theory of the common morality is based on a 
constructive interpretation and B&C’s four interpretive concepts and values secure the norms 
of the common morality in an interpretive way, this completes the integration of B&C’s 
bioethical framework and Dworkin’s theory of law. This is not only because it explicitly 
affirms B&C’s commitment to similar fundamental principles as Dworkin’s theory of law, 
but also because it makes explicit the network of value we are able to situate B&C’s and 
Dworkin’s theories in, relative to each other. There is the extension of a ‘community of 
principle’139 across both the domains of law and bioethics. A community has both a moral 
responsibility, and more specifically a medical moral responsibility and a political moral 
responsibility. That is ‘a community or a culture has moral responsibilities of its own: its 
collective arrangements must show a disposition towards realising that responsibility’.140 
Further, ‘[p]olitics is for most people among their most important moral theatres and 
challenges. So a community’s political philosophy is a major part of its conscience and claim 
to collective moral responsibility’.141 Last, and more specifically, it is clear judges must also 
show a disposition towards realising these responsibilities. Given the problems identified in 
chapter one, the main way in which they can acquit these responsibilities is by engaging with 
the inherently ethical issues in particular cases using a framework that recognises the ethical 
nature of judicial decision-making, so they can confidently rely on their own convictions in 
applying moral principles and medical ethics. Thus, the claim that B&C’s theory is 
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interpretive in the right way is therefore a significant one for this thesis. It now needs to be 
set out.
142
 
4.3. B&C’s theory of the common morality is based on a constructive interpretation; 
B&C’s four interpretive values secure the norms of the common morality 
It is first necessary to outline any additions to B&C’s common morality theory in the 7th 
edition of PBE. Whilst B&C’s most recent common morality theory is virtually the same as 
in the 6
th
 edition of PBE, there are a few noteworthy additions to B&C’s common morality 
theory that impact upon the integration of B&C’s and Dworkin’s theories. First, as well as 
B&C noting there are certain character traits and rules of obligation in the common morality, 
B&C add in the 7
th
 edition that ‘[i]n addition to the vital obligations and virtues just 
mentioned, the common morality supports human rights and endorses many moral ideals 
such as charity and generosity’.143 This quote is interesting because the concept of “human 
rights” can be plausibly said to be quite content thick, despite B&C re-affirming the common 
morality ‘contains moral norms that are abstract, universal and content-thin’.144 If this is the 
case, this seems to add a lot more content to the common morality than is perhaps warranted, 
or in line with the rest of B&C’s comments. 
B&C link the common morality to their four principles in now familiar ways; they note ‘[t]he 
moral norms that are central for biomedical ethics derive from the common morality, though 
they certainly do not exhaust the common morality’.145 Further, ‘[t]he set of pivotal moral 
principles defended in this book functions as an analytical framework of general norms 
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derived from the common morality that form a suitable starting point for biomedical 
ethics’.146 This is different to the language used in the 6th edition of PBE.147 The language 
suggests, in deriving their four principles from the common morality, there is a degree of 
specification occurring. This is much like how Dworkin distinguishes law as part of political 
morality, which in turn is part of the still larger concept of morality.
148
 This idea shall become 
important later when looking to clarify the overall schema this chapter seeks to present.  
What also seems to be new to the 7
th
 edition (or at least made more explicit) is B&C’s 
adherence to an “impartiality criterion” in regards to deciding which persons are committed 
to morality.
149
 For example, B&C note ‘[m]ere coherence is an inadequate criterion, so on 
what basis can we be confident that considered judgements are sufficiently free of bias and 
constitute justified beliefs?’.150 They go on to state ‘[m]oral judges are entitled to claims to 
have reached considered judgements only if those judgements have been framed from an 
impartial perspective that reins in conflicts…of self-interest’.151 In addition, when discussing 
the possibility of empirically proving the existence of the common morality, B&C state ‘the 
persons to be included in a study that investigates [their] hypothesis are (1) persons who pass 
a rigorous test of whether their beliefs conform to some critical considered judgement…and 
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(2) persons who qualify has having the ability to take an impartial moral point of view’152. 
B&C’s hypothesis is that ‘[a]ll persons committed to morality and to impartial moral 
judgment in their moral assessments accept at least the norms that we have proposed as 
central to the common morality’.153 In speaking of how the impartiality criterion tries to 
ensure that persons behave in accordance with their moral commitments and avoid 
temptations of self-interest,
154
 analogies can be drawn with how our moral responsibility 
must act as a way to filter out our unprincipled convictions.
155
 Therefore, this specific 
analysis is beneficial here. This condition provides another example of how B&C’s and 
Dworkin’s moral commitments are similar in substance. 
In addition to outlining B&C’s latest common morality position, in order to show how 
B&C’s theory is interpretive in the right way, it is important to highlight Dworkin’s rebuttal 
of the (morally) sceptical implications of John Rawls’s constructivism. On one understanding 
of Rawls’s ‘original-position device’156 it provides a solution to the problem of how those 
persons in a political community who disagree regarding moral matters are able to live 
together in a coercive state. That solution is to collect together those principles of justice 
common to the community, so as falling within an “overlapping consensus”. Then, using the 
device of the original position,
157
 this allows these persons to model the common convictions 
into a suitable device of representation, allowing them to then construct principles of justice 
that everyone in the political community can accept. But, the sceptical implications of this 
approach are seen when it is noted these principles have been selected not because they are 
true, but because they are common. Thus, whilst this position may not provide a directly 
                                                          
152
 ibid 416. 
153
 ibid (emphasis added).  
154
 ibid 409; 406. 
155
 Dworkin, JFH (n2) 108. 
156
 ibid 63. 
157
 The original position is a thought experiment whereby people come together to establish a political 
community, but each person lacks knowledge of pertinent personal factors such as their own age, sex, talent and 
economic standing (ibid). 
234 
 
sceptical argument, it may show moral truth does not have to play a role in defending a robust 
theory of political justice.
158
 
But, Dworkin contends this sceptical marginalisation of moral truth is in fact impossible. 
Rawls aimed to identify this “overlapping consensus” by emphasising the political traditions 
of a particular historical community. However this project is unfeasible, even if a sociological 
approach is taken. Rawls would simply not be able to find an overlapping consensus that is 
helpful for the purposes above in, for example, what all Britons accept on reflection. The 
issue of abortion itself would render the project unachievable given the deep divisions 
regarding the legal and ethical principles behind such a sensitive issue.
159
 Instead, Dworkin 
contends ‘Rawls plainly had in mind, however, not a sociological, but an interpretive search 
for overlapping consensus. He hoped to identify conceptions and ideals that provide the best 
account and justification of the liberal traditions of law and political practice’.160 This type of 
project however cannot help but rely on morality (as opposed to marginalising moral truth) as 
it must choose among competing interpretations of a political tradition by taking some 
conceptions to provide a better justification for that tradition than others.
161 
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It is important to highlight this critique against Rawls’s constructivism because the same sort 
of argument can be invoked to support B&C’s common morality theory and how the four 
interpretive concepts and values secure the norms of the common morality. B&C note 
(consistent with the 6
th
 edition of PBE) they ‘accept both the normative force of the common 
morality and the object of studying it empirically’.162 Nonetheless, whilst B&C devote space 
to showing how the common morality could be empirically justified,
163
 B&C also accept that 
‘[w]hatever might be established empirically about the existence of universal norms of a 
shared common morality, nothing normative would follow directly from this finding. Neither 
historical facts…nor social science facts of the sort envisaged in the previous section serve to 
justify moral norms’.164  
These passages lead to two main arguments that make a case for it being better to see B&C’s 
common morality theory as based on an interpretive project. Substantively, we are concerned 
with the normative force of the common morality. The main aim of this thesis is to provide 
judges with a framework that recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making, and 
allow them to use it as a normative tool to provide confidence to judges in relying on their 
convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics. Whilst there does have to be a 
degree of fit in order for this idea truly to be a constructive interpretation (as discussed 
below), the point here is there are several moral reasons that argue in favour of seeing B&C’s 
theory of the common morality as based on a constructive interpretation.  
The first is in seeing the common morality as based on an interpretive project, this means the 
argument B&C highlight, that ‘[s]ome critics of our theory of common morality have asserted 
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that scant anthropological or historical evidence supports the empirical hypothesis that a 
common morality exists’,165 cannot affect the normative force of the common morality at all:  
we cannot take the fact of disagreement itself to count as an argument that our moral 
convictions are mistaken. We would not count the popularity of any of our other 
convictions as evidence for their truth…In any case, because diversity is just a matter 
of anthropological fact, it cannot on its own show that all positive moral judgements 
are false. People, in their diversity, must still decide what is true, and this is a matter 
of the justification of conviction, not the best explanation of convergence or 
divergence.
166
 
In basing their formulation of the common morality on a constructive interpretation, B&C do 
not need to worry about the arguments (for example) Leigh Turner highlights in ‘Zones of 
Consensus and Zones of Conflict: Questioning the “Common Morality” Presumption in 
Bioethics’.167 On this interpretive reconceptualisation, B&C’s claim above about empirical 
conclusions and the normative force of the common morality can be developed, as it can now 
be properly explained why such claims cannot affect the normative force of the common 
morality. The best way to see these claims is as “externally sceptical”: they ‘rely entirely on 
second-order, external statements about morality’.168 Though these claims could be revised to 
be internally sceptical, this would mean they would have to rely on some very general moral 
claim in order to be sceptical about further moral claims. They would therefore have to 
assume, and not deny, that moral judgments are capable of being true and having normative 
force.
169
 Moreover, as it has been shown B&C adhere to the same type of interpretive moral 
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epistemology as Dworkin, and B&C’s four principles are best understood as four interpretive 
concepts and values, it is clear the best interpretation of B&C’s theory is one that also relies 
on this premise. Again, this is not to say facts about the common morality cannot figure in 
this interpretive reconstruction, simply those facts are part of the moral judgement about the 
common morality itself, about the moral significance of the common morality.
170
 Seeing 
B&C’s common morality theory as based on an interpretive project places that theory on a 
stronger footing, not just because of the benefits of seeing their theory as interpretive in the 
right way, but because arguments purporting to rely on anthropological evidence to refute 
their normative claims simply cannot do so (with it also being best explained why they cannot 
do so). ‘A non-empirical thesis of this sort cannot be undermined by empirical means’.171  
However, these empirical claims might impact upon this reinterpretation of B&C’s common 
morality in another way. They may potentially defeat the claim B&C’s theory of the common 
morality is based on a constructive interpretation, because they may go towards showing this 
idea does not fit B&C’s theory. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that ‘convictions about 
fit contest with and constrain judgements of substance…The interpretive judgment must 
notice and take account of these several dimensions…it must also meld these dimensions into 
an overall opinion’.172 As the question of fit is still an interpretive question,173 there are still 
moral reasons underlying the discussion as to whether a particular proposition (B&C’s theory 
of the common morality is based on a constructive interpretation) fits in the pertinent sense 
(in this case, whether the proposition above fits with B&C’s claims about the common 
morality). Given this, whilst there are doubts about whether B&C can empirically prove the 
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existence of the common morality
174
 (as was the case with Dworkin’s criticism of Rawls), on 
this interpretive account of B&C’s theory, it is not fully responsive to descriptive criticisms 
of this sort,
175
 given the discussion of the not-significant-in-themselves status of facts in 
moral judgements. Furthermore, there is evidence to support the view B&C do envisage the 
sort of interpretive project being put forward here. 
Before this evidence is explored though, one issue needs to be examined which may reveal a 
large split between B&C’s and Dworkin’s theories. When discussing the possibility of 
change in the common morality, B&C note: 
Changes in the way slaves, women and so forth are regarded seem more to be changes 
in either particular moralities or in ethical and political theories in the common 
morality. The most defensible view, we suggest, is that the common morality does not 
now, and has never, included a provision of equal moral consideration for all 
individuals.
176
 
This is in sharp contrast to Dworkin, who states: 
No government is legitimate unless it subscribes to two reigning principles. First, it 
must show equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion. 
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Second, it must respect fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide for 
himself how to make something valuable of his life.
177
 
One tentative solution to this problem is as follows. By showing how B&C’s theory is 
interpretive in nature, a case can be made that, interpretively, there is a norm of equality or 
equal consideration in the common morality. However, as B&C point out (correctly, in my 
opinion) there are likely to be societies which still discriminate on the basis of arbitrary 
grounds,
178
 there are facts counting against this interpretation. This is not to subscribe to, in 
an analogous way legal positivists do, the idea facts are significant-in-and-of-themselves. 
However, facts have to act as some sort of check, or else such a proposition would then not 
be an interpretation, but instead a normative assertion.
179
 This then brings up important 
questions as to how far facts can operate as checks in interpretation, when they occupy this 
not-significant-in-itself status Dworkin ascribes to them in the interpretive enterprise. 
Dworkin does not answer this question head on.
180
 Overall though, it is the commitment to 
the same enterprise that is as important. Further, B&C do assert throughout their book how 
important a norm of equality is. They note: 
Even if abstract norms do not change, the scope of their application does change. That 
is, to whom many or all of these principles are deemed to apply has changed and we 
may anticipate still further change. Our arguments in Chapter 3 regarding moral status 
anticipate this problem: “Who qualifies as belonging to the moral community?” may 
be the same question as, “Who qualifies for moral status?” It is possible that we might 
radically alter our understanding of who or what qualifies for moral status.
181 
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In addition, this commitment to the interpretive enterprise in turn leads to a commitment to 
objectively true moral norms, the reality of which is reached through moral argument. It is a 
reasonable proposition B&C are committed to a norm of equality this way. Indeed, B&C 
come extremely close to such a position, and state this flows from the common morality in 
the following passage: 
can we confidently assert that norms that prohibit practices such as slave owning are 
justified by the common morality, even though these norms cannot be said to be 
themselves included in the common morality (in the sense that the common morality 
has no explicit standards of this sort)? We think the common morality does have this 
capacity. The justification is that the explicit commitments of the common morality to 
respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, and the like contain implicit commitments to 
norms that prohibit practices such as slave owning…a rule allowing this practice 
would leave the common morality in a state of moral incoherence, whether or not 
slave-owning societies recognise this fact.
182 
Whilst this may look like an initially odd formulation, in the sense B&C say the common 
morality has the capacity to condemn such practices, even though those norms are not in the 
common morality, this oddity is dissolved when taken in the way above. 
With this problem discussed, evidence to support the view B&C do envisage this interpretive 
project can be highlighted. This argument would apply most readily to B&C’s common 
morality theory in the 4
th 
edition of PBE.
183
 However, in the 7
th
 edition of PBE, it is a 
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reasonable inference B&C interpret the interpretive concept of morality itself to arrive at the 
common morality. They note ‘the word morality [is] a much broader term than common 
morality’,184 and ‘we learn to distinguish the part of morality that holds for everyone from 
moral norms that bind only members of specific communities’.185 In addition, B&C state 
‘[n]o particular way of life is morally acceptable unless it conforms to standards in the 
common morality’,186 and ‘[i]t would be absurd to assert that all persons do, in fact, accept 
the norms of the common morality, because many amoral, immoral or selectively moral 
persons do not care about or identify with moral demands’.187 B&C also continue to draw 
their distinction between the common morality and particular moralities, but also make it 
clear a particular morality is not morally viable if it violates the norms of the common 
morality.
188
 This latter passage also has many similarities to Dworkin’s distinction between 
the concept and different conceptions of law.
189
 B&C then join the common morality to their 
four interpretive concepts and values, the selection of these four interpretive concepts and 
values best justifying the central or paradigm features of bioethical practices.
190
 Therefore to 
clarify, given the foregoing quotes, the concept of morality functions for B&C so as to 
include the common morality and the many particular moralities that can be specified from 
the common morality. In addition, the concept of morality includes those four interpretive 
concepts and values that justify the central or paradigm features of the more specific 
interpretive concept and practices of bioethics, which are in turn derived from and secure the 
norms of the common morality themselves.
191 
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This process of specification is best explained as interpretive in nature if this process is 
related to the elements of an interpretive concept above. For example, B&C note ‘[a]lthough 
there is only one universal common morality, there is more than one theory of the common 
morality’,192 and when discussing the limitations of Bernard Gert’s common morality theory, 
note ‘some substantive requirements of the common morality are better expressed in the 
language of principles than the language of rules’.193 B&C go on to state: 
no more central moral content exists as a starting point for biomedical ethics than the 
kinds of norms from which we have formulated our four clusters of principles…“No 
more central” should not be understood here as an assertion that the principles provide 
the sole moral content…these principles are drawn from the territory of the common 
morality, however small or large it may be, a matter we do not try to resolve in this 
book. Our thesis is merely that the principles and rules are a reasonable formulation of 
some vital norms of the common morality and that the principles we analyse are 
particularly suited to biomedical ethics.
194 
Given B&C highlight there are different theories of the common morality, the common 
morality can vary in size according to theory, the common morality might be analysed in 
better ways than others, this disagreement is not to be seen as spurious,
195
 and derived from 
the common morality are four interpretive concepts and values, this implies a degree of 
interpretive, theoretical disagreement over the concept of the common morality itself. These 
different theories can be seen as an instance of a most fundamental disagreement regarding 
                                                          
192
 B&C, PBE (n4) 25, footnote 3. 
193
 ibid 397. 
194
 ibid 410 (emphasis in original). 
195
 Dworkin, JFH (n2) 162. Again, when discussing the limitations of Bernard Gert’s common morality theory, 
B&C state that ‘[c]onsider respect for autonomy, which Gert and his colleagues find as problematic as principles 
of justice and beneficence. This disregard of this principle renders their assessments of some cases convoluted 
and puzzling’ (B&C, PBE (n4) 397). See, for further discussion, PBE 397 
243 
 
‘the values [ ] critics assign to a practice they take themselves to share’196 or alternatively, 
‘conflict in deeper divergent understandings of the critical responsibilities in play’.197 
Therefore, to conclude: in trying to articulate a theory of the common morality that best 
justifies paradigms central to the concept of morality, applicable to all persons committed to 
morality and who are impartial in their moral judgements,
198
 and from which four interpretive 
concepts and values are derived which best justify paradigm features of bioethics and secure 
the norms of the common morality, on this reading it is clear the concept of the common 
morality is interpretive in nature. Further, B&C’s formulation of the common morality is 
based on a constructively interpretive project. Just as Dworkin notes ‘law is a branch of 
political morality, which is a branch of a more personal morality’199 and ‘[t]he more difficult 
question is how that concept should be distinguished from the rest of political morality – how 
these two interpretive concepts should be distinguished to show one as a distinct part of the 
other’,200 a similar structure is apparent in B&C’s theory. The four values which deal with 
bioethics are part of the common morality, which in turn is part of the larger concept of 
morality. In addition, as both theories have their starting points in the interpretive concept of 
morality, it is clear we are able to integrate and situate both Dworkin’s theory of law and 
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B&C’s bioethical framework in the same network of value, relative to each other. Last, given 
the four interpretive concepts and values secure the norms of the interpretive concept of the 
common morality, this completes the integration of B&C’s bioethical framework into 
Dworkin’s theory of law, as it explicitly affirms B&C’s commitment to similar fundamental 
principles of Dworkin’s theory of law. There is an extension of a community of principle 
across the domains of law and bioethics. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has established many claims in seeking to provide some further account of the 
structure of moral arguments that recognises the differences and similarities between law and 
morality/ethics. It has established B&C’s bioethical framework as well as being coherentist in 
character, is interpretive in nature and interpretive in the right way. This means we can 
achieve an integration of B&C’s bioethical framework into Dworkin’s theory of law that is 
mutually supportive and interdependent.
201
 Both theories form a single continuous system 
that follows a tree structure. For Dworkin, the concept of law branches from political 
morality, which in turn branches from the even more general interpretive concept of 
morality.
202
 For B&C, on this reinterpretation, their four interpretive values branch out from 
the common morality, which in turn branches out from the general interpretive concept of 
morality as well. Therefore, we can locate B&C’s bioethical framework and Dworkin’s 
theory of law in the same network of value and as having the same structure. Further, they 
both adhere to the same type of interpretive moral reasoning and moral epistemology. This in 
turn means both theories make extremely similar, fundamental moral demands. This claim is 
reinforced by showing B&C’s four interpretive values secure the fundamental norms of the 
common morality. 
                                                          
201
 ibid 255. 
202
 ibid 405. 
245 
 
However, one issue still remains. Whilst this theory is theoretically coherent, the main aim of 
this thesis is to provide judges with an appropriate or the best decision-making framework 
that recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making so as to provide judges 
confidence in relying on their convictions. One important component of this is the framework 
has to be practicable. This is what the final chapter in this thesis will seek to prove. It shall 
implement this framework by looking to analyse the cases considered at the beginning of the 
thesis. The chapter will seek to provide an outcome which is not only satisfactory in terms of 
providing a right answer, but by also showing judges can rely on the framework, as it 
recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making and shows them how to apply moral 
principles and medical ethics in a particular case.
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Chapter 6 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter established an interdependent integration of Tom L Beauchamp’s and 
James F Childress’s (hereafter B&C’s) reinterpreted framework and Ronald Dworkin’s 
theory of law.
1
 This chapter’s aim is to apply this decision-making framework to an actual 
case. It was noted in the conclusion of chapter five in order to fully answer the central 
research question, it needs to be shown this framework is practicable. Though it may be 
contended the relationship between law and ethics in the risk disclosure scenario is effective, 
this has not occurred deliberately because of the construction of an integrated legal and 
ethical framework, but by chance.
2
 The current framework is not ethically sophisticated. 
Therefore, it is clear from a judicial point of view, judges must be willing and able to rely on 
the soundness of their own moral convictions to recognise and deal appropriately with the 
inherent ethical content in certain cases.
3
   
Due to constraints of space, only one case can be re-interpreted in light of this decision-
making framework: Chester v Afshar.
4
 Finally, this chapter shall provide a comparative 
analysis with the original judgements in Chester. This is to show the differences in approach 
in the Law Lords’ judgments and under the decision-making framework here. It is also to 
show why the approach under the decision-making framework here is to be preferred (it 
highlights just how important coming to the right legal decision depends on the ethical case 
made) than the approaches in Chester. 
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2. From construction to application: Chester 
2.1. The facts 
Chester shall be analysed because the judicial attitudes regarding deference to the medical 
profession in ethical matters were evaluated in chapter one. Further, as this case occurred 
some 19 years after Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors,
5
 intervening cases can 
also be taken into account to show how case law surrounding risk disclosure/informed 
consent has developed. 
The facts of Chester are as follows. Ms Chester consented to an operation to relieve her lower 
back pain due to the degeneration of her spinal discs. She was not warned by Mr Afshar (the 
consultant neurosurgeon) of the small but unavoidable 1-2% risk of nerve damage resulting 
from the procedure. Ms Chester did then suffer nerve damage resulting from the procedure. It 
was claimed by Ms Chester that Mr Afshar’s negligence had caused her injury and she was 
entitled to recover damages. However, it was also found had Ms Chester been duly warned, 
she would not have consented to surgery three days after consultation with Mr Afshar. She 
would have sought further discussion with others and looked at alternative options. It could 
not be shown on the balance of probabilities Ms Chester would not have subsequently 
consented at all to the operation. The question was whether the “but for” test for causation 
(the conventional rules/approach to causation) could be relaxed to allow Ms Chester to 
recover, because on traditional causation principles, Ms Chester would fail that test.
6
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2.2. Application 
There are two possible propositions of law. It has to be determined which is true, to 
determine what concrete legal right Ms Chester does (or does not) have.
7
 Those two 
propositions can be put quite specifically. First, though Mr Afshar has a legal duty to warn a 
patient of a small but inherent risk of surgery, he is not liable to pay damages to Ms Chester 
where it cannot be established on the balance of probabilities “but for” Mr Afshar’s 
negligence, Ms Chester would not have consented to the surgery. Alternatively, Ms Chester 
has a right to recover damages following Mr Afshar’s negligent failure to warn her of the 
small but inherent risk of surgery, and that risk occurs, despite the fact it cannot be asserted 
“but for” Mr Afshar’s negligence, Ms Chester would not have consented to the surgery.  
But before the grounds of these legal propositions are looked at, it is clear this case has an 
ethical component. It is vital this aspect is examined. It is only by analysing this aspect the 
real rationale behind potentially relaxing the rules of causation can be understood, and how 
that rationale really is ethical in nature. Further, this analysis will show why the rationale 
behind relaxing the rules of causation (respecting Ms Chester’s autonomy) is so important 
(‘why autonomy is considered worthy of respect’8). It will also set out precisely what 
respecting a person’s autonomy entails, including the more positive steps to be taken.9 This 
will then be applied to Ms Chester’s situation to show how her autonomy should have been 
respected, which ethical proposition is true, and how the injury that has occurred (the 
infringement of her right to make an autonomous decision) could have been prevented. It will 
then be analysed whether the ethically true proposition is explained by the GMC’s guidance 
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on consent.  The guidance will also be examined to see if it is suitable as a regulatory tool for 
the medical profession, and why. This investigation will go towards ensuring the creation of a 
hierarchy of medical ethics discourse. This will lead to less fragmentation, and recognising 
confidence can be placed in the GMC’s guidance to perform an effective regulatory function. 
2.2.1. Ethical application 
The ethical framework to be used is the reinterpretation of B&C’s four principles theory 
established in chapter five. This reinterpretation shows morality is an interpretive concept, 
just as moral reasoning is interpretive through and through.
10
 Interpretive concepts have five 
key elements.
11
 More specifically, the common morality is based on an interpretive project. 
Progressing with this specification, the four interpretive concepts and values of respect for 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice are derived from the common morality 
and secure its norms. This framework is committed to certain fundamental principles, 
including the principle we should treat others in a genuinely respectful, principled manner.
12
 
These four interpretive concepts and values best justify paradigm features of bioethical 
practices. However, in order for this framework to be applicable practically, we need to 
constructively specify these four interpretive concepts.
13
 As argued throughout chapters four 
and five, it is best to see this framework as coherentist in nature. The framework here also 
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adheres to an interpretive moral epistemology. This means more concrete moral propositions 
are determined in this framework by a coherent scheme of principle that provides the best 
justification of bioethical practices, specifically through the four interpretive concepts and 
values. This scheme recognises bioethics is best understood through these four interpretive 
concepts and values, and the requirements of bioethical practices are sensitive to these 
values.
14
 The moral epistemology here is integrated into the jigsaw of our substantive moral 
theory. Nonetheless, it needs to be separate enough to check our reasoning in other parts of 
that jigsaw.
15
 Finally, B&C’s adherence to fundamental conflicts in value has been rejected, 
as it is based on a philosophically weak claim.
16
 Thus, their version of balancing must be 
modified.
17
 As the ethical framework here is interpretive, and the reality of moral judgements 
is a matter of moral argument, balancing (or something like it) will come into play in the 
process of refining our moral conceptions as we work toward eliminating the conflict that has 
occurred and bringing our values into a coherent whole.
18 
Thus, there is a pertinent ethical question: specifically, the question is whether Mr Afshar has 
infringed Ms Chester’s right to have her autonomy respected. 19  
Initially, a few matters must be clarified. Though Mr Afshar was found to have legally 
breached his duty in not warning Ms Chester of the small inherent danger in the surgery,
20
 the 
ethical concept of informed consent is only minimally constituted by and concerned with 
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professional liability regarding disclosure.
21
 To be sure, issues of professional liability are not 
unimportant. But, the ethical analysis will focus upon the interpretive reasons of principle 
behind the concept of informed consent.  
Second, though legally the question is whether the rules of causation can be relaxed the real, 
ethical, issue is what constitutes the concept of informed consent, and whether the ethical 
proposition Ms Chester ought to have been informed about the small but inherent damage in 
the spinal operation is true, or subject to any exceptive clauses. Interpretively, it is arguable 
the best way to see Ms Chester’s case is as litigation to gain compensation not for the 
physical damage resulting from the operation, but because of the affront to Ms Chester’s 
autonomy, due to the loss of her ability to make an autonomous choice. This argument is 
more pressing given her honesty about her potential course of action had she been non-
negligently warned of the risk.
22
 Precisely because of this ethical issue we must identify the 
values latent in the concept of respect for autonomy and in the practices of informed consent. 
It is only once this ethical analysis has been undertaken can the pertinent legal question really 
be determined. 
Let us first look at what common morality principles might inform the demands of respect for 
autonomy. Principles such as we ought to tell the truth and the concepts (or moral character 
traits) of honesty, truthfulness, caring, and compassion can be appealed to. However, they do 
not fully capture the point of respecting the choices of those who are autonomous, and the 
practices of informed consent.
23
 One fundamental principle that provides more justificatory 
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force however is the principle we should treat others in a genuinely principled, respectful 
manner, otherwise known as ‘equality of respect’.24 In order to treat Ms Chester with equality 
of respect, regardless of how small the inherent risk, Mr Afshar ought to have supplied this 
information to Ms Chester. The risk was inherent regardless of the degree of care taken when 
performing the operation. In placing ourselves in Ms Chester’s position, we would not have 
been able to make the best possible decision whether proceed with the surgery or follow 
alternative treatments unless this vital piece of information had been provided.  
As Ms Chester’s legal claim is based upon the premise her ethical right of respect for 
autonomy, it is essential to understand the “point” of the principle of respect for autonomy. A 
clear instance of theoretical disagreement was highlighted in chapter five in B&C’s 
discussion of different theories of autonomy.  B&C go on to reject ‘split-level theories of 
autonomy’25 in favour of their own ‘three-condition theory’.26 The most important reason 
they do so is on the basis the split-level theory presents an ideal. B&C’s theory is able to 
account for many ordinary actions as autonomous, and thus deserving of respect.
27
 From this 
reason there is at least an indication B&C take the practices in which respect for autonomy 
functions to serve the purpose that, through our actions and attitudes we ought to 
acknowledge, not interfere, prevent interference with, and in some circumstances build up 
and/or maintain, autonomous agents’ capacities to hold views and make choices on their 
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belief-systems and values.
28
 The interpretive fact central to respect for autonomy is it is right 
autonomous agents should be able to make their own decisions. As Dworkin explains: 
The most plausible [account of the point of autonomy] emphasises the integrity rather 
than the welfare of the choosing agent; the value of autonomy on this view, derives 
from the capacity it protects: the capacity to express one’s own character—values, 
commitments, convictions and critical as well as experiential interests—in the life one 
leads.
29
 
As B&C measure how well these theories fit with the central character of respect for 
autonomy, this shows the foregoing principle is the point of the value of respect for 
autonomy; ‘[a] theory should not be inconsistent with pretheoretical assumptions implicit in 
the principle of respect for autonomy’.30 The requirements of respect for autonomy are 
clearly sensitive to its point.
31
 Coupled with the statement that: 
The principle of respect for autonomy can be stated as both a negative obligation and 
as a positive obligation. As a negative obligation, the principle requires that 
autonomous actions not be subjected to controlling constraints by others…as a 
positive obligation, the principle requires both respectful treatment in disclosing 
information and actions that foster autonomous decision making[,]
32 
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the concept of respect for autonomy on B&C’s account is best understood via the idea of 
protecting the capacity to express one’s own character-values through the views, choices and 
actions they take.
33
  
Testing this conception against our substantive moral theory, this conception fits within the 
network of the other three interpretive concepts and values. For example, B&C note ‘the 
principle of positive beneficence supports an array of prima facie rules of obligation’, 
including protecting and defending the rights of others, and preventing harm occurring to 
others.
34
 However, these rules are consistent with, and mutually explained by, the value of 
respect for autonomy. Put simply, we ought to protect the rights of others and prevent harm 
occurring to others so they are able to express their own character-values unimpeded, as well 
as doing so because we ought to act for the benefit of others.
35
 In addition, this conception of 
respect for autonomy is a satisfactory, mutually explanatory elaboration
36
 of the fundamental 
principle of equality of respect highlighted earlier. Protecting the capacity to express one’s 
value-systems is one way we treat others in a genuinely principled, respectful manner. This 
strengthens the explanatory force of the fundamental principle of equality of respect. Placed 
in another’s position, we would wish not wish this capacity to be retarded in any way, in 
order to make something worthwhile of our lives according to our own value-systems. This 
conception of respect for autonomy is sensitive to fundamental principles underpinning 
bioethical practices and found in the common morality, meaning this conception can be 
embraced authentically in our network of value. 
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This conception of respect for autonomy also serves to further explain paradigm cases of 
respecting autonomy in bioethical practices, including practices of informed consent.
37
 
Though there is interpretive disagreement between B&C and Onora O’Neill regarding 
whether informed consent practices are best understood through the ideas of preventing 
deception and coercion or protecting patient autonomy,
38
 a strong case can be argued 
informed consent practices are best understood through this value because of the demands 
respect for autonomy makes. The prevention of deception or coercion provides a much more 
limited interpretive justification for practices of obtaining patients’ consent. 
Respect for autonomy not only demands consent procedures are designed so they ‘give 
patients and others control over the amount of information they receive and opportunity to 
rescind consent already given’,39 but also more positive obligations, such as attempting to 
reduce situational or institutional factors that may control a person’s choices and actions, and 
aiding a subject’s understanding of a particular procedure.40 These more positive obligations 
are not fully captured in terms of preventing deception and coercion. Indeed, B&C get at 
something like this, noting ‘respect for autonomy in health care relationships requires much 
more than avoiding deception and coercion. It requires an attempt to instill relevant 
understanding, to avoid forms of manipulation and to respect persons’ rights’.41 It is better to 
see the prevention of deception and coercion as part of the value of respect for autonomy. In 
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this way, both principles are brought together in manner consistent with one another and 
mutually explanatory through the presence of an inferential connection (one ought not to 
deceive another, as doing so prevents that person from expressing her value-systems as fully 
as she could). Therefore, in the system of our substantive moral theory, seeing informed 
consent practices through the value of respect for autonomy provides a more coherent fit and 
justification than seeing those practices through the point of the prevention of deception and 
coercion could do.
42
  
Given the foregoing, and as Ms Chester’s legal claim is premised upon her ethical one, it is 
vital to further examine informed consent practices in light of the meaning imposed on these 
practices.
43
 This analysis will provide the specific grounds for Ms Chester’s ethical claim that 
only by Mr Afshar disclosing the small but inherent risk of injury to her would her autonomy 
have been properly respected, and not infringed. This analysis thus again highlights the 
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importance of these ethical grounds, both in general and as applied to Ms Chester’s ethical 
and legal claim. 
As the point of informed consent practices is to protect the capacity to express one’s 
character-values and belief systems, it is clear: 
a person must do more than express agreement or comply with a proposal. He or she 
must authorise something through an act of informed and voluntary consent…An 
informed consent in this [ ] sense occurs if and only if a patient or subject, with 
substantial understanding and in absence of substantial control by others, intentionally 
authorises a professional to do something quite specific.
44
 
Further, because of these fundamental principles behind the concept of informed consent, a 
number of additional elements need to be involved. These include the fact a patient must 
understand what they are consenting to in order to act autonomously in this circumstance.
45
 
The terms of the authorisation should be understood; there should be agreement with the 
doctor regarding the essential features of what has been authorised.
46
 The consent must also 
be voluntary, whereby ‘he or she wills the action without being under the control of another 
person or condition’,47 including external and internal controlling influences.48 Most 
important here is there needs to be disclosure of material information from doctor to patient. 
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B&C highlight three standards of disclosure: the reasonable doctor (or professional practice) 
standard, the reasonable person standard, and the subjective (or particular patient) standard.
49
 
In light of the point of informed consent practices, the reasonable doctor standard is not 
adequate ethically. It not only does not fit with many of the demands the value of respect for 
autonomy makes, but is not a ‘satisfactory elaboration’50 of the value of respecting autonomy. 
If standards of disclosure are set by custom or the profession, there is the possibility of 
information communication being inadequate across the profession and yet still being legally 
and ethically permissible. Furthermore, as the nature of the test is to place the judgement of 
standards of disclosure in the hands of doctors, this has the potential to be at least inconsistent 
with the principle the patient ought to be able to decide according to her value-systems and 
beliefs. Finally, the disclosure of material information does not involve technical medical 
skills; it involves communication skills not exclusive to medical professionals. The 
professional practice standard may serve to endorse poor communication between patient and 
doctor, and again may deprive patients of the capacity to express their character-values by 
making meaningful choices about their treatment.
51
 Though the reasonable person standard 
may be preferable to the professional practice standard, there may still be problems with this 
standard (particularly surrounding the concepts of a “reasonable person”, “material 
information”, and employment of these concepts). In order to best realise the value of respect 
for autonomy, the particular patient test initially seems morally preferable.
52
 However, this 
standard cannot be exclusively relied upon. This standard may be problematic as patients may 
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not know what information is relevant to their particular decision. Nor can it be expected a 
doctor should perform an extensive character-analysis for each patient.
53
  
Seemingly what is morally preferable, all things considered, is using the reasonable patient 
test primarily and supplementing it where necessary with investigating what information 
particular patients may need in certain circumstances.
54
 Whilst initially the particular patient 
test may seem the most obvious way of implementing the principle of equality of respect, 
overall the position immediately above best flows from principles of the common morality 
and the value of respect for autonomy that provide the best interpretation of other substantive 
ethical propositions taken as true. 
It has been highlighted why it is so important ethically to respect a person’s autonomy, and 
what respecting a person’s autonomy means regarding informed consent practices. Looking 
directly at Ms Chester’s situation, the grounds for the conceptions of respect for autonomy 
and informed consent (specifically the interpretive proposition it is right a patient should be 
able to authorise a surgical procedure upon her person if the authorisation is given 
voluntarily, on the basis of sufficient understanding and material information has been 
disclosed compatible with the standard above
55
) outlaw an exceptive clause in this case to the 
effect it was morally permissible for Mr Afshar not to disclose the small but inherent risk of 
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the operation.
56
 In refining our moral concepts and propositions into a coherent whole, given 
the nature of the risk, it is necessary for there to be specific informed consent in this scenario. 
This includes the disclosure of the small but inherent risk of surgery. Though the surgery is 
therapeutic,
57
 this course of action avoids potential unjustified medical paternalism. 
To conclude, the ethical proposition Ms Chester ought to be informed of a small but inherent 
risk of surgery involved in her spinal operation before she consents to this operation is true, 
and is subject to no exceptive clauses. It now needs to be examined whether this proposition 
is consistent with the guidance provided by the formal sector of ethical discourse. ‘Ethical 
guidance should provide the standard for the medical profession to follow’.58 Further, ‘the 
[General Medical Council], as the formal sector of discourse, should set the tone by 
emphasising and explaining the importance of the ethical issues under consideration’.59  
This proposition is consistent with the GMC’s guidance, Consent: Patients and Doctors 
Making Decisions Together.
60
 The guidance states doctors ‘should tailor [their] approach to 
discussions with patients according to: (a) their wishes, needs and priorities…(c) the nature of 
their condition (d) the complexity of the treatment, and (e) the nature and level of risk 
associated with the investigation or treatment’.61 Additionally, doctors ‘should not make 
assumptions about (a) the information a patient might want or need [and] (b) the clinical or 
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other factors a patient might consider significant’.62 Moreover, doctors ‘must give patients the 
information they want or need about’ a number of medical issues,63 and ‘should explore these 
matters with patients, listen to their concerns, ask for and respect their views and encourage 
them to ask questions’.64 Finally: 
If after discussion, a patient still does not want to know in detail about their condition 
of their treatment, you should respect their wishes, as far as possible. But you must 
still give them the information they need in order to give their consent to a proposed 
investigation or treatment…If a patient insists that they do not want even this basic 
information, you must explain the potential consequences of them not having it, 
particularly if it might mean their consent is not valid.
65 
Therefore, despite the implications the language used here may have in contrast to previous 
GMC guidance on consent, in explicitly stating discussions should be tailored with the patient 
in mind, their perception of risk, and the nature of that risk, the proposition Ms Chester ought 
to have been informed of a small but inherent risk of surgery by Mr Afshar is not only 
consistent with the GMC guidance, but is explained by such guidance.
66
 Given the guidance 
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rests upon the basic explanatory principle ‘[w]hatever the context in which medical decisions 
are made, [doctors] must work in partnership with our patients to ensure good care. In doing 
so [doctors] must…maximise patients’ opportunities, and their ability, to make decisions for 
themselves’,67 it can be further asserted this proposition is coherent with the guidance, as 
outlined above. This conclusion is also important as it has also highlighted (despite some of 
the implications of language used in the guidance) the overall suitability of the GMC’s 
guidance as a regulatory tool for the medical profession. This is due to the sustained focus 
upon the patient’s circumstances in question, relative to the treatment to be undertaken. Thus, 
confidence can be placed in the GMC’s guidance by courts, and as it is the formal sector of 
discourse, this ethical guidance should be the courts’ first point of contact when dealing with 
medical professional regulation in ethical matters of informed consent. Attention must now 
be turned Ms Chester’s legal claim, and the importance of Ms Chester’s ethical claim to this. 
2.2.2. Legal application 
It was noted earlier the legal question is whether Ms Chester has a concrete legal right on the 
basis of a true proposition of law. ‘Legal rights are those that people are entitled to enforce on 
demand, without further legislative intervention, in adjudicative institutions that direct the 
executive power of the sheriff or police’.68 A concrete right is a political aim specifically 
defined (relative to an abstract right) to express with a greater degree of certainty the weight 
against other political aims they have on certain occasions.
69
 A proposition of law is justified 
if it coheres with principles of personal and political morality that provide the best 
interpretation of other justified propositions of law in contemporary legal practice.
70 
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All of the foregoing links into the ‘weak and commonsensical legal claim’ in hard cases ‘the 
law, properly interpreted is for the plaintiff (or the defendant)’.71 It is our task to work out 
what that right answer is. However, we must make a case for which proposition is true. This 
requires we bring to bear on the case a general theory of the point of legal practice that shows 
it in its best light, why the rules and principles in question create rights at all, and the 
consequences of this general theory for this particular case. The legal argument here is based 
upon abstract jurisprudential foundations.
72
 
Those foundations are as follows. The concept of law is best seen as an interpretive concept. 
Importantly, because the concept of law is an interpretive concept, it is best to see that 
concept through a particular value.
73
 The value that best justifies the practices of law is 
integrity. Integrity best explains the value of the rule of law as a political ideal by making 
fundamental demands of principle.
74
 One key fundamental principle already featured 
prominently is equality of respect, of which integrity is a key component.
75
 Integrity is best 
understood through the idea of coherence. However, this is not to conflate coherence with 
integrity. Integrity requires two conditions to be fulfilled: coherence and authenticity.
76
 
Nonetheless, in stating integrity is best understood through coherence, this shows the best 
way to view the claims integrity makes. The coherentism of integrity is best understood 
through the same characteristics as those applicable to B&C’s bioethical framework. Further, 
the best way to construct an account of the truth conditions of propositions of law in light of 
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integrity is to ‘make the question of what the law is on an issue itself an interpretive 
question’.77 The process of constructive interpretation is also best understood as based on 
coherentism. Therefore, integrity and the process of constructive interpretation fit together. 
Last, as is the case with the ethical framework, there are two dimensions by which we can 
measure the success of an interpretation: (1) the interpretation must fit past political practice, 
and (2) must possess a substantive justificatory power to show the proposed interpretation is 
the best, all things considered.
78
 As these questions are themselves interpretive, coherence 
considerations are pervasive throughout both dimensions. The foregoing considerations are to 
be borne in mind when looking to find a coherent interpretation about legal rights to 
compensation for a negligent failure to warn of a slight but intrinsic risk of surgery where the 
principles of causation have not been satisfied in the traditional manner, ‘such that a single 
political official with that theory could have reached most of the results the precedents 
report’.79 
Moreover, it is possible to situate B&C’s framework and Dworkin’s theory of law in in the 
same network of value, relative to each other. In seeing the concepts of law and morality as 
interpretive concepts, it becomes apparent the concept of law cannot be fully analysed except 
by seeing it located within an integrated web of political morality and other values like 
bioethics. Law is a specification of political morality, as political morality is of a more 
general personal morality.
80
 In comparison, the four interpretive values analysed above 
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branch out from the common morality, which in turn is a specification of the interpretive 
concept of morality. Both theories interlink in a single continuous system, forming a tree 
structure. Interpretive concepts and values must be integrated with one another. Both 
frameworks are interpretive through and through.
81
  
Further important consequences follow from the nature of these two frameworks. As law and 
morality should be seen as one continuous system, it also follows Dworkin’s theory of law 
adheres to an interpretive moral epistemology. However, this epistemology is applied 
specifically with the concept of law in mind. This is shown through the similar fundamental 
demands of principle both frameworks characteristically make. There is an extension of a 
‘community of principle’82 across law and bioethics, whereby there is a responsibility on 
behalf of individuals and a community to treat others in a principled manner. Judges must 
also show a disposition towards realising this responsibility. They must do this by engaging 
with the legal and ethical issues in particular cases on the basis of both the frameworks set 
out above. 
Finally, as both frameworks are thoroughly integrated with one another, this provides another 
reason why Ms Chester’s ethical case is so important to her legal claim. Only by looking at 
Ms Chester’s ethical case can we highlight and understand the specific grounds for her 
argument the rules of causation should be relaxed. A true proposition of law is one that the 
better interpretive case can be made for it. Only by looking at her ethical case can a better 
interpretive case be possibly be made for the proposition of law she argues for. The best way 
to see Ms Chester’s legal claim is for recovery because her ethical right to have her autonomy 
respected was injured. 
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2.2.2.1. Standards of disclosure 
Legally, strictly speaking however, the cases most relevant to Chester do not deal directly 
with issues of causation. Many of the relevant cases concern whether there has been a breach 
of duty on behalf of the doctor to the patient.
83
 These cases are still important to analyse. The 
ethical analysis has shown why, substantively, the rationale behind relaxing the rules of 
causation is so important. Analysis of these cases will show this rationale to be important in a 
different, complementary way; it will show the principles of respect for autonomy and 
equality of respect amenable to Ms Chester’s case to be ‘embedded in the law’.84  
The principles that best explain past political decisions regarding standards of disclosure, 
though not directly on point regarding whether Ms Chester has a right to recover damages 
despite not satisfying the “but for test”, still have ‘a gravitiational force’.85 Though there may 
be disagreement about the extent of the gravitational force of earlier decisions, fairness and 
integrity require a consideration of relevantly similar cases, to the extent of the arguments of 
principle required to justify those cases. These arguments of principle will also become 
important when looking at cases that do not deal with the standards of consent, as these 
principles must also be consistent with, mutually explain, and not render anomalous, all the 
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other decisions pertinent to Ms Chester’s case. This is the implication of treating the law as if 
it were a seamless web.
86
 
In showing why Ms Chester has not just an ethical, but legal right to be informed as well, the 
transition is made from the personal to the political in the large network of value which 
includes B&C’s and Dworkin’s theories. As the focus is on why Ms Chester has a right 
enforceable on demand within an adjudicative political institution, the discussion is situated 
within the broader context of what citizens must do to acquit their political obligations 
through the artificial collective entity of the political community. This also means in 
providing the best moral justification for this legal right, the principles under discussion here 
will be principles of political morality, in that we are looking at the separable department of 
principles that provide the best justification of the political practices of a community. 
However, the concept of law and its departments are pervasively interpretive. There is an 
extension of a community of principle across the domains of law and bioethics. Bioethical 
practices and collective political arrangements must show a disposition towards realising the 
fundamental principles of equality of respect. The principles under discussion here are still 
principles of political morality. This means their substantive force is largely constituted by 
the ethical analysis undertaken above. The pertinent injury Ms Chester seeks recovery for is 
Mr Afshar’s lack of respecting her ethical right to autonomy. But to ask “what duties does a 
doctor have in respecting a patient’s autonomy, and why is it so important to do so?” is to 
engage in ethical analysis. Her legal claim cannot be fully understood without engaging in 
and relying on the ethical analysis above.
87
  
It is important to show why Ms Chester’s ethical right to be informed can be vindicated 
through those principles of political morality that provide the best justification of past 
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political decisions and other true propositions of law in contemporary legal practice for 
further reasons. 
88
 It can be shown how the ethically preferable conception of respect for 
autonomy is supported within our law. This conception’s implications can also be explained, 
so as to eliminate as much as possible the potential for future courts to use inconsistent, 
potentially ethically unsophisticated conceptions of respect for autonomy. The ethical 
analysis has also looked at whether the GMC’s ethical guidance on consent explains and 
coheres with the ethically true proposition Ms Chester ought to have been informed about the 
risk in question. It also highlighted how this guidance can perform an effective regulatory 
function for the medical professional. This legal analysis will look specifically at the role 
different categories of ethical discourse play in relation to legal standards of disclosure. 
Again, both analyses are complementary and cannot be fully understood without one another. 
Put together, this will structure courts’ future engagement with medical ethics, and send a 
message to medical practitioners regarding which sources of discourse to prioritise.  
The ethical discussion showed informed consent practices are best understood through the 
principle of respect for autonomy. The ethically preferable conception of autonomy to be 
respected is best understood as protecting the capacity to express one’s own character-values 
through the views and actions that a person takes. The best justification of cases involving 
standards of consent, and why the proposition Ms Chester legally ought to have been 
informed about the slight but inherent damage in the operation is true, is because past 
political decisions show the principle “people have a moral right to have their autonomy 
respected by being told of all those significant risks that are material to the informational 
needs and would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient” is a principle of our law. There 
is also an issue regarding the meaning of “significant risks”. The concept of significance 
operates as an entryway to the question of whether the information is material. The ethical 
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discussion showed how respecting a patient’s autonomy is one way in which we treat others 
in a genuinely principled, respectful manner. Thus, using this ethical analysis, the best way to 
understand the concept of significance, and to lend coherence to the standard of disclosure as 
a whole, both in its application and underlying rationale, is again through those ethically 
substantive principles of political morality apparent from past political decisions that require 
a patient’s autonomy to be respected. This means recognising a patient’s perception of risk 
may differ from a medical professional’s. It also means that the question of significance is not 
to be decided by clinical judgment, though clinical judgment may help in determining the 
probability and magnitude of relevant harm.
89
  Our law can vindicate Ms Chester’s ethical 
right. 
The case for this interpretation needs to be substantiated. This interpretation is arguably 
superficially inconsistent with previous case law that has applied differing standards of 
disclosure. It is also arguable it is inconsistent with the application/understanding of the 
concept of “significant risks” in previous case law, and on one reading of pertinent case law, 
the currently applicable standard of disclosure in medical negligence claims. However, this 
justification is coherent with pertinent case law. Both the demands of integrity on the 
dimension of fit, and the coherentist process of constructive interpretation must be borne in 
mind. It will also be shown how such an interpretation best secures those fundamental 
principles of equality of respect, and respect for autonomy, highlighted to be of special 
importance in the ethical analysis.
90
  
Any competent interpretation must first look at Sidaway. What is important here is even in 
the most conservative judgment of the house, Lord Diplock was to note: 
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when it comes to warning about risks, the kind of training and experience that a judge 
will have undergone…makes it natural for him to say (correctly) it is my right to 
decide whether any particular thing is done to my body, and I want to be fully 
informed of any risks…No doubt if the patient in fact manifested this attitude by 
means of questioning, the doctor would tell him whatever it was the patient wanted to 
know.
91
 
Though Diplock here limits his analysis to principles of autonomy underpinning the duty to 
disclose when asked questions by the patient, Lords Bridge and Templeman are also explicit 
in recognising the principle of respect for autonomy underpins the duty to disclose 
information when asked questions by a patient.
92
 However, they both go on to recognise a 
more general right for the patient’s autonomy to be respected,93 with Lord Scarman 
prioritising the principle of respect for autonomy in his judgment.
94
  
Therefore, though Sidaway is sensitive to personal and political principles of respect for 
autonomy which all legal standards of disclosure serve, in isolation Sidaway can be read as 
authority for the following proposition. What counts as a material risk is determined 
primarily by reference to professional practice. Though respect for autonomy operates subject 
to the professionally defined best interests of the patient, there are some circumstances which 
in order to truly respect a patient’s autonomy, the court is able to define a risk as material 
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even if medical professionals would not, if that ‘particular risk is so obviously necessary to an 
informed choice on the part of the patient’.95 
Since Sidaway, the law has developed to become more sensitive to the ethical rationale 
behind standards of disclosure. Those with special powers and roles that allow them to act on 
behalf of the whole of those individuals making up the political community have begun to 
recognise how substantively important those ethical principles of respect for autonomy and 
equality of respect are. Those ethically substantive principles provide the best justification for 
the way the state wishes to act in the name of law, inasmuch ethically, this is the best way to 
act (respecting a patient’s autonomy) in the individual scenario.96 This is exemplified in 
Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority
97
 and Pearce v United Bristol Healthcare NHS 
Trust.
98
  
In Smith, it was held Mr Smith had a right to recover damages resulting from his consultant 
surgeon’s negligent failure to provide a sufficiently clear warning of the risk of impotence 
from the operation, given he was under such a duty to warn and that risk did eventuate.
99
 
Smith is important because the best interpretation of the grounds for this legal proposition are 
those principles of political morality which stipulate that the political community ought to 
treat its citizens as equals by respecting the autonomy of patients. This is done by them being 
warned of material risks in a sufficiently clear manner, if the reasonable standard of care 
requires such a warning. Yet, as noted above, these principles’ justificatory force is 
substantially constituted by the ethical case made in the individual scenario. Moreover, 
though Morland J held ‘it is the decision in Sidaway and the test in Bolam which I must [use], 
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and do apply’,100 he was much more ready to infer ‘in my [his] judgment…although some 
surgeons may still not have been warning patients similar in situation to the plaintiff of the 
risk of impotence, that omission was neither reasonable nor responsible’.101 There was far 
stronger assertion by Morland J of the court’s responsibility for deciding what standards of 
disclosure should be.
102
 The principles identified above serving as the grounds for the specific 
and general proposition are seen in the extensive passages to Rogers v Whitaker
103
 which 
emphasised the inadequacy of respecting patients’ autonomy by applying the professional 
practice standard to information disclosure cases, and sets out a modified version of the 
“reasonable patient” test, to focus even more on the particular patient themselves.104 Further, 
every single passage Morland J quotes from Sidaway makes some reference, in one form or 
another, to principles of respect for autonomy underpinning legal standards of disclosure.
105 
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Pearce is also important because although the claimant lost in that case,
106
 it is authority for 
the following proposition of law: 
if there is a significant risk which would affect the judgment of the reasonable patient, 
then in the normal course it is the responsibility of a doctor to inform the patient of 
that significant risk, if the information is needed so that the patient can determine for 
him or herself as to what course he or she should adopt.
107 
This proposition has been treated as true by past political decisions, both pre- and post-
Chester, as the standard of disclosure regarding medical negligence claims in English law. 
Therefore a coherent interpretation of this proposition and its grounds in light of the grounds 
of the other true propositions of law above needs to be provided. This interpretation will 
further show two matters: those local decisions which have a greater force in fixing a medical 
professional’s legal standards of disclosure108 are underpinned by political-moral principles 
of equality of respect and respect for autonomy. Second, these political-moral principles’ 
justificatory force substantially depends upon the ethical case made for them above.  
There are two important, related issues regarding this proposition of law. The first is whether 
to read the proposition as simply an attempt to refine Lord Bridge’s approach to the standard 
of disclosure in medical negligence claims (one based on professional practice subject to the 
caveat highlighted above); or, alternatively, whether the proposition is best read as shifting 
the emphasis of the standard of disclosure to one which a risk is material and must be 
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disclosed if a reasonable patient would wish to be told of it.
109
 The second issue is how to 
read the claim those “significant risks” must be disclosed: 
On the one hand, it may be interpreted as stating that the reasonable doctor will 
disclose everything that the reasonable patient would want to be told of. On the other 
hand, it may be suggested that the use of the word “significant” means that the 
reasonable doctor must disclose only risks that are both “significant” and “material” 
(information the patient needs to make an autonomous choice)’.110 
Further, if the latter interpretation is the correct interpretation to take, the question of how to 
best understand whether a risk is “significant” needs also to be determined. 
In looking at the first question, it is important to highlight the following passages from Lord 
Woolf’s statement that ‘[t]he first speech [in Sidaway] was given by Lord Scarman…The 
views he expresses are a minority view and do not in this jurisdiction represent the law’.111 
Lord Woolf then went on to explicitly highlight Lord Bridge’s caveat112 regarding obviously 
necessary risks that must be disclosed. All of the foregoing has been invoked of the 
proposition ‘Lord Woolf’s test is a significant refinement of Lord Bridge’s approach’.113  
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Despite this argument holding weight and being consistent with previous case law, the best 
interpretation of this proposition of law is, although still framed in terms of the reasonable 
doctor, one where they must disclose that material information which the reasonable patient 
needs to make an informed choice about their care.
114
 The political community acts in the 
best way when it gives effect to those ethical principles of respect for autonomy and equality 
of respect that support Ms Chester’s individual claim above. 
Initially it may seem precisely because of the way Lord Woolf provides context for his 
proposition, the former interpretation is superficially more consistent with previous case law. 
However, properly understood on this interpretive framework, the dimension of fit is an 
interpretive judgement bound up with questions of substance. Thus, the constraint of fit must 
be sensitive to the demands of coherence with equality integrity is best understood through. 
Thus, whilst the former interpretation can be inferentially justified by that dimension of 
equality of respect requiring legitimate expectations encouraged by past political decisions be 
protected (here regarding medical professionals and primarily professional practice-oriented 
standards of disclosure so as not to be legally negligent), the latter interpretation also fits with 
and is inferentially justified by this dimension of equality of respect.
115
 Given the prominence 
attached to principles of autonomy in Smith and McAllister, the highlighting by Lord Woolf 
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of many of the same quotes from Sidaway as Smith,
116
 and all of the judges in Sidaway 
identifying a patient’s autonomy is to be respected, it is arguable past judicial 
pronouncements have also created the more general expectation patients’ autonomy will be 
respected with regards to standards of disclosure. However, the inferential connection can be 
argued to be weaker, given the specification of principles of respect for autonomy and 
professionally-defined best interests of the patient in Sidaway.  
But the dimension of fit is an interpretive question. Thus, whilst convictions of fit are 
sufficiently distinct to ensure this interpretation is an interpretation of legal practice and not a 
normative assertion, the dimensions of fit and substance are to be delicately balanced with 
one another in an overall opinion. But, this interpretive conclusion allows us to trade off that 
interpretation’s success on one standard against its shortcomings on another. The overall 
opinion is about which interpretation makes the community’s legal practice the best it can be 
from the standpoint of political morality. As the latter interpretation has passed the threshold 
of fit, and has the potential to show the community’s legal practice in the best light, the 
defects of fit noticed above are able to be compensated in the final overall judgment, because 
those political-moral principles underpinning this interpretation are markedly more attractive. 
Whilst those principles of respect for autonomy have not always been observed in current 
legal practice, there is more merit in adhering to them and their implications.
117
 The former 
interpretation of Lord Woolf’s proposition is therefore a less coherent elaboration of those 
fundamental principles of respect for autonomy, equality and integrity the department of 
medical negligence law and law in general, serves. 
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The pertinent injury that has occurred to Ms Chester is the affront to have her autonomy 
respected. The ethical analysis showed equality of respect justifies Ms Chester being told of 
the inherent risk. It also showed in order to protect the capacity to express one’s character-
values, informed consent procedures must give patients control, in terms of information 
provision and unwanted influence elimination, to ensure understanding and voluntary action. 
It also showed it is ethically preferable to initially use the reasonable patient test and 
supplement it where necessary with particular patient investigation. This ethical analysis 
shows the principles of equality of respect and respect for autonomy are especially important 
to translate into what a political community of principle owes to its citizens, as part of the 
state’s endeavour to treat all people with equal concern.118 The department of medical 
negligence law relating to standards of disclosure relies upon no special medical skill. As 
such, a test based primarily upon professional practice misidentifies the nature of the matter. 
The principles behind this test are incoherent with the system of principles the department of 
medical negligence law and law itself serves. The primary justification for the Bolam test of 
professional practice is ‘that expert matters can only be judged by expert opinion. This 
rationale cannot be used to justify Bolam in determining standards of disclosure’.119  
Moreover, as seen with Sidaway in chapter one, to interpret Lord Woolf’s proposition of law 
as stating the professional practice standard is the determinative standard of disclosure, the 
test takes on an unjustifiably paternalistic tone. The test also implicitly relies on the premise 
that the law views the relationship of doctor and patient as unilateral in nature; the patient is 
passive, allowing the medical practitioner to dictate their medical care. However, simply 
focussing on the actions and disclosures of the doctor is a too simplistic view to take of the 
doctor-patient relationship. Generally, ‘[t]he informed patient is better equipped to participate 
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in treatment’,120 if the patient has understood the information provided to them. Further, 
‘greater judicial concerns with the process of disclosure would at least be symbolically more 
important’.121 As such, the specification that those principles of respect for autonomy operate 
subject to the professionally defined best interests of the patient (and thus the interpretation 
that Lord Woolf’s proposition of law simply attempts to refine Lord Bridge’s approach) 
cannot be inferentially connected with those political-moral principles of respect for 
autonomy justified by the ethical case made for them, and that dimension of equality of 
respect requiring ‘equal respect in the substantive treatment of individuals by the state’.122 
Again, it has been highlighted how ethically the practices of informed consent are best 
understood through the interpretive value of respecting patients’ autonomy. Such principles 
are justifying premises for the political-moral principles applicable in interpreting Lord 
Woolf’s proposition, given the community’s adherence to the same principle of equality of 
respect as bioethical practices. As the reasonable person standard of disclosure is justified by 
B&C’s theory, because of the coherence between Dworkin’s theory of law and B&C’s 
bioethical theory, we also do well to embrace the legal proposition embodying that coherent 
moral principle (in the ethical scenario). Therefore, the best interpretation of a community’s 
legal practice, regarding Lord Woolf’s proposition and previous case law is one which though 
it still speaks of the reasonable doctor, a medical practitioner must disclose the information 
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that is material for a reasonable patient to make an informed choice about their medical care. 
People have a moral right to have their autonomy respected.
123
 
The highlighting of those principles of respect for autonomy leads to the second contestable 
issue of Lord Woolf’s proposition; the relationship of the significance question to the 
materiality of information issue, and how to best understand how to determine what a 
“significant” risk is. That interpretation is one which the question of significance is 
determined by reference to clinical judgment. This may yet further argue for the proposition 
Lord Woolf intended to refine Lord Bridge’s professional practice-based standard of 
disclosure in Sidaway.
124
 However, the relationship between the significance and materiality 
questions needs to be considered first. It is only on one interpretation of the relationship 
between the significance and materiality questions the issue of how to determine what a 
“significant” risk is arises.  
Lord Woolf’s statement ‘if there is a significant risk that would affect the judgment of a 
reasonable patient’125 is ambiguous. It can be read as either tying the question of significance 
to whether the information is material to the decision of a reasonable patient. Alternatively, 
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the question of significance is separable from the question of whether certain information is 
material, and thus must be disclosed. If this latter interpretation is best, this implies the 
concept of significance acts as the entry point to the question of whether the information is 
material. The doctor must only disclose those risks that are both significant, and then 
material.
126
  
Initially, it seems most logical to read the passage through this latter interpretation:
127
 ‘[t]he 
way Lord Woolf phrased his test the significance of the risk appeared to be linguistically 
prior to whether the risk was material to the patients decision’.128 Though Lord Woolf further 
states ‘where there is what can realistically be called a “significant risk”, then, in the ordinary 
event…the patient is entitled to be informed of that risk’,129 making no reference to a distinct 
question of materiality,
130
 he was to determine the question of significance largely by 
reference to professional practice.
131
 There is thus the potential for ‘the informational needs 
of the reasonable patient [to] be readily disconnected from the doctor’s duty to disclose’.132  
Though the question of which interpretation regarding the relationship between the questions 
of whether a risk is significant and whether it is material has not been conclusively answered 
(although the interpretation that renders such questions separable seems weightier), this 
                                                          
126
 Miola, Paper Tigers (n104) 98; Maclean, Sidaway to Pearce (n89) 120. The former interpretation has been 
expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals in Canterbury v Spence 
(1972) 464 F 2d 772. 
127
 Miola, Paper Tigers (n104) 98. 
128
 Maclean, Given the Reasonable Patient a Voice (n124) 7. 
129
 (n98) at 59. 
130
 Miola, Paper Tigers (n104) 98. Miola also notes that this view, that the questions of “significance” and 
materiality are not separate is shared by the English Court of Appeal in Wyatt v Curtis [2003] EWCA Civ 1779, 
and the Supreme Court of Ireland in Fitzpatrick v White [2007] IESC 51, which viewed both terms as 
interchangeable, and in which medical evidence is helpful but not conclusive (Miola, Paper Tigers (n) 98).  
However, it shall be shown that the scheme of principle that best justifies the statements regarding the 
relationship of the significance and materiality questions and how best to determine whether a risk is significant 
in Wyatt v Curtis, argues for the better interpretation of Lord Woolf’s proposition as one that separates out the 
issues of significance and materiality, yet are still linked together by that system of principles of equality of 
respect and respect for autonomy. Further, Fitzpatrick is a case that arises post-Chester. Thus, whilst it does 
have some influence, it cannot be counted in the interpretive process here. 
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interpretation can be shown to be best by considering why we do well to read Lord Woolf’s 
proposition this way. That is, by determining how to best determine what a significant risk is 
(in acting as an entryway to the question of ‘whether the information would be material to the 
reasonable patient’133). Rendering the questions separable may seem counterintuitive. 
However, these legal questions are still linked by that common scheme of political-moral 
principles of equality of respect and respect for autonomy (based on the ethical case made for 
them). Interpreting the questions as separable does not decrease the coherence of this 
standard of disclosure, relative to interpreting the concepts of “significant” and “material” are 
interchangeable. In fact, the separable interpretation better coheres with the ethical analysis 
and those political-moral principles justifying the community’s legal practice relating to 
standards of disclosure.
134
 In not treating the two concepts as interchangeable this enables us 
to focus on the concept of significance, the principles the concept serves, and the implications 
of this. In doing so, the legal standard of disclosure can be brought closer to the preferred 
ethical standard of disclosure. The ethical analysis highlighted why it was especially 
important to respect a person’s autonomy. A community of principle discharges its duty to 
treat people with equal concern only when it justifiably
135
 gives effect to this ethical rationale 
the best way it can through political-moral principles latent in law. 
Focussing on the concept of “significance” allows us to explicitly recognise that perceptions 
of what constitutes a significant risk may differ between patients and practitioners, in relation 
to both the magnitude and type of harm. Differing perceptions may reflect the ‘psychological 
makeup’ of patients136 and more generally might mirror different approximate assessments of 
certain risks. This may include factors such as ‘whether the risks in question are voluntary, 
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controllable, highly salient, novel, or dreaded’.137 The meaning of that type of harm risked by 
a particular action and whether it is “significant” can only be fully determined by the affected 
person.
138 
Though these arguments are ‘based purely on the concept of risk’,139 they interlink with 
ethical analysis underpinning the best interpretation of the legal standard of disclosure. 
Recognising the question of risk significance is only fully determinable by the affected 
person, and altering the legal standard to reflect this, gives control to the patient over 
information provision. This will further ensure patients’ understanding. Patients’ capacity for 
autonomous choice is maintained,
140
 by ensuring they have had ‘both the likelihood and 
nature of the harm being risked’141 brought home to them in a meaningful way.142 Focussing 
on the question of significance allows us to further promote these fundamental principles of 
equality and respect for autonomy in a way that conflating the two questions does not. It 
brings the legal standard closer to the ethical position outlined above. The proposition that the 
concepts of significance and materiality are separable is the better interpretation of the 
community’s political practice, all things considered. More detailed guidance on what 
constitutes a significant risk can also be supplied to the courts, meaning the potential for 
future inconsistencies regarding this issue is less likely to occur. In determining what a 
“significant” risk is, whilst the court is able to rely on experts in helping to ‘define the nature 
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and to quantify the likelihood of the risks’143 relevant to the issue at hand, it should not rely 
on them for ‘the judgment of significance itself’.144 This judgment serves those principles just 
spoken of, and is sensitive to these and the nature of the concept of risk.
145
  
In conclusion, the system of principles best explaining past political decisions supports the 
subsequent theory about legal rights to damages as a result of negligent disclosure by a 
medical professional of significant and material risks regarding a proposed medical 
procedure.
146
 To best give expression to those political-moral principles of equality of respect 
and respect for autonomy (premised on the ethical analysis which showed informed consent 
practices are sensitive to a particular conception of respect for autonomy), people have a 
moral right to be told of those significant risks material to the reasonable patient in 
determining what course of treatment to take. The concept of significance operates as an 
entryway to the question of whether the information is material. In determining which risks 
are to be properly classified as significant, the court is to have regard to a number of issues. 
First, the court is able to rely on experts to help define the nature of risks, and to quantify 
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their likelihood. They should not rely on experts for the final judgment of significance; issues 
concerning standards of disclosure are ethical in nature.
147
 Of primary importance is 
recognising the main purpose in determining the question of what constitutes a “significant 
risk” is to promote the system of principles of equality of respect and respect for autonomy 
that underpin this department of law and the practice of law itself. The court must always be 
aware a patient’s perception of risk may differ from a medical professional’s. This may stem 
from various factors (including but not limited to) the patients level of understanding, 
disposition, the nature of the treatment, and pertinent cultural or environmental factors. This 
suggests though a risk may be statistically small, it might still be significant to the patient.  
This interpretation applied in the instant case means Ms Chester’s ethical right to have her 
autonomy respected can be vindicated. Ms Chester ‘had a general aversion to surgery’,148 
‘was anxious to avoid surgery if possible’,149 and ‘would have wanted at least two further 
opinions as to whether an operation was necessary’.150 Finally, it was accepted at trial Ms 
Chester had ‘told Mr Afshar that she had heard a lot of horror stories about surgery and that 
she wanted to know about the risks’.151 The risk was inherent to this type of surgery. It is both 
a significant and material one that should have been disclosed. Ms Chester legally ought to 
have been informed about the slight but inherent damage in the operation. 
2.2.2.2. The relationship between the legal standard and medical ethics 
The best interpretation of the legal standard of disclosure has been provided. However, this 
standard seemingly differs from the ethical standard. The ethical standard is one whereby the 
reasonable patient standard is used initially, and then supplemented by further investigation 
where necessary into what information the particular patient may need in particular 
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circumstances.
152
 Contrastingly, the legal standard looks at the separable issues of 
significance and materiality. The materiality of a risk is determined by reference to the 
reasonable patient standard, with the very concept of a “significant risk” meaning courts can 
take into account more individual factors. Though this legal standard deals with some 
objections levelled against the reasonable patient standard,
153
 it may be contended such a test 
is unattainable,
154
 and may lead to counterintuitive results.  
However, by analysing the way different categories of ethical discourse interact with legal 
standards of disclosure for medical professionals and courts, the ethical discourse and legal 
standard work together to ensure patients’ autonomy is fully respected. Further, the 
interaction between the legal and ethical standards means patients’ autonomy is respected in 
an ethically sophisticated way. Finally, in showing how the legal and ethical standards 
interact, this will also go towards ‘defragmenting medical ethics through categorisation’.155 
This will remedy the problems outlined in chapter one. There is recognition medical ethics is 
currently fragmented, but that certain discourses of ethics can be prioritised as they can 
perform a suitable regulatory function. 
 Initially, it may seem the thin (or liberal) view of autonomy highlighted above gives little 
direction regarding how it is to be prioritised and implemented. However, this is not the case, 
given the adherence on this legal and bioethical framework to fundamental principles of 
equality of respect. This adherence means it is valuable there is a private space in which 
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individuals can act autonomously.
156
 But, the freedom to express one’s own character-values 
is parametered by the fundamental principle to ‘respect the moral rights, properly understood, 
of others’.157 At a state level there is therefore a duty to create and protect that space where 
people may act autonomously, since this is one of the main means by which the state adheres 
to the fundamental principle of equality of respect.
158
  
At an individual level, this conception of autonomy has implications for the informed consent 
scenario. Legally, this conception is to be prioritised and implemented by recognising, as far 
as can be done within the community’s current legal practice, informed consent is a process, 
with decisions being made by medical professionals and patients in a co-operative 
partnership. As those principles of respect for autonomy are part of the fundamental 
principles of equality of respect, the state has a strong moral duty to respect an individual’s 
ethical right to autonomy.
159
 The problem is the very nature of the community’s legal 
practices means there is a greater emphasis on the consequences of that partnership, rather 
than the partnership itself. However, on the current legal standard, given the factors the court 
can have regard to in determining whether a risk is “significant”, the court is able to direct its 
attention to whether the medical professional conducts a bilateral discussion with the patient 
to bring home in a meaningful way the risks associated with certain procedures. Whilst the 
nature of the community’s legal practices surrounding standards of disclosure may mean the 
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legal standard does not go as far as the ethical one, these greater concerns are at least (again) 
symbolically important.
160
 
However, because of this legal standard and conception of autonomy, a counterintuitive, 
potentially dangerous situation for the medical professional regarding risk disclosure may 
occur. For example: a woman comes in to discuss cosmetic breast surgery with her medical 
practitioner. Around 1 in 20 women can be left with more severe scarring, resulting from 
surgery.
161
 But, as a result of discussions, the medical practitioner has learned this patient 
places an extremely high ‘premium on having the perfect bust’.162 The patient is calm, willing 
to take all the risks occurring resulting from surgery, and readily comprehends the procedure 
will involve some sort of scarring. In this situation, the medical practitioner might reasonably 
conclude, if such factors overwhelmingly point in one direction, more severe scarring, to this 
patient, is not a significant risk. Nonetheless, as there is approximately a 5% risk of severe 
scarring, such a risk would be (at least on initial reflection) classed as a material one a 
reasonable patient would wish to know. But, this seems to lead to the counterintuitive result 
that if the medical practitioner was not to disclose this risk, as only those risks that are ‘both 
“significant” and “material”’163 must be disclosed, it may be the medical practitioner, if such 
a result did occur as a result of the breast surgery and the patient was not warned, would not 
be legally negligent.
164
 The question arises whether the doctor should still inform the patient 
of these risks. 
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It is here the importance of ethics informing the law comes to the fore. As shown in the 
ethical analysis, the GMC guidance on consent is ‘authoritative and influential in this 
area’.165 The formal (and less so) semi-formal sectors of discourse are not only the primary 
standards the medical profession should follow but the primary reference point for the court 
regarding the standards the medical profession should follow. Turning to our problem, the 
GMC guidance outlined above would require as an overriding duty disclosing the risk of 
more severe scarring. Failure to do so would put the doctor’s registration at risk.166 Further, 
where a risk could be classed as significant to the patient in the circumstances, the GMC 
guidance states medical professionals should be tailoring their discussions with patients to 
take into account a number of personal factors. Indeed, at one point the guidance goes further, 
stating ‘[i]n assessing the risk to an individual patient, you must consider the nature of the 
patient’s condition, their general health and other circumstances’.167 
Thus, it is clear on reflection the formal sector’s ethical guidance regarding consent provides 
a higher standard than law. Legally therefore ‘doctors will be required to do no more than the 
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GMC already requires’.168 This guidance does perform an effective regulatory function. It 
also means the counterintuitive scenarios considered should not occur in practice, if the 
guidance and legal standards are followed.  
So, as the legal and ethical standards work together well in this scenario on reflection, a clear 
categorisation of which sources of medical ethics should be considered by the medical 
profession and the court can be articulated, to begin the process of defragmenting medical 
ethics. Again, both the court and the medical profession should consult first the GMC’s 
guidance on consent as the ethical standard. Insofar as semi-formal sectors of discourse refer 
to the GMC’s guidance, they are also to be considered. They further emphasise how 
important the GMC’s guidance on consent is. The unofficial sector of discourse should not be 
used insofar as to ascertain what specific standards the medical profession should follow.  
Having set out the relationship between the law and ethics regarding standards of disclosure, 
the legal question on point must now be discussed; whether Ms Chester has a right to recover 
damages following a negligent failure to warn, despite her being unable to prove on the 
balance of probabilities “but for” this negligence, she would not have consented to the 
surgery. 
2.2.2.3. Causation 
In dealing with the proposition of law immediately above, important cases which deal with 
principles of causation must be examined. This is to set out in the best way possible the 
principles underlying Mr Afshar’s claim. This case law will also show how Ms Chester’s 
ethical right to make an informed choice regarding the procedure (this principle linking the 
issues surrounding standards of disclosure and causation in medical negligence claims) can 
be fully vindicated. All elements of the legal case flow from the ethical analysis above. There 
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it was shown why the rationale behind relaxing the rules of causation was so important. The 
law can vindicate this right that has been violated,
169
 ‘consistent[ly] with principle and also 
with authority’.170 Moreover, it shall be shown how the gravitational force of the arguments 
of principle (both political-moral and ethical) justifying standard of disclosure cases lead to 
the following conclusion: in order to see legal practice in the best light possible, Ms Chester 
has a right for the rules of causation to be relaxed, so that our legal system is less divided into 
relatively unconnected subsystems of principles. 
Though space precludes a detailed discussion, two cases on causation are appropriate. First, 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services,
171
 where it was held ‘[o]n occasions the threshold 
“but for” test of causal connection may be over exclusionary’.172 More specifically in that 
case ‘by proving that the defendants individually materially increased the risk that the men 
would develop mesothelioma due to inhaling asbestos fibres, the claimants [were] taken in 
law to have proved that the defendants materially contributed to their illness’.173 It was 
sufficient, for causation purposes, the breach of the duty of care substantially contributed to 
the risk that eventually occurred.
174
 Second, though it is an Australian case, Chappel v 
Hart
175
 is also influential as the facts are very similar to those in question here. It was held in 
Chappel the patient was entitled to recover damages for the injury she suffered, of which she 
was not warned. This was despite it not being shown the patient would not have had surgery 
at all, but that she would not have had it when she did, and would have sought out the most 
experienced surgeon to perform the operation.
176 
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Indeed, these help to frame the principles underlying Mr Afshar’s claim. To vindicate Ms 
Chester’s ethical right to respect for autonomy, Mr Afshar was under a duty to warn her, as 
the risk was inherent in the surgery, and thus was foreseeable. But, generally, ‘[t]he purpose 
of a duty to warn someone against the risk involved in what he proposes to do, or allow to be 
done to him, is to give him the opportunity to avoid or reduce that risk’. However, here, Ms 
Chester was both ‘unable and unwilling to take that opportunity’.177 There was no way of 
minimising the inherent risk in the surgery. It was ‘liable to occur at random irrespective of 
the degree of care and skill with which the operation was conducted by the surgeon. This 
means that the risk would have been the same whenever and at whoever’s hands she had the 
operation’.178 Thus although Ms Chester contended she would have not gone ahead with the 
operation at the particular time she did, it is irrelevant at what time she would have 
undergone surgery and who performed it. Mr Afshar’s mistake in not warning Ms Chester, 
though serious enough in itself, had no untoward results which can be properly attributed to 
it.
179
 
Mr Afshar’s case is supported by the principle highlighted in Chappel that: 
To burden a surgeon, in whose actual performance no fault could be found, with civil 
liability for randomised chance events that followed the surgery would not be 
reasonable. It would penalise him for chance alone. It would do nothing to establish a 
superior standard in the performance of the work of surgeons generally.
180 
Further, Mr Afshar’s case gains some support from the analogous situation whereby there is 
more than one person is liable for injury to a person. It is clear the extension of the scope of a 
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defendant’s liability must be exceptional in the latter circumstance ‘because of the adverse 
consequences which the lowering of the threshold will have for the defendant. He will be 
held responsible for a loss the plaintiff might have suffered even if the defendant had not 
been involved in at all. To impose liability on a defendant in such circumstances normally 
runs counter to ordinary perceptions of responsibility’.181 It may be argued by analogy this 
causal connection falling outside the scope of the principle is materially the same as the 
causal connection in Mr Afshar’s case. It was also stated by every Law Lord in Fairchild that 
such principles should be limited.
182
 Finally, and even more explicitly, Lord Hoffman states: 
It is true that actions for clinical negligence notoriously give rise to difficult questions 
of causation. But it cannot possibly be said that the duty to take reasonable care in 
treating patients would be virtually drained of content unless the creation of a material 
risk of injury were accepted as sufficient to satisfy the causal requirements for 
liability.
183 
Mr Afshar’s case therefore weighs very heavily. But these arguments are an attempt to show 
the best justification of medical negligence law contains a moral principle meaning Mr 
Afshar is not liable to pay damages in this case.
184
 As such, the best interpretation of past 
political decisions regarding standards of disclosure, and the ethical analysis and principles 
serving as justifying premises for this interpretation cannot be discounted. 
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An alternative view of the facts can be taken, which complements the ethical rationale behind 
the legal standard of disclosure in medical negligence claims. Much like in Chappel,
185
 Ms 
Chester was anxious to avoid surgery if at all possible.
186
 It was clear this risk was a 
significant one to Ms Chester, and ‘the obtaining of adequate advice as to the risks involved 
was a central concern of [Ms Chester] in seeking and agreeing to undergo the surgical 
procedure in question’.187 In addition, without Mr Afshar’s negligent failure to warn, ‘the 
injury would not have occurred when it did and, statistically, the chance of it occurring 
during an operation on another occasion was very small. Moreover, that failure was the very 
breach of duty which the plaintiff alleges caused her injury’.188 Mr Afshar’s argument that ‘as 
surgery was inevitable and the risk which eventuated was inherent in that surgery, [Ms 
Chester therefore] didn’t in fact suffer any damage’189 is also questionable. This argument 
misses that the pertinent injury is the lack of respect shown to Ms Chester’s autonomy. It was 
shown in the ethical analysis why it is especially important to respect a person’s autonomy.190 
Ms Chester’s case is thus supported by the gravitational force of those ethical and political-
moral principles of equality of respect and respect for autonomy. It is also supported by the 
more general principle that ‘[i]t would…be unjust to absolve the medical practitioner from 
legal responsibility for her injuries by allowing decisive weight to hypothetical and 
problematic considerations of what could have happened’191 to Ms Chester had she 
undertaken surgery at a later date, in conditions of yet further unpredictability.  
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Therefore, there are two competing interpretations of the case, each of which fits and is 
justified by different political-moral principles, neither of which are directly on point. Which 
proposition is justified is therefore to be determined by answering which interpretation flows 
from the system of principles showing medical negligence law in its best light. To this end, it 
is vital to include the ethical analysis showing the point and importance of respect for 
autonomy, what this entails, and its applicability to Ms Chester’s scenario. Whilst dimensions 
of fit are still pertinent in answering this question, they do not help any further in deciding 
which interpretation is best, all things considered. The system of principles underlying issues 
surrounding standards of disclosure captures both an important and wide ranging issue. 
Alternatively, Fairchild deals with principles fundamental to negligence law as a whole. Both 
interpretations, if therefore accepted, would show a degree of damage to integrity, making 
them (at least initially) a less than completely satisfactory interpretation. Further, the 
principle justifying Ms Chester’s proposition of law has not been explicitly recognised in 
English law. Whilst integrity demands the initial best interpretation of past political decisions 
is one which shows judges clearly stating which path later judges should follow, this has to 
be balanced against the more substantive ethical and political-moral principles arguing for 
this interpretation. Whilst more procedural values may be specified so as to take on a less 
prominent role, it is more important the interpretation fits what judges did as opposed to what 
they said.
192 
Thus, the more evidently normative dimensions of the legal framework’s moral epistemology 
must be emphasised. The argument it would be unjust or unfair to hold Mr Afshar liable is 
premised on the following principled specification: a medical practitioner ought to take 
reasonable care in treating patients, in particular their ethical right to have their autonomy 
respected by being told of all those significant risks material to the informational needs of a 
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reasonable patient. Yet it would be unfair to be penalised for a random event inherent in 
surgery, despite not warning the patient of this event. This specification directs us to the 
conclusion there is no causal connection between Mr Afshar’s negligence and Ms Chester’s 
injury. However, this principled specification is not as coherent a specification with those 
fundamental principles of equality the legal and bioethical frameworks’ serve as the one that 
supports Ms Chester’s case. Ethically, autonomy is worthy of respect as it protects the 
capacity to lead our lives according to our own value-systems. This means a person must be 
in control as a result of information provision concerning surgery. There must be an effort by 
the medical practitioner to promote appropriate comprehension. A patient can only authorise 
something on the basis of this control. As this ethical right of respecting a patient’s autonomy 
is especially important, if it is infringed by a medical practitioner negligently failing to warn a 
patient about risks in surgery to the required legal standard, and those risks eventuate, they 
should be held liable for the eventuation of those very risks. This specification signals 
causation principles must be relaxed in this instance, as Mr Afshar did cause the harm Ms 
Chester suffered. He did not cause harm by the advice he failed to give her, but by operating 
on her with adverse outcomes. Mr Afshar is responsible for the consequences of his 
actions.
193 
This is a more coherent interpretation as it correctly recognises the issues are ethical in 
nature. It therefore gives due regard to the ethical analysis above, as it is only once this 
analysis has been undertaken can the real issues at stake be really understood. More legally, 
this interpretation allows the gravitational force of the principles of respect for autonomy to 
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inferentially connect both compartments of law concerning risk disclosure and causation. 
Inconsistency in the law hidden in compartmentalisation potentially allows unprincipled 
distinctions to decisively define and distinguish departments. Such potential arbitrary 
inconsistency shows little genuine equality of respect and concern for others.
194
 To endorse 
the principle supporting Mr Afshar’s case would give too little weight to the importance of 
those principles of respect for autonomy that are inferentially connected to the fundamental 
principles of equality of respect. These principles link and are applicable across the domains 
of bioethics and law. This means the ethical principles constitute and serve as justifying 
premises for those political-moral principles that are so important in justifying case law 
concerning standards of disclosure. To limit the principles in this way would, pace Lord 
Hoffman, empty the content of a medical practitioner’s duty of care to respect the autonomy 
of patients to such a significant degree that the community’s legal practices would not be 
seen in their best light. Legal sanction must be given to the ‘underlying moral responsibility 
for causing injury of the very sort against the risk of which the defendant should have warned 
her’;195 ‘the duty is one intended to create a civil right to compensation for injury relevantly 
connected with its breach’.196 
More positively, Lord Hoffman’s comments in Fairchild can be used to show why the 
principle supporting Ms Chester’s case is a better interpretation. He states ‘what amounts to a 
relevant causal connection…depends upon the purpose of the inquiry’.197 Further, he notes 
causation is a question of fact: ‘whether the causal requirements which the law lays down for 
that particular liability have been satisfied’. Importantly though, ‘those requirements exist by 
virtue of rule of law. Before one can answer the question of fact, one must formulate the 
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question. This involves deciding what, in the circumstances of the particular case, the law’s 
requirements are’.198 From this, the key point Lord Hoffman makes is ‘the causal 
requirements are as much part of the legal conditions for liability as the rules which prescribe 
the kind of conduct which attracts liability or the rules which limit the scope of that 
liability…one is never simply liable, one is always liable for something’.199 
Thus, in this scenario, the departments concerning standards of disclosure and causation are 
best seen as inextricably linked: 
The concepts of fairness, justice and reason underlie the rules which state the causal 
requirements of liability for a particular form of conduct (or non-causal limits on that 
liability) just as much as they underlie the rules which determine that conduct to be 
tortious. And the two are inextricably linked together: the purpose of the casual 
requirement rules is to produce a just result by delimiting the scope of the liability in a 
way which relates to the reason why liability for the conduct in question exists in the 
first place.
200
 
Therefore, as the requirements of causation are sensitive to the point underlying and 
justifying the legal standards surrounding risk disclosure, emphasis must be given to these 
principles of equality of respect and respect for autonomy. One significant feature of this case 
is the duty to disclose specifically flows from the ethical analysis conducted above. 
Moreover, because the system of principles of respect for autonomy and equality of respect is 
pervasive across the domains of bioethics and law, a state that wishes to treat all people with 
equal concern requires disclosure in this case, due to the legal standard of disclosure, 
constituted by the ethical case that has been made. The value of respect for autonomy has 
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been shown in this chapter and the previous one. Therefore the development of these 
standards is for the best reasons. When these standards are breached, it should cause little 
shock there will be legal consequences. Whilst a patient must accept the inherent risk of 
injury in every surgical procedure, such a risk was inherent to this operation. When these 
risks did occur, given the appropriate emphasis on those principles of respect for autonomy, 
this supports the conclusion more than an irrelevant cause has occurred. This conclusion is 
reinforced by the very fact Ms Chester would not have undergone the operation at that 
specific time if duly warned. It is more in accordance with protecting and respecting the 
capacity to express one’s own character-values for Mr Afshar to be made an insurer against 
the risks he failed to warn of.
201
 
Further, it is within our law to be able to relax the principles of causation in this way, if done 
on a sufficiently principled basis. Though all the law lords in Fairchild were unanimous in 
limiting the instances in which the causation principles could be relaxed and in stating the 
rule’s scope (at least as it relates to materially similar cases to Fairchild) should be clear,202 it 
was also explicitly recognised ‘[i]t would be unrealistic to suppose that the principle here 
affirmed will not over time be the subject of incremental and analogical development’203. 
Nonetheless, the principles justifying parting from the “but for” test ‘must be sufficiently 
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weighty to justify depriving the defendant of the protection this test normally and rightly 
affords him, and it must be plain and obvious this is so’.204  
As has been highlighted above, the principles underpinning Ms Chester’s claim are 
sufficiently weighty to be able to justify departing from this test, analogous to the situation in 
Fairchild. Thus, the proposition of law justified in this case is Ms Chester has a right to 
recover damages following Mr Afshar’s negligent failure to warn her of a small but inherent 
risk of surgery, despite it cannot be asserted conclusively that “but for” Mr Afshar’s 
negligence, Ms Chester would not have consented to the surgery at all. It is sufficient for 
causation purposes here Ms Chester would not have consented to the operation at the time 
she did.
205 
3. Comparative evaluation 
It has been shown the system of principles providing the best interpretation of our political 
community’s legal practices is one which justifies the proposition that Mr Afshar’s negligent 
failure to warn of the inherent risk in Ms Chester’s surgery caused the injury for which she 
claimed.
206
 This is coherent with the ethical analysis that Ms Chester ought to be informed of 
a small but inherent risk of surgery involved in the spinal operation before she consents to the 
operation. A brief comparative analysis shall now be undertaken with the original judgments 
in Chester. This analysis will highlight not only the differences in approach with the 
integrated framework set out here, but more importantly, why the approach taken under this 
framework is better, all things considered. This is because of the ethical sophistication of this 
decision-making framework. 
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First, it is clear the judgment here, in considering explicitly the ethical issues surrounding Ms 
Chester’s case, how such ethical issues interlink and can be integrated into the legal decision, 
is much more ethically aware and engaged than Lord Hoffman’s conservative judgment in 
Chester.
207
 Indeed, given the simple assertion of autonomy by Lord Walker, and Lord 
Bingham’s non-identification of the right to be appropriately warned as an ethical right,208 the 
judgment here is much more ethically sophisticated than these judgments as well. 
Additionally, it was analysed (in this chapter and the previous one) what conception of 
respect for autonomy the bioethical framework was committed to, and why this conception is 
preferable. The implications of this conception for the ethically appropriate standards of 
disclosure were then also analysed. It was then shown how this ethical conception of respect 
for autonomy was to be prioritised within the legal scenario. This analysis therefore laid 
down, as far as possible, future guidance regarding how the principle of respect for autonomy 
is to be prioritised and implemented. This shows again an understanding of, and sensitivity 
to, the ethical nature of judicial decision-making. Whilst not forgetting the problematic 
development of case law surrounding standards of disclosure since Chester,
209
 even in 
comparison to Lord Steyn’s judgment in Chester, such an analysis here is more ethically 
proactive and structured, and provides clearer guidance for future courts.  
This leads on to the related point that the integrated framework here correctly identifies the 
issues discussed as ones of principle. This is in contrast to the misidentification of both Lord 
Steyn and Lord Hope in Chester that the issues to be discussed are ones of policy.
210
 In turn, 
these misidentifications mean, in not recognising the true nature of the arguments, both Lords 
Hope and Steyn have reached the correct conclusion, but through the wrong reasoning. The 
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decision-making framework here corrects this flaw, providing a more ethically and legally 
sophisticated judgment, consistent with the principles underpinning the judicial role.
211
 
Third, this decision-making framework has explicitly considered whether the formal sector of 
ethical discourse relating to standards of disclosure performs an effective regulatory function. 
It has also been highlighted why the formal sector of discourse should be looked at by the 
court first, if the court wishes to ascertain the primary standards the medical profession 
should follow. The framework has also explicitly highlighted the formal sector of discourse 
provides the primary standards the medical profession should follow. In recognising the 
effective regulatory function the formal sector of discourse performs, this sector has been 
prioritised. In this way there has been the beginnings of an attempt to defragment medical 
ethics through categorisation. Finally, there has been an explicit consideration of how the 
formal sector of discourse interlinks and integrates with the law, to provide comprehensive 
guidance regarding the doctor’s legal and ethical duty. This is in comparison to those judges 
who actually engaged with medical ethics, those who did doing so in a less structured, 
sophisticated way than outlined here.
212 
Thus, in concluding this section, the judgment here no longer means the relationship between 
medical law and medical ethics in the informed consent/risk disclosure scenario has to be 
seen as fortuitous. Principles of autonomy in all their manifestations (be they ethical or 
political-moral) pervasive throughout the entire discussion in this chapter are given due 
weight and priority. It has also been comprehensively analysed in each scenario (ethical, in 
dealing with different sources of ethical discourse, legal and the interaction of all three) how 
and why such principles should be promoted, and what such principles mean. Thus, whilst 
the outcome of the decision here is the same as the majority in Chester, the decision-making 
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framework has been used here to come to a far greater legally and ethically responsible 
decision.   
4. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has sought to conclude and definitively answer the central research question set, 
by providing an example of how, under the decision-making framework constructed, a 
judgment can be given that recognises the inherent ethical issues at stake and tackles them in 
a proactive, responsible manner. Moreover, the judgment has shown how the integration of 
the legal and ethical frameworks operates in practice. Finally, there has been an explicit 
consideration of the various, multi-faceted roles that medical ethics as a concept does, and 
ought to, play. Thus, it is clear that the decision-making framework constructed in this thesis 
can be provided to judges as it recognises and shows how to analyse the ethical nature of 
judicial decision-making. The decision-making framework also shows judges how to rely on 
their convictions in applying moral principles and medical ethics to come to a legally and 
ethically responsible decision. The theoretical justification for courts to take a more proactive 
approach to both legal and ethical issues involving informed consent and risk disclosure has 
been fully provided. The subsequent chapter shall now conclude and summarise the findings 
of this thesis.
303 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Here is what has been learned. This thesis has attempted to answer a central research 
question: 
“Can an appropriate decision-making framework be provided to judges that 
recognises the ethical nature of judicial decision-making so as to provide confidence 
to judges in relying on their convictions in applying moral principles and medical 
ethics to come to a legally and ethically responsible decision?” 
It has been shown, through a series of subsidiary research questions, such a framework can be 
provided, and is practicable in nature. What prompted this central research question, 
attendant subsidiary research questions, and further investigation, was the findings made and 
conclusions set out in chapter one.  
In that chapter it was shown, using José Miola’s Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A 
Symbiotic Relationship,
1
 that medical law and ethics depend on each other to their mutual 
detriment. This is due to three elements, two of which are of primary importance to this 
thesis. First, there is so much “medical ethics” discourse today, in the form of official and 
unofficial guidelines and analysis. Coupled with no coherent mechanism for prioritising one 
set of guidelines over another, from the medical professional’s point of view and looking at 
the practices of the courts, these sources of discourse cancel each other out. Second, judges 
aggravate these matters by medicalising and deferring matters to the medical profession, even 
in cases with an inherently ethical, not technical-medical, content. Moreover, when judges do 
recognise ethical content in cases, they continue to act as if the various guidelines 
promulgated by the formal and semi-formal sectors of discourse, the GMC and BMA, do 
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effectively regulate the medical profession. This deference is falsely premised. Thus, the 
courts need to identify and rectify this problem.
2
 
These arguments were demonstrated by evaluating two major cases involving informed 
consent/risk disclosure; Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors
3
 and Chester v 
Afshar
4
. The analysis of Sidaway showed the majority of judges misidentified the ethical 
matter as medical in nature. This lead to numerous unjustifiably paternalistic judgments, with 
a resultant lack of focus on the patient in the doctor-patient relationship. Only Lord Scarman 
recognised and prioritised the principle of respect for autonomy. Whilst the majority of 
judges in Chester delivered ethically aware judgments, when dealing with different sources 
of medical ethics, they did not do so in a sufficiently structured way. Further, matters of 
principle are often misidentified as matters of policy. Thus, whilst there is an effective 
relationship between medical law and ethics in the risk disclosure scenario, this relationship 
is accidental. Since Chester, courts have used comparably inconsistent, ethically 
unsophisticated conceptions of respect for autonomy. This has gone unrecognised. These 
conclusions reinforce the argument the courts do not understand the ethical nature of judicial 
decision-making. Consequently, chapter one showed how a project complementary to 
Miola’s investigations was possible, by showing theoretically the courts have the ability to 
realise the possibility of taking the initiative in dealing with the inherent ethical nature of 
judicial decision-making. 
Having mapped out the current state of medical law and ethics concerning risk disclosure, it 
was determined a legal theory which fits and justifies judicial practices, and could also be 
used as a critical tool was needed.  Further, this legal theory would need to be thoroughly 
integrated with a bioethical framework to show how judges can deal with the inherent ethical 
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content in risk disclosure cases responsibly. The starting point in discerning which legal 
theory was appropriate, given the focus on the role of moral principles in the case analysis in 
chapter one, was to look specifically at the role moral principles play in the types of cases 
under consideration. 
Chapter two thus went on to answer the more specific research question “What role d]o moral 
principles play in hard cases?” Two theories of law were considered: a modern version of 
positivism defended by Matthew Kramer, and Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law. Both theories 
provide competing explanations regarding the role of moral principles in hard cases. It was 
shown Kramer’s positivism, which analysed the use of moral principles by judges in hard 
cases as existing “externally” to “the law” and then being incorporated, did not accurately 
capture legal practice. It also did not satisfactorily explain how judges can take a more 
proactive attitude by using moral principles. Problems that befell Kramer’s positivism 
included the supposed convention legal officials adhere to, to ascertain the law in hard cases, 
is so abstract almost any legal practice could be counted as conventional. Further, such an 
abstract convention makes legal reasoning indistinguishable, and eliminates the notion of a 
“convention” itself.5 This is not only because of the substance of the disagreements in hard 
cases, but also the level and scale of these disagreements. Meanwhile, the chapter also 
provided a comparative analysis of the way Kramer’s theory explains the characteristics of 
moral principles of hard cases, relative to Dworkin’s theory of law. This highlighted moral 
principles are able to provide partially exclusionary reasons-for-action in resolving hard 
cases; and, it is best to understand the provenance of moral principles as subsumed within the 
larger interpretive question for Dworkin of constructively interpreting the law. 
Relative to Kramer’s positivism Dworkin’s theory of law is therefore preferable. Thus, as 
evaluative considerations necessarily feature in the truth conditions of propositions of law, 
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this strengthens the claim judges have the ability to take a more proactive stance in cases with 
an inherently ethical content. Further, Dworkin’s sound contention there is a right answer in 
hard cases partially alleviates problems in the three-element analysis above, by providing a 
method for prioritising and eliminating competing principles (leading to less fragmentation 
and cancelling out). But, a more positive case for Dworkin’s theory of law needed to be 
given, one that showed why elements central to his interpretive theory, including the value he 
postulates for law, integrity, is beneficial in explaining how judges can come to a legally and 
ethically responsible, proactive decision. 
As explained in chapter three therefore, integrity is the value law should be seen through, not 
Stephen Guest’s theory of ‘law as justice’6. A greater understanding regarding the underlying 
justificatory structure of Dworkin’s theory was provided, in order to best understand how 
B&C’s and Dworkin’s theories could be integrated. This better understanding was gained by 
answering the question “What role does coherence play in Dworkin’s account of law?” It was 
demonstrated integrity was best understood as having a coherentist structure, as was 
Dworkin’s process of constructive interpretation. Coherence was defined as constituted by 
the elements of consistency, mutual explanation and anomaly elimination, with coherentism 
based on a holistic structure of justification. It was argued, looking at Dworkin’s discussion 
of checkerboard solutions and associative obligations, the demands of integrity express an 
endorsement of the technical conception of coherentism above. Specifically, in looking at 
Dworkin’s discussion of checkerboard solutions, it was argued integrity demands coherence 
with those fundamental principles of equality underpinning the entire legal system. This 
highlights their legitimising and regulating function. The best explanation as to why 
checkerboard solutions are objectionable is because they display incoherence with equality. 
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It was then argued we do well to see integrity through this conception of coherence. This was 
done in the context of Stephen Guest’s arguments against integrity. First though, the chapter 
demonstrated Guest’s problems with constructive interpretation could be solved be recourse 
to coherentist considerations. By distinguishing between security within and outside the 
interpretive process, and the different levels of security a conviction can have within the 
interpretive process, Dworkin’s account of constructive interpretation can fix the object to be 
interpreted, whilst not requiring that object to be outside the interpretive process. This led to 
the larger conclusion that as constructive interpretation and integrity are best understood as 
structured by coherentism, it is natural the latter flows from the former in Dworkin’s theory 
of law. The case of Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill
7
 demonstrated that as both Guest and 
Dworkin endorse the fundamental principle of equality of respect,
8
 what is important in 
securing equality of respect is the coherentist manner of legal argument demanded by 
integrity. Equality of respect makes demands of integrity and coherence in the long run. 
Given it had thus been demonstrated Dworkin’s theory of law was the appropriate legal 
framework to answer the central research question, the next step was to analyse the other side 
of the integrated framework—the ethical framework. Chapter four therefore began to analyse 
and re-interpret B&C’s bioethical theory, by answering the research question “What is the 
best interpretation of B&C’s framework with regards to moral justification so as to come to 
an epistemically responsible decision regarding a moral course of action?” After outlining 
B&C’s common morality theory, the initially most plausible interpretation regarding B&C’s 
common morality and moral justification is the theoretically comprehensible position of 
moderate foundationalism, as B&C maintain the beliefs in the common morality do not 
depend on any other beliefs for their justification. This is regardless of the prominence they 
attach to the coherentist process of reflective equilibrium. This was important to establish, as 
                                                          
7
 (1978) 437 US 153. 
8
 Guest, IEJ (n6) 8 (online). 
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it meant foundationalism as a structural account of justification had to be considered on its 
own merits.  It was found there was no way a moral belief could be justified in virtue of 
itself. Therefore, though B&C’s common morality moderate foundationalism is theoretically 
comprehensible, it is inadequate in depicting the justificatory structure of our moral beliefs.  
Having made this negative claim, a more positive case for adopting a moral coherentism as 
the best structural standard for B&C’s common morality theory was made. This was done by 
considering B&C’s objection to coherentism, their version of the “isolation problem”. This 
problem contends coherence does not provide a sufficient justificatory standard, as those 
coherent beliefs could be morally repugnant. Given the earlier rejection of foundationalism, 
and as B&C raise this problem, it was noted B&C only had two options available: either 
embrace non-moral basic beliefs, or adopt a pure moral coherentist account. Pure moral 
coherentism was shown to be able to deal with the isolation problem. This is due to the best 
conception of moral objectivity being one where moral truth is achieved solely through moral 
argument. Further, even though it was shown moral beliefs have no causal effects in our 
forming moral convictions, it was also set out how there are still cogent reasons for thinking 
moral values objectively true. Thus, it is best B&C adopt a moral coherentist approach when 
considering in detail the interaction of beliefs in a coherentist system, the nature of 
interpretive concepts, and moral objectivity as a matter of moral argument. 
Having begun to explain how judges should deal with the ethical content in risk disclosure 
cases, and how B&C’s theory is best characterised, chapter five sought to directly integrate 
B&C’s ethical theory and Dworkin’s theory of law. It did so by answering the research 
question “How should B&C’s four-principles approach influence cases with an inherently 
ethical content, when used as an example of Dworkinian principles in law?” The answer to 
this in fact asserted B&C’s principles are not best seen as principles. They are best seen as 
four interpretive concepts and values. These values best justify paradigm features of 
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bioethical practices. B&C’s theory satisfies further characteristics that enable it to be 
integrated seamlessly with Dworkin’s theory of law. Not only is B&C’s theory best seen as 
coherentist and interpretive, it also adheres to an interpretive moral epistemology, and is 
interpretive in the right way. Morality as a whole, and B&C’s common morality, is based 
upon an interpretive project. This means B&C’s four-principles are intrinsically linked to the 
common morality, and are the best way of implementing the norms of the common morality. 
This makes the decisions in question the most justifiable and genuine they can be. This 
adherence to an interpretive moral epistemology, and B&C’s four interpretive values securing 
the norms of the common morality means there are the same fundamental demands of 
principle/equality across the domains of law and bioethics. The network of value Dworkin’s 
theory of law and B&C’s bioethical theory is situated in is the following. Both theories’ 
starting points are in the interpretive concept of morality. Morality then branches out in to 
separable domains of the common morality, and political morality. Finally, the four values 
dealing with bioethical practices are part of the common morality, just as law is part of 
political morality. Dworkin’s and B&C’s theories are able to be integrated as the justification 
of those political-moral principles a community committed to equality does best to endorse, 
particularly in cases with an inherent ethical content, are premised on and constituted by the 
ethical case for them. 
These theoretical investigations laid the foundations for the switch of focus in chapter six to 
actually applying the framework constructed. This chapter showed judges, in recognising the 
ethical nature of judicial decision-making, how to apply moral principles and medical ethics 
in cases with an inherently ethical content. In reinterpreting Chester, the chapter was able to 
explicitly show the real, ethical case behind Ms Chester’s claim to relax the rules of causation 
to allow her to recover despite not satisfying the “but for” test. This ethical analysis identified 
an ethically preferable conception of respect for autonomy, the point of which is the 
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protection of the capacity to express one’s character-values. This conception was then 
imposed upon informed consent practices, to restructure those practices in light of the point 
they serve. Importantly, this analysis showed which standard of disclosure was ethically 
preferable. All things considered, it is ethically preferable for the “reasonable patient” 
standard to be used initially, and supplement this where needed with further investigation into 
the particular patients’ requirements and circumstances. This ethical analysis was applied 
specifically to Ms Chester’s case to show it was ethically impermissible for Mr Afshar not to 
disclose the inherent risk of injury in surgery. It was then analysed in detail how this 
proposition was coherent with the GMC’s guidance on consent, and why confidence can be 
placed in this guidance by the courts to perform an effective regulatory role for the medical 
profession. Ms Chester’s legal claim was then discussed. As Ms Chester’s legal claim was 
premised upon her ethical one, the importance of her ethical right to have her autonomy 
respected and the ethical already case made out were shown to be of special significance in 
resolving the legal issues at stake. 
This legal analysis established the best interpretation of past political decisions regarding 
standards of disclosure is one where persons have their right to autonomy respected by being 
told of those significant risks material to the informational needs of a reasonable patient. A 
community discharges its duty to treat people with equal concern when due regard is had to 
the ethical rationale of respecting the ethically preferable conception of respect for autonomy, 
and effect is given to this rationale through political-moral principles, given the community’s 
adherence to the same fundamental principle of equality of respect as bioethical practices. 
The way different categories of ethical discourse interact with legal standards of disclosure 
for medical professionals and courts was then evaluated to show how the ethical discourse 
and legal standard work together to ensure patients’ autonomy is fully respected. Because of 
this, the process of defragmenting medical ethics could begin, by prioritising which sources 
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of medical ethics should first be considered by the medical profession and courts. Explicit 
issues of causation were then turned to. It was shown to endorse the principle supporting Mr 
Afshar’s case would give too little weight to the importance of those principles of respect for 
autonomy that are inferentially connected to the fundamental principles of equality of respect. 
These principles link and are applicable across the domains of bioethics and law. Finally, a 
comparative analysis with the original judgments in Chester was undertaken to show that 
though the decision reached in this case was the same as the majority in Chester, the 
decision-making framework has been used to come to a far greater ethically and legally 
responsible decision. 
To finally conclude, it was noted at the very beginning of chapter one Miola describes the 
symbiosis between medical ethics and law as mutually detrimental. However, it was also 
suggested that he saw this relationship was salvageable and had the potential for good. It is 
hoped this thesis has shown, through the integrated legal and ethical framework, just how 
good that relationship can be. The tools are readily available to generate a positive symbiosis 
between medical ethics and medical law.
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